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ABSTRACT
PROVIDING LOCATION SECURITY IN VEHICULAR
AD HOC NETWORKS
Gongjun Yan
Old Dominion University, 2010
Co-Directors: Dr. Stephan Olariu
Dr. Michele C. Weigle
Location is fundamental information in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs). Almost all VANET applications rely on location information. Therefore it is of importance to ensure location information integrity, meaning that location information
is original (from the generator), correct (not bogus or fabricated) and unmodified
(value not changed). We present validation mechanisms to provide location integrity
for VANETs. In the initial mechanism, we assume that all vehicles are equipped
with a radar, a GPS receiver, and a transceiver. Since radar has a limited radar
range and transceiver has a limited transmission range, we build network cells as a
security unit as well as a communication unit. To ensure the intra-cell position information integrity, we propose an active validation mechanism (called active location
integrity) that actively validates and enhances position security by enlisting the help
of on-board radar to detect neighboring vehicles and to confirm their announced
coordinates. Since radar is not currently installed in many vehicles, we weak the
assumption by removing radar from the vehicle’s equipments and propose the second mechanism (called passive location integrity) that maintains the mobility history
records of vehicles, called the Map History. Based on a vehicle’s Map History, we can
predict a region where the vehicle will be present. The predicted region can be used
to validate the announced position. In reality, vehicles are deployed with different
combinations of equipment and some old vehicles may not have these devices. We
address a validation mechanism (called general location integrity) which filtered and
refined the location measurements obtained by the above active and passive location
integrity methods. The three mechanisms above provide intra-cell position information integrity.
Since applications often involve position information of remote vehicles or entities
which are beyond a cell (ranging to miles), we provide inter-cell position integrity as

well. Vehicles request that neighbors or opposite-side vehicles check the announced
position information of remote vehicles. Both the request and response messages will
be propagated among cells. Because of the high mobility of vehicles, the routing
path is fragile. To improve location availability, we propose a stable routing scheme
which will select and maintain stable routing paths. Both selection and maintenance
of routing paths are based on a proposed probability analysis of VANET links. In
addition, plaintext location information, especially aggregated location information,
is vulnerable to attack as an attacker could easily modify the location information
and harm the location integrity. We propose both encryption/decryption and access
control mechanisms to provide location information confidentiality. The aggregated
position message is encrypted by a key which is a geographic location which specifies
a decryption region. Vehicles have to be physically present in the specified decryption region to decrypt or access the aggregated position information. As we can
ensure the position information confidentiality, integrity, and availability, we achieve
position information security based on the security requirements outlined in the CIA
model (confidentiality, integrity, and availability).
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The last few years have witnessed an unmistakable convergence of Vehicular Ad hoc
Networks (VANETs) that promise to revolutionize the way we drive. Various car
manufacturers, government agencies and standardization bodies have spawned national and international consortia devoted exclusively to VANETs. Examples include
the Car-2-Car Communication Consortium [5], the Vehicle Safety Communications
Consortium [6], and Honda’s Advanced Safety Vehicle Program [7], among others.
In addition, third party providers have already started to offer Internet access, distributed gaming, as well as other features of mobile entertainment.
There are ubiquitous safe and secure applications in VANETs. Most, if not all,
applications rely on location information. If the location information is not secured,
most applications will not function correctly. Therefore, we are motivated to propose
specially designed mechanisms to improve location information security.
In this chapter, we will introduce the basics of the specially designed mechanisms.
We start from advance vehicles, location and location applications. In addition, we
will introduce the threat model, the trusted information and the untrusted in information. With this information, we propose three mechanisms to improve location
confidentiality, location integrity, and location availability. The motivation and contributions of the thesis are also listed in this chapter.
I.1
I.1.1

VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORK BASICS
Advanced Vehicle

New technology brings not only streamlined design but also new devices to vehicles.
The new devices can extend vehicles’ capabilities in computing, communication and
sensing. The provision of on-board Global Positioning System (GPS) devices has
revolutionized driving. Similarly, the recent introduction of short-range radar in
some top-of-the-line models promises to reduce the number of fender-benders and
other accidents. In fact, on-board radar is already used in advanced cruise control
systems [8]. We base our vehicle model on the smart vehicle proposed by Hubaux et
al. [9]. Hubaux includes an Event Data Recorder (EDR), a GPS receiver, and radar
in his smart vehicle model. Specifically, vehicles represented in this dissertation are
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assumed to be equipped with the following features (all sections in this dissertation
will use these features unless specified):
 A wireless transceiver. The transceiver adopts the standard Dedicated Short

Range Communications (DSRC) [10] for fast communications which are shortrange wireless communication channels specifically designed for automotive use
and a corresponding set of protocols and standards (IEEE 802.11p [11, 12]).
The transmission range of DSRC is 300 meters. We assume that location
information can be modified by attackers before being transmitted by this
device. DSRC for intelligent transportation systems operates in the 5.9 GHz
band (U.S.) or 5.8 GHz band (Japan, Europe).
 A GPS receiver. The GPS receiver will provide accurate location for a vehi-

cle. The location information includes latitude, longitude, altitude, speed and
heading information.
 Radar [13, 14], such as microwave, infrared or ultrasonic radar. We assume that

the omni-directional radar can detect neighboring cars within line of sight in a
radius of 150 meters. Some cruise control systems already use this kind of radar.
Although the driver can visually confirm the objects detected by radar in some
cases, our system does not require human intervention at all. Vehicular radar
is only used active location integrity and general location integrity models.
 A unique ID. The ID device can be an electronic license plate [9], issued by

a registration authority annually. It is an electronically tagged number plate
which can identify a vehicle whether it is on the move or stationary. It is
also a standard-looking number plate with an embedded tamperproof, active,
RFID tag [15]. The tag is self-powered and independent of the vehicle’s power
systems. Once the number plate is fitted to the vehicle, the unique ID is
installed. No further modifications are needed. We assume that the ID can be
changed by attackers when they construct a location message. For example, an
attacker can launch a Sybil attack (a vehicle pretends to be many fake vehicles)
by using an electronic license plate test unit to generate fake IDs.
 A location key GeoLock black box. This device will convert a location into a

secret key which will be used in geographic location based encryption algorithm
discussed in Chapter V.

Page 3 of 169

 A digital map. The digital map is an electronic map (e.g. GPS navigation

Garmin digital map). Attackers cannot change other vehicles’ digital map.
 A computer center. The computer center will provide data processing, com-

puting and storage, etc.
 A virus checker. We will not discuss virus injection-based attacks.

In our model, vehicles with some of these devices (e.g. GPS, radar) are already
in production. For example, Toyota has developed a Pre-Crash Safety system [14]
which uses millimeter-wave radar to sense vehicles and obstacles on the road. Sensor
Technologies and Systems developed forward looking vehicle radar [13], which can
detect obstacles with a 150-meter range. Furthermore, GPS and a computing center
are popular vehicle accessories today. Since these components are already being installed in vehicles, there is no additional cost required to deploy our location security
techniques except a wireless transceiver.
Vehicles equipped with computing, communication and sensing capabilities will
be organized into a ubiquitous and pervasive network, i.e., Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs). VANETs can provide numerous services to travelers, mainly in
improved driving safety and comfort to passengers. For example, an accident occurs
in an intersection. An alert message will be generated by the infrastructure at the
intersection. The alert message includes the location, the accident time, and the
expected clearing time of the accident. All vehicles in the range of the transceiver
will receive this alert. The alert message will be further propagated by some of the
receivers on the basis of different routing protocols. All the vehicles received the alert
message will be informed about the accident.
I.1.2

VANET Applications

Although the initial impetus of VANETs was safety, many other applications have
been proposed or developed. Schoch et al. [1] partition the current VANET applications into four categories: active safety, public service, improving driving and
entertainment, shown in Table I.1.2. For the active safety application, there are
accident prevention applications (such as speed warning on curve or hill road, infrared visibility helper, blind spot helper) and accident warning applications (such
as accident awareness warning). The public service applications include emergency
reaction (e.g. fire truck localization) and support for authorities (e.g. stolen vehicle

Page 4 of 169

tacking and finding). The improved driving applications include enhanced driving
applications (e.g. the intelligent adaptive cruise control application and driving focus
helper) and the traffic efficiency applications (e.g. intelligent traffic flow management,
digital map update.) Applications such as Internet access anytime anywhere, multimedia play, and so on, can belong to entertainment applications. Therefore, the
above discussion shows that the active safety applications and the improving driving
applications can help the safety of driving. The public service applications and the
entertainment applications can improve the comfort of driving.
Most, if not all, applications in VANETs need location information to function
appropriately. For safety applications, vehicles need to know each other’s location to
avoid accidents. For public service applications, vehicles must be aware of the location of emergency vehicles to move aside for them. For entertainment applications,
both the location of vehicles and the location of resources are needed to provide a
high quality service. We now highlight some typical applications that rely on location
information:
 Incident management is an application that manages operations and actions

after an incident occurs. It includes incident detection, incident assistance, and
traffic recovery from the incident. Incident detection discovers the exact incident location and is the basis of the rest of the incident management operations
and actions.
 Collision warning is considered as the most important safety application. This

application warns drivers about an impending collision by sensing and calculating a safety distance from obstacles, like other vehicles, buildings or anything
that may cause a collision.
 Vehicle tracking is an application that allows car manufacturers, logistic com-

panies and other trusted parties to remotely monitor a vehicle’s location and
movement. The location information is collected, confirmed, and transmitted
to a central location server.
 Emergency vehicle avoidance is an application that alerts vehicle drivers to

give way to emergency vehicles like fire engines, medical ambulances, police
vehicles, military vehicles, etc. To avoid these vehicles, drivers have to know
the location of these vehicles and their own location.
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TABLE 1: VANET Applications [1]
Situations
Application examples
1.
Dangerous
1. Speed warning (curve, hill), 2. tunnel,
road features
low bridge warning, 3. traffic lights violaI. Active safety
tion warning
2.
Abnormal
1. Road condition sensing and warning
conditions
(wet, sand, icing, flooding), 2. visibility helper (infrared detection), 3. detour
warning.
3. Dangers of ac1. Intersection accident alert, 2. blind spot
cidents
and lane change warning, 3. backing car
warning, 4. front/rear collision warning, 5.
parking helper, 6. bikes/pedestrians crossing warning, 7. highway merge alert, 7.
left/right turn assistant
4. Accident oc1. Accident awareness warning
curred
1.
Emergency
1. Emergency vehicle approaching alert, 2.
reaction
II. Public service
emergency vehicle location/route awareness
2. Support for
1. Electronic vehicle plate/status, 2. elecauthorities
tronic driver license and identity, 3. stolen
vehicle tracking and finding
1.
Enhanced
1. Intelligent adaptive cruise control, 2.
III. Improved driving Driving
driver focus detection/alert, 3. driver
trainning/helper
2. Traffic Effi1. Broadcasting of accident, 2. intelligent
ciency
traffic flow management, 3. advanced navigation system, 4. digital map update, 5.
resource locator service (gas station, parking, hotel, food, etc.)
1. Vehicle Main1. Vehicle self diagnostics, 2. tires check 3.
tenance
repair notification
IV. Entertainment
2. Mobile Ser1. Internet access anytime anywhere, 2.
vices
music/movie share/watch, 3. short messaging
3. E-Commerce 1. Advertisement in traffic, 2. car rental
service, 3. parking reservation, 4. cargo
tracking; 5. toll auto-collection,
Purposes
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 Resource awareness is an application that informs drivers of resources nearby

like gas stations, parking lots, shopping centers, etc.
 Accident insurance claims and accident law enforcement are applications that

need accurate location information to determine accident liability.
I.1.3

Location Information

In VANETs, the location in a message can be part of the message as shown in Figure 1.a. Multimedia entertainment (movies, music, etc.) applications are examples
which use this type of message. The copyright of movie is restricted in a certain
region. The movie can be encrypted and be played in a certain decryption region.
We have to make sure the movie is not played beyond the decryption region. Ebusiness applications for VANETs (online shopping, toll payment collection, etc.)
can use this type message to enhance the security of messages. For example, credit
card information can be strictly encrypted and decrypted in a certain region. This
restriction will greatly enhance the security of credit card information. Alternatively,
the whole content of a message can be composed of location information, shown in
Figure 1.b. Military vehicle movement on the battlefield can use this type of message. The greedy location routing protocol for creating the VANET will use this type
of message. The location information of all vehicles is aggregated. The aggregated
location information can be strictly encrypted and decrypted in a specified decryption region to enhance the security of the location information. We also expect the
decryption region can move along with the receiver vehicle.

Location
Header

Data

Header

Location1
Location2

...

Locationn
(a)

(b)

FIG. 1: Two types of location messages: (a) location is part of the message and (b)
location is the whole content of the message.
Location information can be obtained from several devices, including GPS receiver, infrared scanner, etc. Since GPS imposes some constraints such as lack of
coverage in some environments or its weak robustness for some critical applications,
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other positioning techniques have been proposed for the vehicular field, including
cellular or WiFi localization, dead reckoning (by using last known last location information and velocity), ultrasound range sensors [16], and image/video localization
[17]. Critical safety applications such as cooperative collision warning and incident
management need highly accurate localization. Some comfort applications such as
parking reservation may benefit as well because an accurate positioning system can
define the zone of relevance more precisely. Other services, however, do not require
highly accurate localization, such as peer to peer applications, email clients, etc.
GPS location information in a vehicle is computed from received signals obtained
from satellites high above the Earth [18]. Each satellite constantly transmits messages
which include time, orbital information, and other satellite orbits. After receiving
the message by GPS receivers in vehicles, vehicles can obtain the synchronized time.
Vehicles use trilateration to compute their own locations. The location is displayed as
latitude, longitude, and altitude. In this thesis we only deal with a two-dimensional
coordinate system (latitude and longitude). Theoretically, three satellites are sufficient to compute a location. Since a small amount of clock error will result a large
location error (because the speed of light is large), in reality, a GPS receiver uses
more than three satellites to compute more precise locations. Some GPS receivers
also show derived information such as direction and speed, calculated from location
changes.
Location information can also be computed by using radio signals, infrared sensing, ultrasound and camera vision triangulation. If we think of GPS location as
absolute location, then this kind of location information is relative location. The
common computation basis is trilateration as well. Figure 2 shows the idea of trilateration. Vehicle D communicates with vehicle A, B, C through a transceiver. Vehicle
D receives radio signals from vehicles A, B, C. Therefore, D can compute the relative
location (a distance and an angle) of A, B,or C based on the received signal strength.

I.2
I.2.1

TRUST MODEL
Potential Attacks on Location Information

Since location information is fundamental and important in vehicular wireless networks, adversaries may attack the location information to harm the system in the
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C

D

A

B

FIG. 2: Location computed by using trilateration.

following ways [19]:
 Fabrication Attack. Attackers create a bogus message, lie about the location of

traffic congestion location, lie about identity, or lie about location. An attacker
can fabricate its own location and announce the fake location to its neighbors
and cell leader. An attacker (as a router) can fabricate other vehicle’s location
as a forwarded location packet.
 Alteration Attack. Attackers modify the location in the message. An attacker

can modify its own location information. As a cell leader or router, an attacker
can modify other vehicles’ location information as well.
 Packet Dropping. Attackers serving as routers can simply drop packets. As a

router, an attacker can drop packets directly to launch either a black-hole attack
(dropping all packets) or a gray-hole attack (selectively dropping packets).
 Replaying. A malicious attacker pretends to be a vehicle in the past. The

attacker re-injects previously received packets into the network. The attacker
will pollute a node’s location table by replaying beacons recorded in the past.
 Geographic Sybil Attack [19, 20]. The attacker pretends to be many other

vehicles with fake location information. The attacker advertises multiple IDs
and/or locations to mislead other nodes that high numbers of (non-existent)
neighbors exist. Communication across non-existing nodes is in full control of
the attacker; e.g., forwarded packets will be lost.
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I.2.2

CIA model

Papadimitratos et al. [21] proposed security requirements for VANETs. These requirements are the minimum requirements of the NIST, information C onfidentiality,
I ntegrity, and Availability (CIA) model [22]. The CIA model is widely used in information security [23, 24]. The goal of the CIA model in information systems is to
protect computers, software, and networks and the information they store, process
and transmit. The CIA model in this dissertation means the following:
 Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only au-

thorized users and preventing access by or disclosure to unauthorized individuals or systems.
 Integrity refers to the trustworthiness of location information. Information is

original (from the generator), correct (not bogus or fabricated) and unmodified
(value not changed).
 Availability refers, unsurprisingly, to the availability of location information, i.e.

providing information whenever the information is needed. The availability of
location information means that the protocol and service should be operational
even in the presence of malicious or benign faults.
I.2.3

Trusted Information

We trust the following information:
 Radar detection. We trust the location which is “seen” by radar. Since radar

detection has a measurement error which can be caused by shifting of the radar
signal, we consider measurement error in angle error 4θ and radius error 4γ.
 Oncoming traffic. Vehicles in oncoming traffic can report a vehicle’s location

if the oncoming vehicle has the location information. The oncoming vehicle
can obtain the location of a certain vehicle by using its radar. We trust this
information because attackers in the oncoming traffic will pay an extremely
high cost to launch a location attack. Even if there might be some attackers in
the oncoming traffic, they will pass by in a short time and the damage will be
minimal.
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 Secret key from D-GeoLock. Since we assume this device is tamper-proof, the

outputs of this device are trusted.
I.2.4

Untrusted Information

In this dissertation, the information that is protected is a tuple <time, ID, location>.
We want to provide confidentiality, integrity and availability of this tuple. Before our
security mechanism is applied, we assume that the attackers can change any value of
<time, ID, location>. For example, an attacker can create a faked tuple about its
own location. The attacker can modify time, ID or location value in other vehicles’
location tuple. We also assume that the location message (e.g. the aggregated
location message) is not signed by digital signature because we assume not all vehicles
have Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI).
I.3

MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES

The original impetus for the interest in VANET was provided by the need to inform
fellow drivers of actual or imminent road conditions, delays, congestion, hazardous
driving conditions and other similar concerns. In time, however, it was recognized
that the veracity of the traffic advisories is as important as the advisories themselves. A fabricated or doctored traffic advisory distributed by a malicious driver or
bystander is apt to create slow-downs and even severe congestion. This simple fact
of life has, in turn, spawned a substantial body of research in information security
in VANET. Almost all advisories and other traffic-safety related messages depend in
a critical way on location information. For example, traffic status reports, collision
avoidance, emergency alerts, cooperative driving, resource availability, driver assistance, insurance justification of accidents, and accident rescue, etc., directly rely on
location information. Online payment services, online shopping, and the like, mainly
focus on network access. However, most of the time, these applications involve local
services which need location information as well. Therefore accurate location information is of key importance. If location information is altered by malicious attackers,
these applications will not work at all and will not be adopted by the public.
Therefore, it is of importance to ensure the security of location information. Yet,
it has not been seriously addressed until recently. PKI is an important way to ensure
information confidentiality [25]. We assume there is a trusted authority. The trusted
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authority will generate keys for PKI. PKI has two keys, one is a public key which
will be known by everyone and the other is a private key which is known only by the
owner. The two keys are mathematically related each other, but the public key does
not disclose the private key (within a long enough time). The PKI algorithm is known
to all parties. If a public key is used by the PKI algorithm to encrypt information,
a ciphertext will be generated. The ciphertext can only be decrypted by using the
associated private key. The digital signature of a message often uses PKI to ensure
the information integrity. In the following example, we illustrate how the digital
signature works. A message M will be sent with a signed string SHA(KA− (M ), IDA )
where KA− (M ) is the encrypted message using private key of sender A and IDA is
the ID of the sender A. A digital signature can ensure the integrity of information
if the receiver computes the signature and validates the received signature. When
receiver B receives the message, B will compute the string SHA(KA+ (M ), IDA ) where
KA+ (M ) is the encrypted message using public key of sender A. PKI is naturely
adopted in VANET. For example, Hubaux et al. [9], Raya et al. [26], and Capkun
et al. [27] apply PKI to encrypt information. There has been some research using
digital signatures [28, 29, 30, 31] in VANETs as well.
On the other hand, PKI brings new challenges to VANETs. PKI includes both
the public key and the private key. The public key needs to be known by other
vehicles and the private key needs to be secretly stored. Therefore, key management
is one of the challenges because of the large scale of the vehicle population. Some
vehicles may have expired keys. To update the public and private keys, pervasive
infrastructure will be required. Another challenge is that PKI requires homogenous
configuration to achieve communication among vehicles. Some old vehicles may not
have PKI installed. In addition, the overhead of PKI in terms of processing time will
add significant processing time overhead to VANETs as well.
Several methods that try to provide location security for VANETs in the literature are presented. However, they all share the same shortcoming, namely that
they cannot offer a comprehensive location security solution in VANETs because
of the difficult network environment. In the literature, many information security
algorithms claim to use PKI to achieve security. But information security by PKI
encryption can only ensure confidentiality. PKI does not solve location integrity. A
malicious vehicle could sign bad location information. There is no validation of the
location information. For example in Figure 3, vehicle A and C can encrypt message
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to generate a ciphertext, but those without the secret key can not access it. But, C
can lie about its location, shown as C1 , C2 or C3 . Vehicle A has no way to know
about the lie. In addition, the ciphertext itself can be replayed.

A

C2

B

C
C1

D

C3

E

F

FIG. 3: Vehicle C lies about its location.
PKI does not solve location availability either. The main difficulty with location
availability is caused by the high mobility of vehicles. Encryption of messages cannot
help to select a reliable routing link and to disseminate message in a reliable way.
More importantly, in VANETs where multi-hop network connectivity is challenging, there is an ignored fact that location availability is fundamental. Location availability is a fundamental security feature of VANETs in which location information
is always available when the location information is needed. Without this feature,
location confidentiality and integrity have no value. Another ignored fact is that
location confidentiality and location integrity do not provide location availability. A
malicious vehicle can simply drop all of the messages that include location information. When location is needed most (e.g. in a collision avoidance application),
location of vehicles is not available.
Therefore, our goal is to provide comprehensive location security protection for all
applications in VANETs. Specifically, the objectives of this work are the following:
 achieve high location availability
 offer efficient location integrity
 provide feasible location confidentiality

Our goal of providing location confidentiality, integrity and availability satisfies
the CIA information security model.
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I.4

CONTRIBUTIONS

To ensure location information security in VANETs where the nodes have high mobility, we specially design mechanisms to ensure location confidentiality, location
integrity and location availability. We call this the location CIA model.
Since the value of location information decays with time and distance, the location
information of remote vehicles is often aggregated into a single packet. Because of
the high mobility of vehicles, the routing path which delivers the aggregated location
information packets is fragile. Location information that is not available when needed
is almost as bad as none at all. It may be much worse for many applications like
a traffic congestion notification application because drivers may be used to these
applications and rely on them. Without location availability, these applications will
not work when drivers need them most. To improve location availability, we propose
a stable routing scheme in the second mechanism. The scheme selects and maintains
stable wireless links which create a routing path. The selection and maintenance of
wireless links are based on a probability analysis model of VANET links.
Location integrity means that information is original, correct (not fabricated)
and unmodified (value not changed). We address a validation mechanism to provide
location integrity. In the initial solution, we assume that all vehicles are enlisted with
a radar, GPS, and transceiver. Since both radar and the transceiver have limited
ranges, we build network cells as a security unit as well as a communication unit. To
ensure the intra-cell integrity, our first proposed mechanism, active location integrity
is proposed to validate location information by enlisting the help of on-board radar
to detect neighboring vehicles and to confirm their announce location coordinates.
Since on-board radar is not currently installed in many vehicles, we propose a
second solution passive location integrity, which does not need radar. The observer
vehicle will send a location query of the observed vehicle and then will receive a set of
locations of the observed vehicle from the neighboring vehicles of the observer vehicle.
A statistical method is applied and the abnormal location values can be filtered out
by this method. The correct location estimation can be obtained by averaging the
remaining locations.
In reality, some vehicles have both on-board GPS and transceiver, some have
transceiver only, and some old vehicles do not have any of these devices. Therefore,
we propose the third validation solution to provide general location integrity under a
real environment. The observer vehicle will collect a set of locations of the observed
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vehicle from three data sources, radar detection, neighboring vehicles’ reports and
the on-coming vehicles’ reports. The general location integrity solution can filter out
the abnormal location values and obtain the validated location. These three solutions
ensure intra-cell location information integrity.
Moreover, we ensure inter-cell location information integrity as well because numerous applications (for example, traffic notification, road view, etc.) involve location information of remote vehicles or entities which are beyond a cell (ranging to
miles). Vehicles request that neighbors or on-coming vehicles check the announced
location information. Both the request and response messages will be propagated
among cells.
Given the insecure nature of wireless communication, the plaintext message is
vulnerable because an attacker can easily modify the location information and corrupt
location integrity. Therefore, we propose both encryption/decryption and access
control mechanisms to provide location confidentiality in the third mechanism. In
our approach, a special region (decryption region) is specified to the message receiver.
The receiver must physically present in the decryption region to decrypt the received
message. To achieve this idea, the receiver’s location information is converted part of
a key. We design an algorithm dynamic-GeoLock to convert the location information
into the key.
The relationship of the modules addressed above is shown in Figure 4. Integrity
prevents location information from alteration and fabrication. Confidentiality prevents location information from being exposed to unauthorized access. Availability
means information is available when needed. The three components of location confidentiality, integrity, and availability, are interrelated. For example, confidentiality
is often thought as information security by many people. However, confidentiality
cannot detect fabricated information because an attack can create bogus information
using the same encryption algorithm that regular vehicles use. Similarly, confidentiality does not improve information availability. As we can ensure the location information confidentiality, integrity, and availability, we achieve the location information
security based on the security requirements outlined in the CIA model.
We summarize the main contributions of this dissertation as follows:
1. Discovering link duration distribution: In our analytical expression, we discover
that the link duration has a log-normal distribution which is often assumed to
be an exponential distribution in the literature.
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FIG. 4: Relationship of the proposed modules.

2. Reducing control overhead in routing: Based on our probability model and
link duration time prediction, vehicles will send control messages only when
the routing path is going to expire soon. This will save control messages and
reduce control overhead.
3. Reducing response time in routing: Rebuilding a routing path is time consuming. We can reduce responding time because our location availability can
maintain a more reliable routing path.
4. First proposing active location integrity algorithm: By using on-board radar,
GPS location information can be actively validated by radar detection.
5. Presenting a real world location integrity solution: In normal traffic and most
of scenarios, our location integrity solution can validate location integrity in a
real world environment where some vehicles have GPS and transceiver, some
have transceiver only, and some old vehicles do not have any of the proposed
devices.
6. Enabling location key dynamic computation: Our D-Geolock algorithm can
dynamically convert a location into a secret key instead of checking mapping
tables.
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7. Ensuring location confidentiality: Location messages are not exposed to one
who are unauthorized to access them.
8. Reducing control overhead in D-GeoEncryption: Our D-GeoEncryption algorithm can send less frequent control message to update the decryption region.
9. Improving location error tolerance in D-GeoEncryption: Our D-Geolock algorithm can tolerate larger location errors than the original D-Geolock algorithm.
I.5

OUTLINE

The dissertation is organized as follows:
 Chapter II presents the state of the art in location security of VANETs. The

related work includes security algorithms and solutions in mobile networks,
wireless sensor networks, mobile ad hoc networks and vehicular ad hoc networks.
 Chapter III addresses the proposed module to improve location availability.

A probability model is established by analytically deriving expressions of link
duration and the probability of link duration, the basis of the proposed routing
protocol. We then presented a specially designed routing protocol for propagating messages among vehicles.
 Chapter IV states the specially designed solutions to improve location integrity.

This chapter initially addresses a homogeneous system in which all vehicles are
installed with the same devices, such as radar, GPS, transceiver. We improve
the initial homogeneous system by removing radar. We adopt statistical data
fusion to filter false location data and to refine low resolution location data.
To match real world scenarios, we further improve it by accepting a mix of
devices: some vehicles can have all devices, some vehicles can have GPS and
transceiver, and some vehicles can have only transceiver.
 Chapter V explains our extension of the geographic location based encryption

mechanism to provide location confidentiality. We redesign the mapping function GeoLock which can convert a location into a secret key and propose a
dynamic GeoLock (D-GeoLock) which can compute the secret key on the fly
instead of looking up preinstalled secret key-table.
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 Chapter VI shows the evaluation work of our proposed mechanisms. We com-

pare the proposed location security schemes to related work. Each simulation
begins by describing the simulation environment and how we obtain simulation
results. The results are compared and analyzed.
 Chapter VII contains a summary and a list of future work.
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CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
The aim of this chapter is to discuss previous attempts to achieve location security
in VANETs. We will give a brief overview of the major solutions. Since VANETs
are related to Sensor Networks and Mobile Adhoc Networks (MANETs), we review
location security solutions in these related fields. We will start with location availability solutions in Section II.1. Since location availability is ensured by reliable
location delivery over VANETs, we address reliable communication by selecting predictable and endurable routing links in terms of link duration and the probability of
link duration. Therefore, we introduce link probability models and reliable routing
algorithms. Section II.2 will cover the solutions in location integrity. The solutions
include digital signature, resource-based, and radio signal strength based algorithms.
Section II.3 discusses location confidentiality solutions. A geographic location based
encryption algorithm will be introduced.
II.1

LOCATION AVAILABILITY

Because of the high mobility of vehicles, the topology of VANETs is constantly changing. Therefore, the routing links and routing paths are inherently unstable. Unstable
routing links and paths will cause a problem in location availability. Since routing
paths are not reliable, location information is not guaranteed to be available when
it is needed. To provide a reliable routing path, there are several routing schemes in
the literature. But these schemes share a common shortcoming in that they cannot
accurately predict the link duration and link probability. The link duration is the
expected time that the wireless connection can last. The link probability is the probability of the existence of a link. Therefore, there is no guarantee of the availability
of location information. In this dissertation, we propose a reliable routing algorithm
to guarantee location availability. Our algorithm computes link duration and link
probability on the basis of vehicle mobility information such as distance, velocity,
acceleration, and direction.
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II.1.1

An Overview

VANETs have several properties that can be used in routing protocols. They are
connectivity, mobility, infrastructure, geographic location, and the probability of
certain events such as link existence and link duration. We can classify the routing
protocols in literature based on these properties. Connectivity among vehicles can
be achieved by sending packets among vehicles, i.e. flooding messages to all nodes.
The flooding-based protocols are first proposed in MANETs and Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs). Some flooding-based protocols proposed originally in MANETs
and WSNs, such as AODV [32], DSR [33], and DSDV [34], have been extended to
VANETs. Some protocols in VANETs, such as Biswas [35], Murthy [36], Abedi [37],
and DisjLi [38], are proposed on the basis of flooding as well. We give an introduction
of each type of routing method, as shown in Figure 5.
Mobility includes relative distance, relative speed, and relative acceleration, even
including the direction or moving patterns defined by maps. Mobility is a unique
property, compared with fixed networks like Ethernet and ATM. Even compared
with MANETs, vehicles in VANETs have a larger mobility scale. They can turn
right/left, accelerate, decelerate, and stop. Vehicles are also constrained by roads.
This mobility information, therefore, can be used to predict the lifetime/duration
of the routing path. PBR [39], DisjLi [38], Taleb [40], Abedi [37], Wedde [41] and
NiuDe [42] adjust mobility parameters to route messages.
In some proposals for VANETs, infrastructure, such as Road Side Units (RSU),
bridges, buildings, cellular base stations and even routine buses, is used. The infrastructure helps the robustness and security of VANET communication. Therefore,
routing protocols, such as DRR [43], SARC [44] and Bus [45], adopt the infrastructure to propagate messages.
A GPS receiver is a useful device in modern vehicles. VANETs can use GPS
location coordinates to locate other vehicles and to guide vehicles to trip destinations
(addresses, shops, hotels, etc.). Therefore, GPS geographic location coordinates can
be used to construct an efficient routing path. There are some routing protocols, for
example, CarNet [46], Kato [47], Zone [48], Greedy [49, 50], ROVER [51] and LORADCBF [52], that follow the same idea: find the next router which is geographically
closest to the destination vehicle.
Geographic location-related routing is based on the current location information
without considering the dynamics caused by the high mobility of vehicles. Probability
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theory is often used in dynamic systems to describe the likelihood of certain events,
for example the probability of link breakage with a certain transmission power or
a certain mobility parameter. Protocols such as Yan [53], GVGrid [54], CAR [42],
DeReQ [55], and REAR [56] use probability to build the routing protocols.

AODV
DSR

PBR
DisjLi

DSDV
Biswas
Murthy
Abedi
DisjLi

Mobility
(distance,
speed, etc.)

Connectivity
(flooding)

NiuDe

Vehicular Adhoc Networks
(VANETs)
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Bus
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Abedi
Wedde

Infrastructure
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Geographic
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Kato
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Greedy
ROVER
LORA-DCBF

Probability
Yan

GVGrid

CAR

DeReQ

REAR

FIG. 5: An overview of reliable routing protocols in VANETs.

II.1.2

Flooding-Based Routing

Flooding-based routing is simple and easy to implement. This protocol is very efficient for broadcasting applications, for example traffic accident alerting applications.
Figure 6 shows the basic idea of the flooding protocol. The source vehicle broadcasts
a message. All of its neighbors will rebroadcast the received message. The rebroadcasting continues until the destination vehicle receives the message. During message
propagation, if the message had been received before at one vehicle, the vehicle will
drop the duplicate message. This protocol has some drawbacks. It is not efficient
and has the potential risk to create a broadcast storm. Indeed, a broadcast storm
may happen when the traffic density is high. The transmission attempts from a
large population will cause even more responses and the responses will result in more
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retransmissions in a snowball effect. The broadcast storm will waste the bandwidth
and even block network communication.
For applications that need to unicast messages, the flooding protocol can be
improved by dividing the packets into two types: control packets and data packets.
The control packets are often RREQ (Route Request), RERR (Route Error), and
RREP (Route Reply). The RREQ spreads out the routing requests among vehicles.
The RREP returns the selected routing path along all the involved vehicles. Both
RREQ and RREP are shown in Figure 6. The RERR reports the error encountered
during the routing path exploration.

RREQ

RREP

FIG. 6: Flooding routing protocols (the figure is not proportionally drawn).
In flooding routing protocols, the basic idea is to broadcast packets to the whole
network. Each node receiving a packet will rebroadcast it if the node is not the
destination node. It is not an efficient routing protocol in terms of bandwidth and
delay. If all nodes can be reached within the transmission range of the sources’s
transceiver, the flooding method can be seen as an efficient routing scheme. However,
in case of multi-hop communication, the performance of network will dramatically
drop when the population of nodes increases. Flooding methods will generate a lot of
duplicate packets, even causing a broadcast storm. In addition, the flooding methods
scale badly beyond a few hundred nodes. But flooding is a reliable routing protocol
in terms of availability, especially when the topology of the network is constantly
changing and the traffic density is not high.
Since the pure flooding methods are costly in delay and bandwidth, enhanced
flooding methods are proposed. The basic idea of the enhancement is to find a
feasible routing path by broadcasting a control message, or probe, and then to send
packets through the found routing path. For example, Murthy et al. [36], marked
as Murthy in Figure 5, presented a wireless routing protocol by flooding control
messages over the network which is viewed as a directed graph. AODV [32], initially
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proposed for MANET, is often extended in VANET. It is a unicast on-demand routing
protocol which includes two phases, route discovery and route maintenance. Four
types of control packets are used: HELLO (a Hello message), RREQ, RREP, and
RERR. Abedi et al. [37] (marked as Abedi in Figure 5) and Li et al. [38] (marked as
DisjLi in Figure 5) extend AODV and use RREQ to explore the routing path as well.
Additionally, there are several other flooding-based mechanisms used in MANET, for
example DSR [33], and DSDV [34].
Biswas et al. [35], marked as Biswas in Figure 5, addressed a flooding routing
method which extends the original flooding method by acknowledging the flooding
message. When a node receives a packet, it rebroadcasts the packet. This vehicle
watches the packets from behind vehicles. If it receives the same message from
behind, it infers that at least one vehicle in the back has received the packet and
that vehicle will retransmit the packet. Therefore, the event of receiving the same
packet from behind vehicles is treated as an acknowledgment of flooding. If the
vehicle does not receive the acknowledgment, it will periodically rebroadcast the
packet until the acknowledgment is received.
II.1.3

Mobility-Based Routing

Mobility is one of the major differences between VANET and other network systems,
even MANET. In wired networks, such as Ethernet and ATM, nodes are fixed in
location. In conventional wireless networks, such as MANETs, which is often used
in a small region like an airport, nodes often have slow mobility. In cellular networks, nodes can have fast mobility but the communications among nodes are often
through infrastructure, i.e. base station. Nodes in VANET often have high mobility,
for example fast speed and frequently changing speed and direction. The high mobility makes many of the existing conventional routing algorithms not applicable to
VANET. Mobility, therefore, is used as a key factor to select and maintain a routing
path.
Namboodiri et al. [39], marked as PBR in Figure 5, present a predictable mobility
pattern of vehicles on highways and use it to create a route by predicting the lifetime
of route and selecting the best route. Li et al. [38] (marked as DisjLi ) and Taleb et
al. [40], marked as Taleb in Figure 5, present a routing method by grouping vehicles
according to velocity. The basic idea of the method is to predict a possible link
breakage event prior to its occurrence by computing from vehicle’s speed. Vehicles
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are grouped into four different groups based on their velocity vectors (speed with
directions). If the directions of speeds of two vehicles are the same, the link between
the vehicles will stay longer than the link composed by two vehicles with different
speed directions. The process of routing path searching is the following. Initially, the
source node broadcasts a request packet, RREQ. This RREQ will be disseminated
among nodes by rebroadcasting. The most suitable path is chosen when the RREQ
is received by the destination. The duration of the path is predicted by the vehicle’s
speed and the distance of the two vehicles. A new route discovery is always initiated
prior duration of the routing path, i.e. the shortest link duration.
Abedi et al. [37] (marked as Abedi in Figure 5) present a enhanced routing protocol based on AODV to adapt to the high mobility of vehicles. The protocol uses three
mobility parameters: location, direction and speed. This method treats direction as
the most important parameter to select the next hop because the nodes moving in the
same direction will be more stable than nodes in the opposite direction. Therefore,
this method will select routing links composed of nodes in the same direction as the
source and/or destination nodes. Moreover, location is the second most important
parameter that is used for next hop selection.
Wedde et al. [41] (marked as Wedde in Figure 5) address a routing algorithm
based on a rating value . The rating value is computed to evaluate the road conditions
(actual traffic situation) based on the interdependencies of average vehicle speed,
traffic density and the traffic quality (in terms of congestion). A routing link is
incorporated into a routing path if the rating value satisfies a certain requirement,
i.e. the rating value. This method only uses part of mobility information, i.e. average
vehicle speed, which is not sufficient to compute the path accurately. In addition, the
average vehicle speed is not the reason for link breakage, but rather it is the relative
speed between the sender vehicle and the receiver vehicle.
Niu et al. [42] (marked as NiuDe in Figure 5) propose a new link reliability
mathematical model which considers not only the impact of the link duration but
also the traffic density. A purpose of this model is to find a route which is not only
reliable but also compliant with delay requirements in multimedia application. This
link duration is computed by using two mobility parameters. The distance between
the sender vehicle and the receiver vehicle is divided by the relative speed of the
sender vehicle and the receiver vehicle. The accelerations of the sender vehicle and
the receiver vehicle are not considered in the computation. But the accelerations will
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greatly affect the link duration.
II.1.4

Infrastructure-Based Routing

In hybrid VANETs, stationary roadside units (RSUs) are combined with the on-board
units (OBUs) equipped on vehicles to provide reliable routing and differentiated applications. RSUs act as fixed reliable nodes. They are connected by backbone links
with high bandwidth, low delay, and low bit error rates. Vehicles can directly communicate with each other through wireless links. Figure 7 shows the infrastructure.
When the link between two vehicles is broken, the RSU will act as a node to relay
packets to the destination vehicle. This routing protocol is the most reliable and
feasible in reality. However, the drawback is that the infrastructure is costly and
limited to urban areas. In the scenario of rural areas, especially during disasters
like hurricanes and earthquakes, infrastructure will be damaged first, and the traffic
information will not be able to be delivered to the drivers when they need it most.

FIG. 7: Stationary roadside units can be used in hybrid VANETs.
He et al. [43] (marked as DRR in Figure 5) propose two notions, virtual equivalent
node (VEN) and differentiated reliable path (DRP) to protect against link failures.
If the routing path is broken, RSUs (one or multiple) will act as a VEN to provide
connection, for the broken clusters of vehicles. After a vehicle successfully connects
with an RSU, its location information is synchronized to all related RSUs instantly.
Kim et al. [44] address a novel routing protocol, called SARC, which can find the
routing path and protect privacy in a route discovery and data forwarding phase.
The method adopts a street-based path calculation algorithm for route discovery.
The identity, location, and route anonymity are defined and analyzed as well.
Kitani et al. [45] (marked as Bus in Figure 5) propose a information routing
method that uses buses traveling along regular routes as message ferries. Buses are
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an ideal medium to avoid losing traffic information statistics of areas that buses
travel. Each vehicle measures time consumption to pass an area. Traffic information
statistics can be computed from the information received by cars in inter-vehicle
communication.
II.1.5

Geographic Location Based Routing

Location based routing protocols have received a great deal of attention in VANETs.
These routing protocols are very efficient in high mobility ad hoc networks since the
path to a destination can be determined by the location information of neighbor
and destination nodes. The fundamental idea of geographic location based routing
protocol is shown in Figure 8. The geographic location values of vehicles are used
to partition the nodes into sub-sections of roads. The sub-sections, or zones, can be
dynamically created on the fly and can be predefined and installed on each vehicle.
Therefore, vehicles in a zone become members in a group. Each group only has one or
two vehicles functioning as gateways to relay packets. Other members in the group
keep silent and drop the packets. The advantage of this method is to reduce the
duplicates of packets and therefore, to improve the delay and bandwidth utilization.
But this method, especially for the routing method based on dynamic group creation,
will introduce other issues like group management, as well as overhead of control
messages because vehicles have to know their neighbor location information. Another
drawback is that this protocol may not find the optimal routing path because relative
mobility is not considered.
Bachir et al. [57] and Ibrahim et al. [58] address a geographic location based
routing protocol. The protocol uses the geographic location as a parameter to select
the next router, i.e. Inter-Vehicle Geocast (IVG). Ibrahim et al. [59] improved one
shortcoming in the protocol proposed by Bachir. If the traffic is dense, there may
be a broadcast storm. The broadcast storm can be avoided by a probability. The
1
probability of sending message is a random number (0, density
) where density is the

density of the traffic.
CarNet [46] uses a grid to propagate packets. The grid is defined on the basis
of the geographic location of nodes. A forwarding method based on geographic
location and a scalable dissemination service based on location are designed to route
packets from car to car without flooding the whole network. CarNet, as announced
by the authors, can support many applications: IP connectivity, cooperative highway
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FIG. 8: Geographic location-based routing protocols. The circles and shaded area
represent zones

congestion monitoring, fleet tracking, and discovery of nearby points of interest. Kato
et al. [47] (marked as Kato in Figure 5) propose a method for constructing network
groups according to lane location and evaluate the proposed method by simulation
as well.
Bronsted et al. [48] (marked as Zone in Figure 5) present a zone flooding algorithm and a zone routing algorithm. A zone is defined as a geographic area, for
example 500 meters of a road. If vehicles are in the zone, it allows them to broadcast
packets. Otherwise the received packets will be dropped. The effect of the zone is
that packets are only delivered in a particular section of a road.
Gong et al. [49] and Lochert et al. [50] present a greedy routing method (marked
as Greedy in Figure 5) on the basis of geographic positions of vehicles, as shown in
Figure 8. Each vehicle knows its own geographic location by the help of an enlisted
GPS receiver or some other method, for example radio signal strength. Vehicles
rebroadcast packets only at the nodes whose distance to the sender is the longest.
The fact that vehicles transmit packets aggressively toward the destination gives the
name “greedy”. The directions of vehicles’ movement are included in the geographic
greedy routing. The direction of movement helps to select long duration links. But
the mere direction of movement does not help much. The mobility of vehicles are
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considered and predictive directional greedy routing is proposed [49].
Kihl et al. [51] describe a routing protocol, called ROVER (RObust VEhicular
Routing). Zones are defined on the basis of positions of vehicles which are equipped
with GPS receivers. ROVER broadcasts a control packet, similar to AODV, among
zones to find a routing path. Once the routing path is found, data packets are unicasted by the routing path to improve the performance of communication. Similarly,
Momeni et al. [52] propose a reactive algorithm for mobile wireless ad-hoc networks,
called Location Routing Algorithm with Directional Cluster-Based Flooding (LORADCBF). LORA-DCBF uses a zone-like group routing method. To reduce the number
of Location Request (LREQ) packets and minimize duplicate retransmissions in the
same region, the control traffic packets are selectively transmitted by selected nodes,
called gateways. All the members in the zone can read and process the packet, but do
not retransmit the packets. Only gateway nodes retransmit packets between zones,
i.e. gateway to gateway communication.
II.1.6

Probability-Based Routing

Because of high mobility, the topology of a VANET is changing constantly. Probability theory is an ideal tool to find a routing path, for example the probability that
a wireless link exists between two nodes at a certain time, or the probability that a
wireless link will stay connected for a certain time interval. In this section, we will
give a short survey on probability-based routing protocols.
Jiang et al. [56] present a routing method, called REAR, based on the receipt
probability of alarm messages of nodes. REAR can compute the receipt probability
of alarm packets based on the real wireless channel in VANET. The selection of the
next hop is based on the receipt probability. The probability model is based on
wireless signal strength and the loss of signal. The wireless signal loss is composed of
two parts, the path loss and the diffraction loss. The receipt probability is computed
by using the relationship between packet loss rate and received signal strength. The
receipt probability values of all neighboring nodes are estimated from the received
signal strengths. The routing path with highest receipt probability value will be
selected as the routing path.
Niu et al. [42] address a routing protocol (marked as DeReQ in Figure 5) that
dynamically creates and maintains a robust route to provide QoS for multimedia
applications over VANETs. The routing methods use parameters, reliability and
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delay. The reliability is on the basis of a probability function that can predict the
future status of a wireless link. The probability function is introduced in the literature
[60, 61] and is defined as the probability that there is an active link between two
nodes. The digital map and the GPS device are used to find the route with best
reliability. The route is maintained by proactive communication among intermediate
nodes. If a link is going to break, the routing path will be rebuilt before the link
breaks.
Yang et al. [55] develop a new routing protocol called connectivity aware routing
(CAR in Figure 5). The basis of this method is the connectivity probability model of
each road segment. A route with the highest probability of connectivity to forward
packets will be selected. As claimed by Yang, the packet delivery ratio using the proposed method can be increased up to at least 90% and the delay is in the acceptable
range as well. The connectivity model is on the probability computation on a road
which is partitioned into grids/cells. The unit of cell is the average length of a car,
5 meters. Then the probability to compute the connection between two nodes is to
compute the probability that the distance between the two nodes is within a certain
value (transmission range of wireless).
Sun et al. [54] propose an algorithm (marked as GVGrid in Figure 5) to find a
reliable routing path that was compliant with delay requirements. The algorithm is
based on several assumptions, namely (1) intermediate nodes are equally spaced, and
(2) vehicle speed is normally distributed. Based on these assumptions, they compute
the probability of link lifetime as the reliability of a link. By querying possible links
or paths, a path with high reliability and sufficiently small link delay will be selected
as the routing path. However, assumption (1) is not reasonable since, as known, the
inter-vehicle distance is a random variable and certainly not constant.
Our previous work addresses a ticket-based routing method [53] (marked as Yan
in Figure 5) in VANET by using the expected duration of links. The expected link
duration is computed by a probability model. The Ticket-Based Probing with Stability conStrained(TBP-SS) Routing method is also proposed [53]. The key parameter
used to select a route is based on the mean duration of a link (defined as stability)
which is computed by the probability model. From the “divide and conquer” algorithm, each optimal routing link is selected and results an optimized routing path
which is composed by each optimized link. Vehicles are equipped with a DSRC/IEEE
802-based wireless transceiver (e.g. IEEE 802.11p) and a GPS device.
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Cheng et al. [62] proposed a method on the assumption of a Poisson process.
The distance of a broadcast message can be propagated in a network which contains
homogeneous Poisson distributed nodes. Several bounded areas (e.g. a straight line,
a circle, etc.) are studied. Piret et al. [63] addressed the connectivity issues on
a one-dimensional line segment where nodes are uniformly distributed. There are
other routing algorithms on the assumption that vehicles are uniformly distributed
[64, 65, 66]. In VANETs, vehicles move on roads. But roads can be circles, rectangles,
straight lines, etc. It is not sufficient to limit the road as a certain bounded shape,
like a straight line, a circle, or as one-dimensional shapes.
Bettstetter et al. give a tight lower bound of connectivity of multihop radio
networks for the minimum node density [67]. The basic assumptions are (1) the
wireless network is in a log-normal shadow fading environment, (2) nodes have equal
transmission capabilities, (3) the number of nodes at any time is randomly distributed
according to a homogeneous Poisson process. Based on the three assumptions, the
probability of the link and the node degree are derived. Bettstetter et al. can be used
in sensor networks and MANETs. However, in VANETs, the mobility of vehicles can
greatly change the topology of the network. For example, a network with high speed
nodes is less likely to have a stable link. But the velocity of nodes is not shown in
the probability of a link. In our model, we analyze the probability model based on
the mobility and a log-normal shadow fading environment.
Nekovee et al. [68] assumed that the distribution of car velocity is a normal
distribution. The path loss is also formalized as an exponential function of velocity.
Nekovee et al. [69] proposed a model to compute the probability of a link in VANETs.
The distance headway is expressed by a constant mean speed times the time. The
distance headway computation does not include the relative speed and acceleration
between the sender vehicle and the receiver vehicle. This paper only considers the
slow fading/shading radio propagation model. Moreover, this work only considered
the radio signal without considering the mobility of vehicles.
II.2

LOCATION INTEGRITY

Location information in this dissertation refers to a tuple <time, ID, location>. Due
to the limit of transmission range specified by DSRC (300m), the communication
connection among vehicles is in a multi-hop mode, i.e. a location message will be
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propagated by several intermediate nodes before the message arrives at the destination. There is a risk that the content of the location information can be changed
or fabricated by malicious attackers. Therefore, a validation mechanism needs to be
addressed to improve location integrity.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [9, 26, 27] and digital signatures [28, 29, 30, 31]
have been used for location integrity. But there are some shortcomings. PKI-based
encryption solutions add significant overhead to the system in terms of processing
time and response time. More importantly, message encryption does not solve location integrity because a message can be fabricated by the sender or be replayed by
intermediate nodes. Although a digital signature can provide location integrity by
signing the message, the key management (distribution and updating) of the secret
keys or public/private key pair is challenging because of the large scale of vehicle population. In this dissertation, we take a different approach. We allow vehicles to send
the information in plain-text and depend upon receivers to verify the information.
Leinmüller et al. [70] proposed a method to secure location information by using
hard thresholds to detect false locations. Vehicles monitor data to verify the reported
location. If the reported location lies beyond a threshold, the location is determined
to be false. If the number of nodes is larger than a threshold maximum number of
nodes, the honest nodes know that there are some fake nodes. Although the authors
do not use any other devices or hardware, the accuracy and efficiency are difficult to
guarantee. In addition, this method is not flexible because of the high mobility of
vehicles in VANETs.
Radio signal-based methods [71, 72] can determine false claimed positions based
on the received signal power. The basic idea of this method is that the distance
between two nodes can be computed from the received signal power. If there is a
vehicle at a location which does not match the distance computed from the received
radio power, the location of the vehicle is determined to be a fake. However, a
malicious node can use the same method to compute the transmission signal power
to fool other nodes. Also, the radio signal may bounce off of vehicles and other
obstacles. Detection based on these bounced radio signals may not be accurate.
Resource-based methods test vehicles’ resources, such as radio resource [73], computational resources (vehicles failing to solve a puzzle are identified as fakes) [20],
and identification resources (vehicles whose MAC and IP addresses which are not
recorded in a profile are identified as fakes) [74]. Newsome et al. [73] claimed that
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the method for detecting Sybil attacks proposed by Douceur [20] is not applicable
to ad hoc networks and proposed other prevention methods including radio resource
testing, central registration, and location verification. Radio resource testing is based
on the assumption that no device can send and receive on more than one channel at
a time. But, the attackers may have multiple channels. Central registration requires
all vehicles to authenticate themselves before sending messages. Central registration
may not work because the attackers can simply create multiple identities, like Sybil
attacks. Besides, registration creates a privacy concern. Piro et al. [74] records vehicles’ MAC and IP addresses as a passive ID to create a profile about neighbors. The
profile can be used to validate the neighboring vehicles’ location. However, attackers
can have multiple devices to defeat this method. Moreover, privacy is an issue if
MAC and IP addresses are recorded and tracked.
In this section, we stated location integrity solutions in the literature. There
are PKI-based location encryption methods, digital signature solutions, radio signal
based solutions, and resource-based methods. But there are some shortcomings in
these solutions as we addressed above. We specially design a light-weight and efficient location integrity solution. We start with a strong assumption that all vehicles
are equipped with radar, GPS receiver, and transceiver. When a receiver receives
a location announcement, the receiver will use its radar to detect the location of
the announcement. Then we weaken the assumption by removing the requirement
of radar. A receiver will consult its neighboring vehicles about the location announcement. The receiver will apply a statistical method to filter and refine location
information to obtain an agreement of location. If the announced location is very
close the agreed location, the announced location is validated. We further weaken
the assumption by assuming that some vehicles have different level of combinations
of the devices. We propose a real-world solution. A receiver will collect location
information from three different resources: radar, neighbors, oncoming vehicles. We
apply a statistical method to obtain the location estimation.
II.3

LOCATION CONFIDENTIALITY

In a wireless environment, location in plaintext mode is vulnerable to attackers.
For efficiency, the message which includes location information can be in plain-text
mode to transmit. Wireless media is open to the public, and everyone in the wireless
network can access the content of the message. Therefore, the content of the message
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will be exposed to unauthorized access. This will harm location confidentiality. In
literature, there are several attempts to enhance information confidentiality. We will
give a brief overview of the major solutions.
II.3.1

Encryption and Authentication

There are two basic types of encryption algorithms, asymmetric and symmetric. In
asymmetric algorithms, each node has a public key and a private key. The public and
private keys are special in that a message encrypted with a node’s public key can only
be decrypted using the node’s private key, and vice versa. In public key infrastructure
(PKI), a well-known mechanism for using and distributing public keys, a Certification
Authority (CA) is responsible for validating public keys and distributing certificates
used for authentication. In symmetric algorithms, the communicating peers share a
secret key. Both encryption and decryption are performed using the same secret key,
thus the secret key must be protected.
PKI and digital signatures are well-explored methods in VANETs [29, 9, 75]. A
CA generates public and private keys for nodes. When a node A sends an encrypted
message M to node B, A will encrypt M by using the public key of B. Only B has
the private key, so only B can decrypt the ciphertext. If B wants to digitally sign
the message M , B encrypts the message with its private key and sends both M and
the signed version of M to A. A then verifies the signature by using B’s public key
to decrypt the signed version. If the result is M , A will accept M as sent by B,
because only B has the private key to generate the unique signature. Laberteaux
et al. [76] discussed applying a similar method to sign messages in VANETs. The
purpose of the digital signature is to validate and authenticate the sender. The
purpose of encryption is to disclose the content of message only to the nodes with
the secret keys. PKI is a method well-suited for security purposes, especially for
roadside infrastructure, like roadside e-shops, Internet access points, etc.
But, there are some issues in using PKI in VANETs. The main problem is the
need for a trusted CA to distribute public keys and certificates. In order for all
vehicles to be able to communicate with each other, all vehicles will have to trust
the same CA, a difficult requirement when vehicles are manufactured by different
companies in different countries. In addition, bad or mis-used certificates must be
revoked. The list of revoked certificates must then be distributed to all vehicles.
Another problem is that asymmetric encryption/decryption often takes 1000 times
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longer to perform than symmetric encryption/decryption [2]. In addition, nodes in
VANETs can communicate in groups [77, 78, 26, 75]. In this case, the requirement
of public keys for all nodes is not needed, because the vehicles in a group can share
the message. In our work, we improve the encryption/decryption speed by using
symmetric algorithms. Therefore, we have to design the secret key. The secret key
is based on the location of vehicles and no extra cost needed. Moreover, the secret
key is a group key which can be shared by a group of nodes.
II.3.2

Location-Based Encryption

Location-based encryption was proposed by Denning et al. [79, 2] to limit the area
inside which the intended recipient can decrypt messages. This GeoEncryption integrates geographic and mobility information (such as location, time, speed, etc)
into the encryption and decryption processes. Denning proposed GeoLock, which is
computed with the recipient’s location, velocity, and time, as shown in Figure 46.
Suppose vehicle A wants to send a message to vehicle B. The GeoLock is a secret
key converted from the location by a mapping table shown in Figure 10. The GeoLock of A is processed by modulo operation with a secret key Key S and then the
result is encrypted by the public key Key E of B and sent to B which decrypts the
ciphertext using the private key Key D of B. The secret key (symmetric key) Key S
is obtained and used to decrypt the message.
Al-Fuqaha et al. [80] extended Denning’s GeoEncryption model by providing decryption zone prediction under mobile networks. The decryption zone is a specified
region where the encrypted message is allowed to be decrypted. However, the decryption zone by Al-Fuqaha is designed for slow or constant mobility nodes. The location
predicted by Al-Fuqaha does not consider prediction errors. But in VANETs, the
nodes have high mobility which will definitely cause a certain range of prediction
error. Vehicles can move about 33 meters per second (75 miles/hour) and can turn
at street intersections, stop, accelerate, decelerate, etc. The dynamics of a vehicle’s
mobility will make the prediction from a sender difficult and inaccurate. Therefore,
Al-Fuqaha’s extension is not designed for VANETs.
Reddy et al. [81, 82] proposed an application of Denning’s GeoEncryption. The
latitude/longitude coordinate of a message decrypter is used as the key for data
encryption and a toleration distance (TD) is designed to overcome the inaccuracy
and inconsistent problem of GPS receiver.
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FIG. 9: Denning’s GeoEncryption [2] (Used with permission.)

Zhang et al. [3] proposed a location-based security algorithm in wireless sensor
networks (WSN). Both ID and locations of nodes are hashed and served as a public
key. Suppose Alice and Bob are nodes in WSN. Bob wants to send a message to
Alice. They have a key handshaking process, shown in Figure 11. Bob will broadcast
a “helloLBK” message in the network. Alice will unicast a reply including its ID, i.e.
IDA . Bob will send an encrypted message processed by a secret key IKA which is
an outcome of hashing IDA . The encrypted message includes IDA , the location of
Alice and the hashed location LKA . The LKA can serve as a secret key. There are
two issues in this algorithm. First, IDs are broadcasted over the whole network, so
privacy is a potential problem. Second, this algorithm lacks location error tolerance.
Location measurements often include precision errors. A hash function may produce
different keys for Alice in different measurements.
Eschenauer et al. [83] proposed a security algorithm. The key contribution is key
management. For each node, there is a set of keys which are randomly selected from
a set of global keys. The requirement of the selection is to ensure that there exists a
common key between any two nodes within a certain probability.
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FIG. 10: Denning’s GeoLock table [2] (Used with permission.)

Bob
Bob

Alice : “helloLBK” (broadcast);
Alice : IDA (unicast);

Bob

Alice : {IDA, posA, LKA}IKA (unicast).

FIG. 11: Location based security in wireless sensor network (WSN) [3]. Alice and
Bob are nodes in WSN.
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Cho et al. [84] proposed a location authentication and authorization algorithm
which can authenticate the location announcements of mobile nodes. The algorithm
relies on access points to distribute secret keys and to locate nodes. Although this
algorithm does not require GPS, the accuracy of localization is not high especially
in some environment such as among the high buildings or under tunnels.
In our work, we design the key composition/recovery in detail. No mapping tables
are needed. Positions can be mapped to a lock on the fly. Since nodes in VANETs
have high dynamics, the decryption region is designed as a series of fixed-size squares.
The area of the square is sufficiently large to cover the error of the decryption region
prediction. Moreover, we incorporate prediction error by using location prediction
deviation. We trade freedom of the size and the shape of the decryption region in
order to obtain the feasibility and the accuracy of decryption region prediction.
II.4

SUMMARY

In this section, we presented related work on enhancing location security in location
availability, location integrity and location confidentiality. We have started the section by showing location availability solutions. Location availability can improved
by more reliable routing protocols. Five types of routing protocols are reviewed.
The link duration and link probability are used as parameters to construct and to
maintain a routing path in our solution. Therefore, we also reviewed the probability
model of a link in related fields, e.g. VANETs, sensor networks and mobile ad hoc
networks. In location integrity solutions, we have showed digital signature methods,
radio signal-based methods, and resource-based methods. Finally, we addressed location confidentiality solutions. Two types of confidentiality methods are addressed,
traditional encryption methods and geographic location-based encryption methods.
In each work relevant to what we are proposing, we analyzed the features and the
shortcomings.
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CHAPTER III
LOCATION AVAILABILITY
It is fair to say that most, if not all, VANET applications rely on accurate location
information. The location information that is not available when you need it is almost
as bad as none at all. Given the scale of its mobility and number of actors involved,
the topology of a VANET is changing constantly and, as a result, both individual links
and routing paths are inherently unstable. Therefore, in this chapter, we introduce a
stable routing scheme to improve the location availability. Our main contribution is
a probability model for link duration based on realistic vehicular dynamics and radio
propagation assumptions. We then go on to show how the proposed model can be
incorporated in a routing protocol that results in paths that are easier to construct
and maintain, both locally and globally. Extensive simulation results confirm that
our probabilistic routing protocol produces paths that are easier to maintain.
III.1

PROBABILITY ANALYTICAL MODEL

The main contribution of this section is to perform a probabilistic analysis of link
duration in VANETs. Our results are based on a realistic distribution of headway
distance as well as on a realistic channel model. Since, as already mentioned, there
is no consensus in the literature on the exact distribution of the headway distance,
we begin by an empirical validation of the log-normal headway distribution assumption proposed by Greenberg [85]. Our empirical validation serves the dual purpose
of anchoring our analytical work in a realistic headway distance model and also to
calibrate our subsequent simulation environment. Next, assuming a log-normal distribution of headway distance and a realistic channel propagation model, we derive
the probability distribution as well as the expected duration of links in VANET.
These analytical results are later confirmed by extensive simulation.
III.1.1

The Radio Model

The main goal of this section is to spell out the details of the radio propagation
model that we assume throughout the thesis. It is well known that in wireless communications, signal attenuation is caused by the following three main factors [86]:
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 distance path loss is the attenuation of the signal due to the distance between

the transmitter and the receiver. Under most conditions, this is the principal
cause of signal attenuation;
 slow fading (also known as shadow fading or log-normal fading) is caused by

various factors including building dimensions, weather conditions and relative
speed. As its name suggests, slow fading is typically modeled by log-normal
distribution [87];
 fast fading (also referred to as multi-path fading) involves rapid fluctuations

of the signal over small areas. Fast fading is mostly caused by the presence
of reflectors, in the environment surrounding the transmitter or the receiver,
which create multiple paths that the transmitted signal can traverse. As a
result of multi-path, the receiver sees the superposition of multiple copies of
the transmitted signal, each traversing a different path. Fast fading is typically
modeled by a Rayleigh distribution [87].
Fast fading is short-term fading, and slow fading is long-term fading. Figure 12
shows the relationship among fast fading, slow fading and path loss. Slow fading
captures long term fading effects and is generally applied in research and assumed
as log-normal distribution [86]; fast fading is used in special scenarios where the
coherence time of the channel is small relative to the delay constraint of the channel.
Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter we are interested in path loss in the
context of slow (i.e. shadow) fading only.
III.1.2

A Closer Look at Headway Distance in VANET

The headway distance between two vehicles is defined as the time (or, equivalently,
distance) between two consecutive vehicles passing the same point and traveling in
the same direction [88]. The headway distance between consecutive cars on a roadway
plays a fundamental role, in understanding traffic flow, in ensuring travel safety and
in other related issues. While there have been several attempts at suggesting a safe
headway distance on roadways and streets, the task of legislating what the best
headway distance should be is a complex problem fraught with technical, societal
and political issues. This explains, to some extent, why the task of determining
the probability distribution of headway distance is still an open question that has
received a great deal of attention in the literature [85, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93].
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Fast Fading
(Short-term fading)

Slow Fading
(Long-term fading)

Signal
Strength
(dB)

Path Loss
Distance

FIG. 12: Illustrating the relationship between slow fading, fast fading and path loss
(with permission [4]).

Not surprisingly, many headway distance models have been developed since the
1960s. As pointed out by Cowan [91], typical representatives of such distribution
models include the exponential distribution, the normal distribution, the gamma
distribution and the log-normal distribution. For instance, the log-normal distribution was proposed to model headways under car-following situations [85]. A major
assumption for the log-normal headway models is that a vehicle maintains a safe distance while following its leading vehicle closely at variable speeds. This assumption
makes sense and is apparent in real traffic data [88, 89, 90, 94, 95, 96]. For example,
Krbálek and S̆eba [96] studied the statistics of public transportation in and around
Mexico City. Chowdhury et al. [94] proposed a different distribution of headways.
A road can be partitioned into a sections (boxes), that have the length of a car, i.e.
4 meters. The headways between two successive cars is defined based on the number
of empty boxes between them. Abul-Magd [90] studied both the distribution of distance headway and time headway by applying the Beck and Cohen super-statistics
[97]. Both traffic free phase and congested phase are studied. Some mixed distribution models are proposed on the assumption that a road consists of two components,
tracking/following and free components. For example, Cowan [91] proposed a mixed
distribution consisting of a constant distribution (tracking/following component) and
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an exponential distribution (free component). Griffiths and Hunt [95] proposed another mixed model called the Double Displaced Negative Exponential Distribution
(DDNED). These are common distributions of headway distance.
An Empirical Investigation of Headway Distance
Given the large variety of opinions in the literature concerning the probability distribution of the headway distance, we decided to begin our investigations by validating
several candidates: the exponential distribution, the normal distribution, the gamma
distribution and the log-normal distribution, in relation to their suitability as a basis
for analytical studies of link distribution in VANET.
Towards this purpose, we have carried out experiments using the open source
simulator written by Treiber [98]. Specifically, we have recorded and plotted the
distance between consecutive cars. It is important to note that Treiber [98] does not
have a specific model for the headway distance and, as a consequence, our empirical
measurements were not biased towards any distribution. Having plotted the resulting headway distance, we then plotted, on the same graph, the various candidate
probability distributions just mentioned (see Figure 13). For a detailed discussion
we refer the reader to the Appendix.
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FIG. 13: The pdf of headway distance versus the normal, log-normal, exponential
and gamma distribution. The log-normal distribution best matches our simulations.
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As discussed below, and as revealed by Figure 14, we found that the best fit
between a classic distribution function and the simulation results is provided by
the log-normal distribution. Our results agree with those of a similar experiment
conducted and reported independently by Puan [92].
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FIG. 14: Illustrating the pdf of headway distance versus the log-normal distribution
To fit the simulation curve of headway’s probability density function (pdf) we
solved a set of equations. The process of fitting the simulation curve of the headway’s pdf is detailed in the Appendix. As is apparent from Figure 14, after curve
fitting, the simulation results very closely match the log-normal distribution. The
normal distribution is also similar to the simulation results. However, as evidenced
in Figure 14, there are several segments where normal distribution does not match
the simulation results, for example when headway distance is between 15-25m and
also between 30-35m. We compared our simulation results with Paun’s results. We
found that both data are close to the log-normal distribution. As shown in Figure 15,
our pdf is slightly shifted from Paun’s data which was collected using video cameras
to record traffic movement at four sites.
Given the good fit between our simulation results and the log-normal distribution,
we have adopted the latter as the basis for our analytical derivations.

Page 42 of 169

0.25
Field data
Simulation data

Probability

0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0-5 5- 10- 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45- 50- 55- 60- 65- 7010 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
Headway (m)

FIG. 15: Contrasting our headway simulation vs. Paun’s field data.

The Log-normal Distribution – a Refresher
A continuous random variable X is said to have the log-normal distribution with
parameters µ and σ if X = eY where Y is normally distributed with parameters µ
and σ. It is not hard to see that X itself is continuous and, for all positive x, the
probability distribution function FX of X reads
FX (x) = Pr[{X ≤ x}]
Z x
=
fX (t)dt
Z0 x
(ln x−µ)2
1
√ e− 2σ2 dt
=
0 tσ 2π

(1)

where the probability density function (pdf) fX is of the form
fX (x) =

(ln x−µ)2
1
√ e− 2σ2 .
xσ 2π

(2)

For later reference, we recall that the expected value E[X] and variance V ar[X]
of the log-normal distribution with parameters µ and σ read
E[X] = eµ+

σ2
2

(3)
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and
V ar[X] = e
III.1.3

2µ+σ 2



σ2

e


−1 .

(4)

The Probability Distribution of a Link

The Probability Distribution of Path Loss
The path loss model [86, 87, 99] is a radio propagation model that predicts the signal
attenuation (in dB) at a distance X from the transmitter as a result of the combined
effect of path loss and shadowing. More precisely, beyond a crossover distance d0 ,
the combined effect of path loss and shadowing is a random variable L(X) described
by
L(X) = l0 + 10γ log

X
+ Rg
d0

(5)

where1
 d0 is the crossover distance, usually 1 meter [100];
 l0 is the free-space path loss at distance d0 ;
 γ, (2 ≤ γ ≤ 6), is the power fall-off coefficient;
 the random variable Rg describes shadow fading; Rg is normally distributed

with zero-mean and standard deviation σg , i.e. Rg ∈ N (0, σg ).
A quick look at (5) reveals that the path loss L(X) is the convolution of two
random variables: Y = l0 + 10γ log dX0 and Rg . It is important to note that, since
we are interested in the stability of radio links, we assume that the distance X is a
random variable that represents the headway distance between consecutive cars. We
know X is log-normally distributed.
The probability density function of L(X) obtained in the Appendix is f (x),
f (x) =

(ln(0.80x−2.93)−2.95)2
1
2∗0.552
√ e−
.
(0.80x − 2.93)0.55 2π

(6)

We are interested in the distance between a sender and a receiver. Let Xi be
the i-th headway distance which is covered by the sender and the receiver, shown in
Figure 16. Let there are m headway distances that are covered by the sender and
1

Here, and in the remainder of this section, we use log to represent log10 and ln to represent the
natural logarithm loge .
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the receiver. Xi ∼ LogN (µi , σi2 ) be independent log-normally distributed variables
with parameters σi and µi .

FIG. 16: Illustrating X = X1 + X2 + · · · + Xm .
Let the link distance between the sender and the receiver be Xs . We notice
P
Xs = m
i=1 Xi . The distribution of Xs can be approximated by another log-normal
distribution Z. The commonly-used Fenton-Wilkinson approximation [101, 102] is
σZ2 = log

"P

(e + 1)
e
P µ +σ2 /2 2 + 1
i
i
( e
)

X

eσi ) −

µZ = log(

2µi +σi2

2

σi2

#

σZ2
.
2

To simplify the notation, we change variable Z to X with parameter µ and σ.
Let µ = µZ and σ = σZ . From this point, the variable X represents the sum of
m headways where m is the number of headways included in the communication
link. Therefore, the link distance variable is X. We assume that the safety distance
between two vehicles is at least 6 meters and that the vehicles have an average length
of 4 meters. The maximum number of headways in a wireless link with range 300
meters is, therefore,

300
,
6+4

or 30, implying that 1 ≤ m ≤ 30.

Lemma 1. Assuming that X is log-normal with parameters µ and σ, the random
variable Y = l0 + 10γ log dX0 is normally distributed.
Proof. Let GY be the probability distribution function of Y . For every positive y,
we write
GY (y) = Pr[{Y ≤ y}].

(7)

Since Y is obviously continuous, we let gY stand for its density function. Now,
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(7) allows us to write
GY (y) = Pr[{Y ≤ y}]
Z y
gY (t)dt
=
−∞

= Pr{l0 + 10γ log

X
≤ y}
d0

y−l0

= Pr{X ≤ d0 10 10γ }
y−l0

= Pr{X ≤ 10e 10γ
Z A(y)
=
fX (t)dt

+log d0

}
(8)

−∞

where fX is the density function of X and
y−l0

A(y) = 10e 10γ

+log d0

.

We can obtain gY (y) by differentiating (8) with respect to y.
dA(y)
dy


a
(ay + b − µ)2
√ exp −
=
2σ 2
σ 2π


µ − b σ2
, 2
∈ aN
a
a

gY (y) = fX (A(y))

where a =

ln 10
10γ

(9)

10
and b = log d0 · ln 10 − l0 ln10γ
.

Thus, Y is normally distributed, completing the proof.
Lemma 2. Assuming that the headway distance is log-normally distributed, the path
loss (including shadowing) has a normal distribution.
Proof. Recall that, by (5), the path loss L(X) is the convolution L(X) = Y + Rg . By
Lemma 1, Y is normally distributed; as already mentioned, Rg is normally distributed
with zero-mean and standard deviation σg , that is, Rg ∈ N (0, σg ). Moreover, Y and
Rg are independent.
Now, it is a classic result in probability theory that the convolution of two independent normally distributed random variables is also normally distributed. The
random variable L(X) = Y + R is shown in Figure 17.
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It follows that L(X) = Y + R is normally distributed with pdf l(z),


µ − b 2 σ2
l(z) ∈ aN 0 +
, σg + 2
a
a


2
µ−b 2 σ
, σg + 2
∈ aN
a
a

(10)

FIG. 17: Illustrating the random variables L(X) = Y + R
From (10) we can see that the mean path loss is
to read, we write z = aN (µ1 , σ12 ), where µ1 =

µ−b
a

µ−b
.
a

To make the notation easier

and σ12 = σg2 +

σ2
.
a2

The Probability Distribution of the Existence of a Link
Our main goal in this section is to determine the probability distribution of a communication link established between two cars on a roadway. For this purpose, the
basic approach we take is to evaluate the probability of a link based on path loss.
Recall that we looked at the probability distribution of path loss under the shadow
fading model. In this section, we shall often refer back to the notation established
and to the results derived above.
The existence of a communication link between a transmitter vehicle and a receiving vehicle depends on the path loss at the receiver’s side. For a link between the
transmitter and the receiver to exist, the path loss between them needs to be smaller
than a given threshold value P Lthr . Therefore, the probability distribution F (z) of
the existence of a link between a transmitter and receiver z distance units apart is:
F (z) = P {L(X) ≤ z}


Z z
a
(t − µ1 )2
√ exp −
=
dt
2σ12
−∞ σ1 2π



C1 a
z − µ1
√
=
1 + erf
,
2
σ1 2

(11)

where C1 is a normalization coefficient and erf is the well know Gauss function (error
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function) which is defined as
2
erf(x) = √
π

Z

x

2

e−t dt.

0

From the well-known relation
lim F (z) = 1,

z→∞

we obtain C1 = a1 . Consequently, we write
F (z) =
III.1.4

1
2

+

1
erf
2



z−µ
√1
σ1 2



.

(12)

The Distribution Function of Link Duration

The duration of a link is the time interval during which an established communication
link between two vehicles continues to exist. The main goal of this section is to
derive analytical expressions for the (time) duration of a link and the probability
distribution of the link duration.
Computing Link Duration
Assume, without loss of generality, that at time t0 = 0, a communication link is
established between two vehicles i and j moving in the same direction or in the
opposite direction, with j ahead of i. Referring to Figures 18 and 19, let the random
variable X denote the distance separating the two vehicles at link setup time. Mindful
of the maximum DSRC transmission range constraint, we have
0 ≤ X < 300.

(13)

j (vj,aj)
i (vi,ai)
FIG. 18: Illustrating the same direction scenario.
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j (vj,aj)
i (vi,ai)
Si(t0)

Sj(t0)

(a)

j (vj,aj)
i (vi,ai)
Si(t0)

Sj(t0)

(b)

FIG. 19: Illustrating the opposite direction scenario.

It is important to note that X is the convolution of m independent headway
distances with a common log-normal distribution. As discussed before, it is well
known that the convolution of independent log-normal random variables can be
approximated by a log-normal random variable [103, 104]. Thus, we assume that
X ∈ logN(µ, σ) has parameters µ and σ.
We further assume that the speed limit on the roadway is vm and that no vehicle
will travel faster than vm . For t ≥ 0, we define a(t), the acceleration of the vehicle
at time t as follows:
 if a(0) = 0, then a(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0;
 if a(0) > 0, then

(
a(t) =

a(0) for t ≤
0

vm −v(0)
a(0)

otherwise.

(14)

 if a(0) < 0, then

(
a(t) =

a(0) for t ≤
0

−v(0)
a(0)

otherwise.

(15)

In other words, (14) and (15) indicate that as long as the vehicle has not reached
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the maximum speed vm or has not stopped (in case a(0) < 0), its acceleration
remains a(0). However, once the vehicle reaches the speed limit (or has stopped), its
acceleration becomes 0.
Given a generic vehicle with initial speed v(0), the instantaneous speed v(t) at
time t is defined as

Z

t

a(u)du,

v(t) = v(0) +

(16)

0

where for all u ∈ [0, t], a(u) is the instantaneous acceleration at time u defined by
above.
Now, (14) and (15) and (16) combined imply that
 if a(0) = 0, then v(t) = v(0) for all t ≥ 0;
 if a(0) > 0, then

(
v(t) =

v(0) + a(0)t for t ≤
vm

vm −v(0)
a(0)

otherwise.

(17)

 if a(0) < 0, then

(
v(t) =

v(0) + a(0)t for t ≤
0

−v(0)
a(0)

otherwise

(18)

Similarly, the distance that our generic vehicle travels in the time interval [0, t] is
defined as

t

Z
S(t) =

v(x)dx,

(19)

0

where v(x) was defined above.
We now return to our vehicles i and j. To simplify the notation, we write
vi = vi (0), ai = ai (0) and vj = vj (0), aj = aj (0). The instantaneous speeds and
accelerations vi (t) and ai (t), respectively, vj (t) and aj (t) are obtained by suitably
instantiating (14), (15), (17), and (18).
Now, (19) guarantees that the distances traversed in the time interval [0, t] by
vehicle i and j are, respectively,
Z
Si (t) =

t

vi (x)dx
0

(20)
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and

Z

t

vj (x)dx.

Sj (t) =

(21)

0

Assuming that at connection setup (i.e. time 0) the distance between the two
vehicles was X, it follows that the distance between i and j at time t can be written
as
Sj (t) − Si (t) + X.

(22)

It is important to notice that (22) defines a signed distance: indeed, if at time t,
Sj (t) − Si (t) + X > 0, then vehicle j is ahead of i; otherwise, vehicle i is ahead of j.
For later reference, we find it convenient to define the indicator function I(i, j)
intended to capture information about which of the two vehicles is ahead when the
communication link between them breaks:
(
1
if Sj (t) − Si (t) + X > 0
I(i, j) =
−1 otherwise.

(23)

Given that DSRC links break at 300 meters, it follows that when the link breaks
the following relation holds:
Sj (t) − Si (t) + X = 300 · I(i, j).

(24)

Figures 20, 21, and 22 which will be explained in detail below, illustrate the
various possible combination of vi , vj , ai , aj . Figure 20 assumes that vehicles i and j
move in the same direction, i.e. vi , vj > 0. Figure 21 shows the various combinations
of vi , vj , ai , aj when i and j are moving in opposite direction, i.e. {vi < 0, vj > 0}
or {vi > 0, vj < 0}. Figure 22 illustrates that vehicles i and j decelerate to stop in
either same direction or opposite direction. The two figures illustrate the relationship
between speed (v-axis) and time (t-axis). The box beside the speed axis indicates a
possible combination of vi and vj . There are three special times tα , tβ , tγ where tα
is the time when two vehicles have same speed, tβ is the time when one vehicle has
zero speed but the other has nonzero speed and tγ is the time when both vehicles
stop. Due to the existence of a speed limit, we have tε and tζ as special time instants
where tε is the time when one vehicle reaches the speed limit vm and tζ is the time
when both vehicles reach the speed limit. The reason that we discuss these special
time moments is that these special time instants will change the definition of the
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speed and velocity for vehicles and, thereafter, change the link duration time. The
planar regions A0 , A00 and A000 are several sections of the area formed by speed lines.
The planar regions will be used to derive the link duration as notations.
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FIG. 20: Illustrating the same direction case.

m
m
j

i
j

j

i

i

j

i

β
β
i

j

(a)

i

j

β

m

(b)

m
j

i

i

j

(c)

m

j

i

j

i

j

i

i

β
m

m

j
m

(e)

(d)

(f)

FIG. 21: Illustrating the opposite direction case.
We now define a number of time instances that will be used in our analysis:
 provided that

vj −vi
aj −ai

> 0, we write
tα =

vj − vi
;
aj − ai

(25)
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FIG. 22: Both vehicles decelerate and stop: a rare event in a highway scenario.

 define tβ as follows

tβ =















−vi
ai
−vj
aj

if
if

−vi
ai
−vj
aj
−vi
ai

> 0 and
> 0 and

i −vj
min{ −v
, aj }
ai

if

undefined

otherwise;

> 0 and

−vj
aj
−vi
ai
−vj
aj

<0

−vj
aj

>0

<0

(26)

>0

 similarly, define tγ as follows

(
tγ =

i
max{ −v
,
ai

−vj
}
aj

undefined

if

−vi
ai

> 0 and

(27)

otherwise;

 define tε as follows

tε =















vm −vi
ai
vm −vj
aj

if
if

v −v
−vi
> 0 and maj j < 0
ai
−vj
i
> 0 and vma−v
<0
aj
i
vm −vj
vm −vi
> 0 and aj >
ai

i vm −vj
min{ vma−v
, aj }
i

if

undefined

otherwise;

0

(28)

 define tζ as follows

(
tζ =

i
max{ vma−v
,
i

undefined

vm −vj
}
aj

if

vm −vi
ai

> 0 and

otherwise.

vm −vj
aj

>0

(29)

It is important to note that tα ≤ tβ ≤ tγ and tε , tζ only depend on the speeds
and accelerations of the two vehicles at connection setup time as well as on the value
of the speed limit vm . Therefore, vehicles i and j can use the following algorithm to
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predict the time (if any) when the established link will break:
Algorithm III.1.1: FindLinkBreakTime(vi , vj , ai , aj )
procedure ProbeRoutingPath(time)
if |Sj (time) − Si (time) + X| ≥ 300
then t = +(0, time]
else t = −(0, time]
return (t)
main
region = [0, +∞]
x ← use vi , vj , ai , aj to computetα , tβ , tγ , tε , tζ
for each t ∈ x
do region = region ∩ BreakTimeRegion(t)
determine the value of I(x, y) based on the value of region
solve the roots of the equation Sj (t) − Si (t) + X = I(i, j) · 300
time ← determine the right root
output (time)
Discussion: The algorithm FindLinkBreakTime takes the four signed mobility parameters: vi , vj , ai , aj as input and returns the link duration time. First,
tα , tβ , tγ , tε , tζ are computed as described by (25) – (29) above. For each of them,
we check the time region where the link may break. We mark the region where the
link will break as a positive region and the region that the link will not break as a
negative region. Then, we intersect these positive and negative regions to find the
smallest region where the link will break. If it turns out that the connection breaks,
the corresponding value of the indicator function I(i, j) is computed. Finally, we can
solve the equation to find the link duration time.
To make this work easier to read, we will discuss only two of the several possible
cases, namely the one illustrated in Figure 20.e, as an illustrative example of the
“same direction” scenario and the one illustrated in Figure 21.e as an example of
the opposite direction scenario. Both sample cases are representative and prevalent
on highways. We show how to compute the link duration given vi , vj , ai , aj as an
illustration of the Algorithm III.1.1. A detailed derivation of the other cases can be
found in [105]. The exact duration of the link in each of these cases is summarized
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in the appendix (“Link Duration Cases”).
Deriving the Link Duration When the Vehicles Move in the Same Direction
In this scenario we shall discuss only the case vj > vi > 0 in Figure 20.e as an
example. In this example, both vehicles move in the same direction and have positive
accelerations. Sooner or later they will reach the speed limit and will, thereafter,
cruise at the maximum speed.
Case 1: 0 ≤ t ≤ tα

The time region where the link breaks is A0 in Figure 20.e.

Since i, j are in A0 , when the link breaks vehicle j must be ahead of i and, thus,
I(i, j) = 1. Recall that in DSRC the link breaks when the distance between i and j
is 300 meters. Therefore, we can write
Sj (t) − Si (t) + X = 300.

(30)

On the other hand, by (19)
Z

t

Z

t

vj (x)dx −

Sj (t) − Si (t) =
0

vi (x)dx
0

1
1
= aj t2 + vj t − ( ai t2 + vi t)
2
2
1 2
= ar t + vr t.
2
All that remains is to substitute Sj (t) − Si (t) in (30) and to solve for t. Since t < tα ,
we obtain
t=
Case 2: tα < t ≤ tε

−vr +

p

vr2 + 2ar (300 − X)
.
ar

(31)

In this case, the time region where the link breaks is A00 in

Figure 20.e. Since i, j are in A00 , when the link breaks vehicle i must be ahead of
vehicle j; thus I(i, j) = −1 and by (24) we can write
Sj (t) − Si (t) + X = −300.

(32)
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We know that Sj (t) − Si (t) = 21 ar t2 + vr t. By substituting the value of Sj (t) − Si (t)
in (32) and by solving for t we obtain
t=
Case 3: tε < t ≤ tζ

−vr −

p
vr2 − 2ar (300 + X)
.
ar

(33)

In this case, the time region where the link breaks is denoted

by A000 in Figure 20.e. Since i, j are in A000 , when the link breaks vehicle i must be
ahead of vehicle j and so I(i, j) = −1. Thus, we can write
Sj (t) − Si (t) + X = −300

(34)

Observe that by (19), Sj (t) = 21 aj t2 +vj t and Si (t) = vm t− vm2−vi tε . After substituting
the value of Sj (t) − Si (t) in (34) and after solving for t we obtain
−(vj − vm ) −

q
(vj − vm )2 − 2aj (300 + x +

t=

aj

vm −vi
tε )
2

.

(35)

Case 4: tζ < t In this case, the link will not break because the two vehicles are
moving in the same direction and at the same speed. Therefore, in this case, the
connection breaks at +∞. In reality, the +∞ time means an extremely longer time
compared with the average link duration.
The situation in Figure 20.e shows that vehicle i catches up vehicle j, passes j and
finally breaks the link with vehicle j. This is a quite frequent case on the highway.
Deriving the Link Duration When the Vehicles Move in Opposite Directions
In this scenario we shall discuss only the case vj > vi > 0 in Figure 21.e where
vehicles i and j are both accelerating and reaching speed limit while moving in
opposite directions.
Case 1: 0 < t ≤ tε

The time region where the link breaks is denote by A0 in Figure

21.e. Since i, j are in A0 , when the link breaks vehicle j must be ahead of vehicle i
and, consequently, I(i, j) = 1. We can write
Sj (t) − Si (t) + X = 300.

(36)
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It is easy to see that Sj (t) − Si (t) = 21 (aj − ai )t2 + (vj − vi )t = 12 ar t2 + vr t. After
substituting this value in (36), we can solve for t to get
t=
Case 2: tε < t ≤ tζ

−vr +

p

vr2 + 2ar (300 − X)
.
ar

(37)

In this case, the time region where the link breaks is denoted

by A00 in Figure 21.e. Since i, j are in A00 , the vehicle j must be ahead of vehicle i
when the link breaks, thus I(i, j) = 1. We must have
Sj (t) − Si (t) + X = 300.
It is easy to confirm that, in this case, Sj (t) = vm t−

(38)
vm −vj
tε
2

and Si (t) = 12 ai t2 +vi t

since j has already reached the speed limit vm (vj = vm and aj = 0). By substituting
these expressions in (38) and by solving for t we get

t=

q
−(vi − vm ) − (vi − vm )2 − 2ai (300 − X +

vm +vj
tε )
2

ai

.

Case 3: tζ < t In this case the time region where the link breaks is denoted by A000
in Figure 21.e. Since i, j are in A000 , the vehicle j must be ahead of vehicle i when
the link breaks, and so I(i, j) = 1. When the link breaks, we can write
Sj (t) − Si (t) + X = 300
Observe that in this case Sj (t) = vm t −

vm −vj
tε
2

and Si (t) = −vm t −

(39)
−vm −vi
tζ
2

because both vehicles i and j have reached the speed limit. After substituting Sj (t)
and Si (t) and after solving (39) we obtain
t=

300 − X + tε (vm − vj )/2 + tζ (vm + vi )
.
2vm

(40)

This case shows that vehicle j and i move in opposite directions and are accelerating to reach the maximum speed. This is a quite frequent case on the highway.
Reasoning About Link Duration Distribution
With the preamble of the previous section out of the way, we are now ready to state
and prove the following important result.
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Lemma 3. Assuming that X is log-normal with parameters µ and σ, a random
√
variable T = aX + b + c is log-normally distributed, where a, b, c ∈ R, a, b, c 6= 0
and aX + b ≥ 0.
Proof. Let GT be the probability distribution function of T . For every positive t, we
write
GT (t) = Pr[{T ≤ t}].

(41)

Since T is obviously continuous, now, (41) allows us to write
GT (t) = Pr[{T ≤ t}]
√
= Pr[{ aX + b + c ≤ t}]
= Pr[{aX ≤ (t − c)2 − b}]
(
2
Pr[{X ≤ (t−c)a −b }] for a > 0
=
2
Pr[{X ≥ (t−c)a −b }] for a < 0



 FX (t−c)2 −b
for a > 0
a

=
2
 1 − FX (t−c) −b
for a < 0
a
where FX is the probability distribution function of X. When a > 0, it is clear that
T is log-normally distributed.
Next, we propose to show that T is also log-normally distributed when a < 0.
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For this purpose, using (12), we write

1 − FX

(t − c)2 − b
a



1 1
= 1 − − erf
2 2



ln z − µ(X)
√
σ(X) 2



2

=
=

=
=
=
=

[where z = (t−c)a −b ]



1
ln z − µ(X)
√
1 − erf
2
σ(X) 2



ln z − µ(X)
1
√
1 + erf −
2
σ(X) 2
[since −erf (x) = erf (−x)]



1
− ln z + µ(X)
√
1 + erf
2
σ(X) 2

 1

ln z + µ(X)
1
√
1 + erf
2
σ(X) 2
!#
"
ln (t−c)a 2 −b − (−µ(X))
1
√
1 + erf
2
σ(X) 2


a
FY
,
(t − c)2 − b

(42)

where Y is a log-normal random variable with parameters −µ(X) and σ(X). Thus,
in all cases, T obeys a log-normal distribution, completing the proof.
Lemma 4. Assuming that X is log-normal with parameters µ and σ, the random
variable T = aX + b is log-normally distributed, where a, b, c ∈ R and a, b, c 6= 0.
Proof. Let GT be the probability distribution function of T . For every positive t, we
write
GT (t) = Pr[{T ≤ t}].
Now, (43) allows us to write
GT (t) = Pr[{T ≤ t}]
= Pr[{aX + b ≤ t}]
= Pr[{aX ≤ t − b}]
(
Pr[{X ≤ t−b
}] for a > 0
a
=
Pr[{X ≥ t−b
}] for a < 0
a
(

FX t−b
for a > 0
a
=

1 − FX t−b
for a < 0
a

(43)
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where FX is the probability function of X. When a > 0, we observe that T is lognormally distributed. It remains to be shown that T is log-normally distributed even
if a < 0. From (12), we write

1 − FX

t−b
a



1 1
= 1 − − erf
2 2

=
=

=
=
=
=



ln z − µ(X)
√
σ(X) 2



]
[where z = t−b


a
1
ln z − µ(X)
√
1 − erf
2
σ(X) 2



1
ln z − µ(X)
√
1 + erf −
2
σ(X) 2
[since −erf (x) = erf (−x)]



1
− ln z + µ(X)
√
1 + erf
2
σ(X) 2

 1

ln z + µ(X)
1
√
1 + erf
2
σ(X) 2



a
ln t−b
− (−µ(X))
1
√
1 + erf
2
σ(X) 2


a
FY
t−b

(44)

where Y is a log-normal random variable with parameters −µ(X) and σ(X). Thus,
in all cases T is log-normally distributed, completing the proof.
Lemma 5. Suppose that the communication link between two vehicles i and j breaks
at time t. The link duration time is either a linear function of X or a square root
function of X.
Proof. Recall that when the link breaks, t satisfies (24). By the definition of Si (t), we
Rt
know that Si (t) = 0 vi (x)dx is a linear function of t when the speed vi is constant,
i.e. vi (t) = vm . Let Si (t) = at + b. Similarly, Sj (t) is a linear function of t when
vj is constant, i.e. vj (t) = vm . Let Sj (t) = ct + d. When both Si (t) and Sj (t) are
linear function of t, substituting the corresponding values of Sj (t) and Si (t) in (24),
we obtain
(a − c)t + b − d + X = I(i, j)300
⇒t=

I(i, j)300 − X − b + d
.
a−c

(45)
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The t can be a linear function when both vi (t) and vj (t) are constant. If any of
vi (t) and vj (t) is not a constant function, the distance function will be a polynomial
function with degree 2. Without loss of generality, we let vi (t) = vi (0) + ai t, by
definition, the distance function
Z

t

vi (0) + ai xdx

Si (t) =
0

1
= vi (0)t + ai t2 .
2

(46)

Therefore, Sj (t) − Si (t) will be a quadratic polynomial. Suppose Sj (t) − Si (t) =
at2 + bt + c and a 6= 0. Substitute Sj (t) − Si (t) in (24) to get the quadratic equation
at2 + bt + c + X − I(i, j)300 = 0.

(47)

Clearly, t exists because the link breaks at time t. Therefore, the solution must be a
square root function of X. This completes the proof.
Theorem 1. The duration of the link between vehicles i and j is log-normally distributed.
Proof. By Lemma 5, the link duration can be expressed as one of the two formulas:
√
√
aX + b or aX + b + c. By Lemma 3, the expression aX + b + c is log-normally
distributed. By Lemma 4, aX + b is log-normally distributed. Thus, in all cases, the
duration of the link has a log-normal distribution. This completes the proof of the
theorem.
The Mean of Link Duration
Let Φ be a set of all real combinations of vi , vj , ai , aj on roads and φ be the size of
Φ. Let Pk be the probability of the case k ∈ Φ and Tk be the link duration of case
k. By the law of total expectation, we can obtain the overall expected duration of a
link E(link),

E(link) =

φ
X
k=1

Pk Tk .

(48)
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Theoretically, the E(link) can be computed by (48). But there are no analytical
results or field-tested data on Pk and Tk in the literature. We will leave the computation of the expected link duration as future work. Once we have the probability
function of a link, we can easily compute the probability of a link by suitably instantiating t in GT (t). Specifically, the t is usually the routing path duration requirement
EDur.
III.2

OUR PROPOSED PROTOCOL

The main contribution of this section is to show how the proposed routing protocol
works on the basis of the above probability model. We assume that the system is
composed by vehicles which are installed with transceivers, GPS and unique identities. For the purpose of this work, we assume that the traffic is moderate in intensity,
since sparse traffic renders networking as we describe it impossible. We also assumed
that only the vehicles on the same direction will be recruited to propagate packets because the oncoming vehicles break the routing link sooner than the same directional
vehicles.
III.2.1

Probing the Routing Path

Due to high mobility, the topology of the network is constantly changing. Therefore,
a reactive routing path probing is needed, i.e. routing path searching is on-demand,
for example, DSDV. In the literature, there are several reactive routing protocols,
for example AODV and DSR etc. which were discussed in Chapter II.1.2. These
protocols find a routing path on the basis of reachability instead of quality of the
routing path. We propose a new routing path search protocol on the basis of quality
of the routing path: the duration of the routing path, as well as the reachability.
This is because the duration of a routing path is the most difficult and important
metric to consider when routing packets in the presence of high vehicular mobility.
In the routing process illustrated in Figure 23.a, we use the unique vehicle ID as
the network address. The source vehicle will send out a probing request, a control
packet: Prb. Since the Prb is broadcast by the wireless channel, all vehicles in the
transmission range will receive it and compute the distance from the sender, the
duration of the link and the probability of link duration. The computation is based
on the previous discussion. An acknowledgment packet AckP will be constructed by
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using the computed distance, duration, and probability of link duration. The AckP
is sent back to the sender who will collect multiple AckP s and select the best link.
The best link is the one with highest probability and larger duration than the routing
path duration requirement EDur. The sender only sends a confirmation packet CfmP
to the best link, which will further explore the routing path by multicasting the Prb.
When the destination node receives the probing packet, it will terminate the probing
and send an acknowledgment packet back to the source node along the newly formed
routing path. This completes the routing path exploration stage. The route we found
is optimal in terms of duration length.

Sender

Receiver
Prb

Sender

AckP

Receiver
Upd

AckU

CfmP

CfmU
(b)

(a)

FIG. 23: The proposed protocol

type
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Dst

ID

pre

next
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r_a
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dis

Others
(len, chksum, priority, sig, etc)
FIG. 24: The packet header

III.2.2

A Summary

The following pseudo-code is intended to summarize our previous discussion:
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Algorithm III.2.1: RoutingPathProtocol(packet)
main
while p ← receive a packet


if p.type = P rb or p.type = U pd







then




t ← FindLinkBreakTime(vi , vj , ai , aj )












P r ← compute the probability of link duration




d ← compute the distance from the sender








construct a ACK ← t, d, P r









send the ACK to the sender respectively






if p.type = AckU





then


(



select the hop with highestP r and t < EDur





send a confirm packet CfmU





if p.type = AckP






then


(


select the hop with highestP r and t < EDur
do
do

send a confirm packet CfmP





if p.type = CfmP






then







if p.hops < M axHop







 then




do



broadcast a P rb message to find the next hop










else send ERR message to sender





if p.type = CfmU





then







if p.hops < M axHop










then


do




broadcast a U pd message to find the next hop









else send ERR message to sender




drop message p
Discussion: The algorithm RoutingPathProtocol involves an infinite loop. In
each iteration, it takes one packet, parses the type of the packet and processes the
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packet according to its type. Packets of type P rb or U pd are processed similarly:
1) computing the link duration, the probability of a link duration with the EDur,
and the distance from the sender; 2) sending an acknowledgment packet AckP if the
packet is P rb or AckU if the packet is U pd. If the type of the packet is AckP or AckU,
we will select the hop that satisfies the condition that the link duration is greater than
the path duration requirement, and that is a hop with highest probability computed
by method in Section III.1.3 using EDur. If the type of the packet is CfmP or CfmU,
the protocol will continue to find the next hop. From the above discussion, we can
observe that the probing of the routing path is processed by the control packet P rb.
The maintenance of the routing path is done by the control packet U pd.
III.2.3

Routing Path Maintenance

In this section, we are going to address two routing path maintenance methods, local
repair and global repair. First, the links that cause the breakage of the routing path
will be locally repaired/replaced. Second, a backup route will be constructed globally
before the breakage of the current routing path and will be switched as the current
route. The repair procedures are based on the prediction of the link duration and the
probability of the link duration discussed in Section III.1.3. By using this prediction,
we can repair the current path before it is broken. In this way, we enhance the
reliability of the routing path and provide location availability.
Local Repair
In our protocol, data packets will include a mobility header which includes: the type
of the packet (“type” in Figure 24), the duration of the link (“dur”), the routing path
duration requirement (“EDur”), the probability of the link (“Pr”), the number of
hops (“Hop”), the source and destination address (“Src”, “Dst”), the current node’s
id (“ID”), the previous and next router (“pre”,“next”), the receiver of the link’s
signed speed and acceleration (“rv ”,“ra ”), the sender of the link’s signed speed and
acceleration (“sv ”,“sa ”), the distance of the link (“dis”). During the communication,
each receiver of a link will monitor the connectivity condition of the link by computing
the duration and the probability of the link. If the link is about to break, the receiver
will send a control packet RBRK (Routing BReaK). The sender will send a U pd
packet whose hop is set to 1. The U pd packet only explore the one-hop neighbors to
find a replacement link.
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Global Repair
All the vehicles along the routing path know the expected expiration time of the
path. These vehicles do not need to check the connectivity of the routing path if
the vehicles move at constant speed. But the prediction of the routing path needs
to be updated due to the dynamics of vehicular mobility where vehicles accelerate
and decelerate randomly. Therefore, the connectivity of the routing path needs to
be updated as well.
The frequency of the updating packets tupd is determined as follows. There is
a fixed frequency, tuf for example, 10 seconds. Consider that there will be some
short connection. Suppose ppnt is a certain percentage of the routing path duration
requirement EDur. The frequency of updating packets is tuf if tuf ≤ ppnt ∗ EDur,
otherwise, it is ppnt ∗ EDur if tuf > ppnt ∗ EDur.
As shown in Figure 23.b, the source node sends a update packet U pd every tupd
seconds. When a node receives the U pd, it computes the distance from the sender,
the duration of the link and the probability of the link. The computation is based on
the previous discussion and will not be repeated here. An acknowledgment packet
AckU is constructed using the computed distance, duration, and probability of the
link. The AckU is sent back to the sender who will collect multiple AckU s and
will select the best link which is the one with highest probability and having larger
duration than the routing path duration requirement EDur. The sender only sends
a confirmation packet CfmU to the best link, which will further explore the routing
path by multicasting the U pd. When the destination node receives the update packet,
it will terminate the updating process and will send an acknowledgment packet back
to the source node along the latest routing path. This completes the routing path
update.
III.3

SUMMARY

In this chapter, we addressed a fundamental problem, namely that of enhancing location availability. Due to the high vehicle mobility, the topology of VANET changes
constantly. The changing topology makes the wireless connection (routing) difficult
and makes location availability extremely challenging. Our motivation is to ensure
location availability over a certain period of time by computing the duration of a
routing path and the probability of the path. To compute the two parameters for
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the routing path, we compute the two parameters for the routing links which compose
the routing path.
We first discussed the probability analytical model which is the basis of our wireless routing protocol. The motivation of the model is to derive the expression of
link duration and the distribution of link probability. We started from the concept
of headway distance. Given the mobility of each vehicle, we can compute the link
duration. With the fact that headway distance is log-normally distributed, we can
show that the distribution of link duration is log-normally distributed as well. Once
we have the two expressions of link duration and link probability, we can construct
a routing path. Since the duration of our routing path is predictable, we can reduce the maintenance control messages and achieve good status of the routing path.
Therefore, we can reduce the control message overhead and improve the response
time of messages (by avoiding rebuilding a routing path).
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CHAPTER IV
LOCATION INTEGRITY
We present validation mechanisms to provide location integrity in VANETs. In our
approach, we use network cells as both security and communication units. Providing
location integrity is thus split into intra-cell integrity and inter-cell integrity. We
provide three solutions to intra-cell integrity; each of the three solutions assumes
different on-board equipped devices. First, we assume that all vehicles are equipped
with an on-board radar device, a GPS unit and a standard transceiver. To ensure
intra-cell location information integrity, we propose an active validation solution
(called active location integrity) which relies on the help of on-board radar to detect neighboring vehicles and to confirm their alleged coordinates. Since radar is
not currently installed in all vehicles, we propose a second solution (called passive
location integrity) which relies on information fusion to filter out malicious data and
refine low-resolution location information into high-resolution location information.
Mindful of the fact that some of the vehicles participating in the traffic may not have
any of these devices, we propose a third validation solution (called general location
integrity) which combines the active and passive location integrity solutions. Since
VANET applications often need the location information of vehicles that belong to
different cells, we address inter-cell location information integrity as well. Vehicles
request that their neighbors or vehicles in oncoming traffic check the alleged location information of remote vehicles. Both the request and response messages are
propagated among the cells.
The validated location obtained from the above mechanisms is stored in the memory of vehicles in a certain time interval. The stored locations constitute a location
history, called Map History. The map history can further improve the location integrity. The map history can be used to distinguish a “real” location from a “fabricated” location. The basic idea is that any vehicle without historical consistency
is highly suspect. All location information must be consistent with the location history. The vehicles which send fabricated locations will be isolated by using a trust
mechanism. If a vehicle is isolated, the vehicle will not be able to receive or send
messages from or to other vehicles. We will also address the trust mechanism in this
chapter.
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IV.1

CELL-BASED NETWORK

Based on the philosophy of “divide and conquer”, a cell-based network is adopted
in this dissertation. The advantage of this network is local optimization for both
location integrity and location availability. For integrity, we can use an “eye device”
(i.e. radar) to validate the location and achieve local optimization of location integrity
inside a single cell. Once we achieve local optimization, we can extend the local
optimization to global, i.e. inter-cell optimization. In this chapter, we assume a
medium level of traffic density. Scenarios of sparse traffic or traffic with gaps are our
future work.
IV.1.1

Network Formation

Network communication can be modeled either as a city scenario or a highway scenario. We choose to address the highway scenario because we are concerned with
security, and Leinmüller et al. [106, 107] showed that the effects of malicious nodes
in a highway scenario are worse than in a city scenario.
Network Cells
Two types of cells have been proposed in the literature [26, 75]: dynamic cells and
location-based cells. Dynamic cells are vehicle clusters that are formed on the fly
based on the current location of vehicles. Location-based cells are specific regions
that are pre-defined on the digital map. Although dynamic cells are flexible, they
are not efficient. Location-based cells, on the other hand, are created in advance,
and vehicles use their GPS coordinates to map themselves to their respective cells.
These preset cells avoid the need to undergo the complex process of forming a cell.
In this dissertation, we use location-based cells to build a communication network.
An example of two cells is shown in Figure 78. The center of a cell is in the median
between the two directions of traffic. We assume the two directions of traffic in the
same cell can always communicate with each other, i.e. there are no large obstacles
between the two directions.
The Advantage of Cells
In VANETs, routing protocols are often based on flooding because the topology
changes very frequently. In flooding, every incoming packet is sent out by wireless
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FIG. 25: System model. The circular areas are the preset cells. A vehicle compares
its GPS coordinates with these preset cells to identify its host cell.

broadcasting. No routing table are necessary. The major problem with flooding is
the vast number of duplicates packets. Some means of controlling the unchecked
growth of the number of packets is needed.
The reason we use cells is to save bandwidth, reduce delay and increase security.
We try to avoid flooding messages over the whole network all the time. Bandwidth
is wasted by flooding messages because all nodes are involved in relaying and communicating. Significant delays can be caused by the collision of flooding messages
and even the broadcast storm [108] may arise in dense traffic. Last but not least,
the more vehicles that are involved in forwarding the message, the more likely the
message is modified.
We want to reduce the number of routing participants. Therefore, we partition
the network into small cells. In each cell, we locally manage the information. Only
a cell leader and a cell router respond to the request from inter-cell nodes. The
rest of the nodes in the cell keep silent but monitor the behavior of the cell leader
and cell router. The cell-based structure improves the scalability of the system. In
flooding, the number of duplicates will exponentially increase with the distance of
message propagation. In cell-based routing, for each hop, there are only one or two
cell routers involved. It dramatically reduces the number of duplicate messages.
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Formation of Network Cells
We configure the road with virtual digital cells. For example, every 300 meters there
is a cell on the road, i.e., cell’s radius is 150 meters. All vehicles inside a cell are
one-hop neighbors. The diameter of cells matches the transmission range of radar, so
that all the neighbors inside can be directly detected by radar when the line of sight
is clear. In this dissertation, we use a highway model and assume that cell overlap
is about 30 meters. When vehicles are close to the overlap area between two cells,
they may be chosen as routing vehicles as will be discussed in Section IV.1.2.
The series of cell center coordinates are (Xci , Y ci ), 0 < ci < n. A vehicle is at
coordinate (xv , yv ) on the highway. The computer in the vehicle will find the closest
cell center coordinates (Xck , Y ck ) to the vehicle’s coordinates. If the coordinates
satisfy (xv − Xck )2 + (yv − Y ck )2 ≤ 1502 , the vehicle is in cell k.
IV.1.2

Message Propagation

Location messages can be propagated over the cell-based network. For example, a
observer vehicle A wants to know the topology of a certain cell whose cell leader is
B. To save bandwidth, the request message is not propagated by all vehicles but only
by cell leaders and cell routers. The request will be delivered to B. The cell leader B
will send back topology packets which can be used by the observer to build a rough
topology of the network cells. The message routing process is shown in Figure 26.

x

A

x

x

x

B

FIG. 26: Message propagation over the cell based network.

Cell Leader
The main duties of the cell leader are to verify the GPS location of all the vehicles
in its cell, aggregate these locations and broadcast this data to other vehicles in the
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cell. The cell leader collects the locations of all vehicles in its cell and exchanges this
location information with other cells.
If a leader is determined to be malicious, the leader can be challenged by another
member of the cell. A vehicle challenging to become the new leader must meet one of
the following conditions: 1) be closest to cell center, 2) be approaching the cell leader.
Condition 1 has precedence over condition 2. We can use the following formula to
compute the score s for each leader candidate
s = Cdc ∗ Dc + Cdi ∗ Di

(49)

where Cdc is a coefficient for the distance between the vehicle and the center of the
cell, Dc is the distance to the cell center, Cdi is a coefficient for the traveling direction,
and Di is the traveling direction. If the vehicle is moving towards the center of the
cell then Di = 1. If it is moving away from the center then Di = −1. We define
Cdc =

R
Dc +1

and Cdi = R. The candidate with highest score wins.

If a leader is about to exit the cell, the leader will send an announcement to
inform other vehicles. The other vehicles will elect a new leader to replace the
existing one. The algorithm of electing a new leader is same as the challenging
algorithm stated above. Therefore, a leader normally can stay in action for about
150m. The advantage of this cell-based network is lower risk of attacks. Even if there
are attackers who temporally are cell leaders, they can only harm the system during
a short period of time. The drawback of this cell-based network is control message
overhead. But the control messages are local, i.e. inside a cell. There is not much
effect on inter-cell communication.
Cell Router
The purpose of a cell router is to propagate messages from cell to cell and to reduce
the number of duplicate messages. Determination of cell routers is similar to the
determination of a cell leader. The difference is that two cell routers (upstream and
downstream) will be determined instead of only one. Routers should be far from
the center of the cell and close to the overlapping region. Cell routers can also be
selected on the basis of link duration and link probability which are computed by
a probability model discussed in Chapter III. The basic idea is as follows: the cell
leader wants to send an aggregated location message to other vehicles which are
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outside of the cell leader’s cell. The cell leader will compute the link duration and
link probability among all neighboring vehicles. Then, the cell leader will select a
neighboring vehicle which has the largest link duration and link probability value, as
the cell router.
IV.2

ACTIVE LOCATION INTEGRITY

In this section, we assume that all vehicles have on-board radar, GPS, and transceiver.
The network is a homogenous system, i.e. all vehicles are installed with the same
devices. In this scenario, we will address our first solution active location integrity.
Underlying our solution is the famous adage: “Seeing is believing”. We use onboard radar as the virtual “eye” of a vehicle and a wireless transceiver as the virtual
“ear”. Although the “eyesight” is limited due to a modest radar transmission range,
a vehicle can “see” surrounding vehicles and “hear” reports of their GPS coordinates.
In accord with other works, we assume that the majority of cars (about 85%)
are honest [109]. By comparing what is seen to what has been heard, a vehicle can
corroborate the real location of neighbors and isolate malicious vehicles to achieve
local security. We expect the on-board radar device to provide useful corroboration of
reported location information, except for during short transient periods. For example,
the line-of-sight that radar needs may be temporarily obstructed by a large truck.
Due to the dynamic nature of traffic, even if there are transient obstructions, the line
of sight will be restored eventually.
Since radar has a range limit and the transceivers are limited by DSRC, we
build network cells as security units as well as communication units. We use preset
location-based cells as a basis for our approach. Each vehicle in the cell can directly
communicate with every other vehicle in the cell. To achieve intra-cell security, a
vehicle may use its radar to verify its neighbors’ locations or issue queries to verify
the location of a specified vehicle in the cell. In this way, each vehicle in the cell
knows the location of the other vehicles in the cell with high certainty.
In addition, we propose a solution to provide inter-cell location information integrity for two reasons. The first reason is that applications often refer to location
information of remote vehicles which are beyond a cell (ranging up to several miles).
The second reason is that the on-board radar is not strong enough to verify vehicles
in remote cells. When a vehicle receives an aggregated message which declares the
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location of remote vehicles, the vehicle can randomly challenge and confirm the location of a vehicle in a remote cell by using the on-board radar in oncoming traffic.
In this solution, we only cover the solution that challenges and confirms the location
of a remote vehicle with the help of radar. When radar is not available, we can
rely on location reports from the oncoming traffic or confirmed location reports from
neighbors.
IV.2.1

Intra-cell Integrity

In this section we propose a method of verifying the location inside a cell, i.e. intracell integrity. Radar will be used to verify the reported location of vehicles, i.e. GPS
location. Using radar, we can obtain the relative velocity, angle and location of the
target vehicle. Both GPS location and radar location detections have measurement
errors. The measurement errors will form a set of possible locations. If we can
find an overlap between the two sets of locations from GPS measurement and radar
detection, we can confirm the reported GPS location using radar detection.
GPS Location
In GPS, when satellite radio signals are transmitted, they are distorted by the troposphere and the ionosphere. Therefore GPS coordinates have some error. GPS data
normally varies in the range of ∆x = ±10m; ∆y = ±10m [110]. In Figure 27, we
assume that ∆x and ∆y are always equal, marked as ∆x = ∆y = ∆α. The shadowed
region is the set of possible real vehicle locations. We use (x, y) to represent the real
location of vehicle. We can use (50) to describe this region.
(x − xgps )2 + (y − ygps )2 ≤ (∆α)2

(50)

Radar-Detected Location
Since radar also suffers from measurement errors, we assume that the radar’s error
includes two parts: angle error 4θ and radius error 4γ, marked as (4θ, 4γ). In
Figure 28, the region bounded by HGQFEP is the set of possible locations of the
detected vehicle. We use (x, y) to represent the real location of vehicle in the GPS
system and mark the radar readings as (θ, γ). We can use (51) and (52) to describe
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FIG. 27: GPS coordinates location. The GPS error results in a set of possible GPS
location, shown as a shadow. (xgps , ygps )is detection value of the GPS coordinates.

the circle D and circle C in Figure 28, respectively.
(x − γ × cos (θ − ∆θ))2 + (y − γ × sin (θ − ∆θ))2 ≤ (∆γ)2

(51)

(x − γ × cos (θ + ∆θ))2 + (y − γ × sin (θ + ∆θ))2 ≤ (∆γ)2

(52)

Here, θ is the detected angle, starting from north 0 degree and γ is the detected
radius in meters (distance between vehicle A and vehicle B ).
We note that there are two small regions HRG and EBF where the vehicle could
be located, but these regions are not described by (51) or (52). Therefore we use the
following formula to describe the region FCGHDE in Figure 28:
(

γ − ∆γ ≤

p
x2 + y 2 ≤ γ + ∆γ

θ − ∆θ ≤ arctan xy ≤ θ + ∆θ

(53)

Although (53) includes some regions which are described by (51) and (52), for
example the region RGCFB, this has no negative effect because we will find an
intersection between the GPS location formula and radar location formula by using
the technique to be described in the next section.
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FIG. 28: Radar detected location.

Combining GPS and Radar Coordinates
To draw a conclusion, such as “my neighbor is lying to me about its location”, we
need to reason about the overlap (solution) between the GPS location formula and
the radar location formula.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the possible vehicle is at the center of
GPS location and radar location, shown as the lightly shaded area in Figure 29. If
any of the following combinations has a solution, we can draw a conclusion that the
detected vehicle is honest: (50) and (51); (50) and (52); (50) and (53). Otherwise
the vehicle’s location is infeasible and we conclude that the vehicle lies about its
actual location. The meaning of these combinations is shown in Figure 29. If the
GPS possible location intersects the radar possible location region, i.e. if there is
an intersection between the GPS location shadow and radar location shadow, this
means the GPS possible location is very close the value which is detected by the
radar system. Therefore, we claim that we can accept the GPS location, i.e. we
achieve the intra-cell location information integrity.
IV.2.2

Inter-cell Integrity

Similar to the idea behind greedy algorithms, local security is the basis of global
security. In a greedy algorithm, we determine local optimal solutions and combine
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FIG. 29: Confirming GPS coordinates on GPS and radar location, if there is an
intersection area between GPS location and radar location, we accept the GPS coordinates, otherwise discard it.

them to obtain a possibly optimal solution in the global region. Here, we use radar
to obtain local security and combine the local security in various regions to get global
security.
The basic idea of inter-cell security is to challenge and confirm the location of a
vehicle in a remote cell by using the on-board radar in oncoming traffic. It is based on
the fact that the vehicles in the same cell would see and hear almost the same traffic
and road situation, so any modification done by malicious nodes can be detected by
other honest vehicles. These honest vehicles then broadcast the correct record and
isolate the malicious vehicles. An adversary may launch a Sybil attack or two types
of location attacks: 1) the compromised vehicle continually lies about its location,
2) the compromised vehicle occasionally lies about its location. We can successfully
solve the first type of location attack using the solutions described here.
Locally secured location needs to be propagated so that other vehicles approaching the cell may benefit from it. For this purpose, we use a cell router in each direction
to minimize collisions and bandwidth usage. An alternative approach could be to use
the distance from the message source as a factor in determining the next broadcast
time. The reason we opted not to use it is because of the fact that in heavy traffic situations, there can be more than one car at approximately the same distance
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(taking precision error into account). This would increase the chance of collisions.
Other vehicles in the cell have the responsibility of monitoring the responses of the
cell router or cell leader. If either of them tries to change the records or inject wrong
information, honest vehicles can notify other members and initiate the process to find
a cell router or cell leader and broadcast the correct record. There could be a case
where the presence of many compromised vehicles might isolate honest vehicles. We
propose a challenging method on the basis of the following facts: (1) it is most likely
that majority of the nodes are honest (one of our assumptions), (2) even if in one
cell there are more compromised than honest nodes, it is difficult to maintain such
a topology in a VANET, and (3) to confirm whether the cell router is compromised,
vehicles in other cells who have received records from this cell router can run a simple
verification test as described below.
A message challenging method is used to verify records which are disputed. Whenever vehicles in a cell do not agree with the message broadcasted, they express their
concern by broadcasting their records about the observed vehicle. Each record is
associated with vehicle’s ID (e.g. Electronic License Plate). A vehicle getting different information for the same vehicle can verify the disputed record through this
challenging method.
Since we assume that traffic moves in both directions, a node can send the verification request to the cell router in the oncoming direction. We show an example in
Figure 30. Traffic is moving in two directions: the bottom road is eastbound whereas
the top road is westbound. Suppose car F transmits a message which is propagated
backwards and eventually received by car A. If car A would like to verify the location received from car F, it can send the verification request using cars moving in the
oncoming direction. Cell routers propagate the message to neighboring cells until it
reaches the destination cell as determined by sender. The destination can be more
than one cell depending on the location of the node when the record was sent, its
speed and the cell where it was present. Once the car with the same ID is identified,
its location can be verified and a response can be generated. If there is no such node
in the potential destination cells, or the location information was modified, then the
record is considered to be spurious and is dropped. The sender of that record comes
under the scrutiny of other honest nodes.
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FIG. 30: Message routing among the cells.

IV.3

PASSIVE LOCATION INTEGRITY

For three major reasons, we propose a solution to validate location information without the help of radar. First, radar will not work when the line of sight is blocked,
although the active location integrity model can prevent many location related attacks. In this scenario, vehicles have to trust their neighbors. But there definitely is
a certain risk that the neighbors are the location attackers. Another problem in the
active location integrity model is that there is no relationship between identity and
the location of a vehicle. Suppose two vehicles a and b are at location pa and pb . An
attacker announces that vehicle a is at location pb and b at pa . By using radar, we
cannot tell if the statement is true or not because radar can only detect the presence
of vehicles. No identities are related to the presence of vehicles. The third, not all
vehicles may have an on-board radar installed.
Therefore, we propose a passive location integrity model. In this solution, we
remove the requirement of a radar device but keep GPS and transceiver devices.
Vehicles collect location information from neighbors and from the oncoming traffic.
The collection of locations include reports from honest vehicles and reports from
malicious attackers. We apply a statistical method to filter out malicious reports.
After validating and filtering out false or inaccurate locations, we can refine the
remaining location reports and obtain an average estimation of location.
The passive location integrity model provides intra-cell location information integrity. For inter-cell location integrity, we can keep the same algorithm as the one
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presented in Section IV.2.1. We rely on the intra-cell location validation method
to check the announced location. In inter-cell algorithm, we apply a suitable intracell location validation method in the last cell that includes the announced location.
Therefore, the substitution of intra-cell method does not affect the inter-cell location
integrity.
IV.3.1

Data Sources

Since radar is no longer present, we can only rely on the transceiver to obtain location information about other vehicles. When an observer receives an announced
location from a neighbor, the observer monitors the source location of the neighbor
by wireless signal strength. If the source location of the radio matches the announced
location (with a certain error tolerance), the observer accepts the announced location.
Otherwise, it ignores the announced location.
Based on the sources of location information, we can have two types of data: data
from neighboring vehicles and data from oncoming traffic attackers. The location
reports can come from neighboring vehicles shown in Figure 31. The neighboring
vehicles are co-directional vehicles on the co-direction in a cell. The oncoming vehicles
are ones on opposite direction in a cell.
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FIG. 31: Data sources. The neighboring vehicles are ones with upper cases letters.
The oncoming traffic vehicles are one with lower case letters.
Based on the threat model, we assume that the location information collected by
the observer includes two types of location reports. One type of location report is the
one from malicious attackers, called malicious report. Since attackers can modify the
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values of locations into any arbitrary number, there is no universal distribution of the
location from malicious attackers. Figure 32 shows malicious locations as the squares
deviating far from normally distributed location. Another type of location reports is
the observation from honest vehicles. These observations generally have a consistent
distribution, e.g. a certain error which is often assumed as a normal distribution.
Figure 33 shows the one dimensional location with normal distribution. In reality,
the collected location report depends on the number of neighboring vehicles. The
mean value of this type of location report is close to the actual location. We assume
that the majority of vehicles are honest. In this section, our motivation is to filter the
malicious location and then to determine the accepted location from the collected
location report.
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FIG. 32: Passive integrity: raw location reports. One square represents one location
report. The outliers are malicious location report with abnormal values.

IV.3.2

Filtering Out Malicious Data

Once the location announcements/reports are collected, a statistical method will be
applied to filter out the abnormal location reports sent by malicious vehicles. The
statistical method is called Mahalanobis Distance, a distance measure introduced by
P. C. Mahalanobis [111].
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FIG. 33: Passive integrity: filtered location reports. One square represents one location report. These reports include measurement errors and are assumed as normally
distributed.

The Standard Mahalanobis Distance
The Mahalanobis distance is a useful technique of determining the similarity between
an unknown sample set and a known one. The idea of Mahalanobis distance is the
following: if two input locations belong to the same distribution, the Mahalanobis
distance value of the two locations will fall into a certain range; on the other hand, if
two input locations do not belong to the same distribution, the Mahalanobis distance
value of the two locations will be far from the range. Base on this fact, we can
filter out the abnormal locations. Formally, the Mahalanobis distance is defined as a
dissimilarity measure between two random vectors ~x and ~y with the same distribution
and covariance matrix S :
d(~x, ~y ) =

p
(~x − ~y )T S −1 (~x − ~y ).
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If the covariance matrix is the identity matrix, the Mahalanobis distance reduces to
the Euclidean distance which is the distance between two points, i.e.
v
u n
uX
t (xi − yi )2 .
i=1

We assume the sample points are distributed about the center of mass in a elliptical
manner.
An Intuitive Explanation
It is known that the normally distributed data can be illustrated using a ellipse in
a two dimensional space. As an intuitive explanation, the Mahalanobis distance is
simply the distance of the test point from the center of mass divided by the width
of the ellipse in the direction of the test point. For example, A and B are two test
points, shown in Figure 34. The Mahalanobis distance value of A is

OA
OW

where OA

is the distance of the test point A from the center of mass O and OW is the width
of the ellipse in the direction of the test point A. The Mahalanobis distance value
of B is

OB
OW

where OB is the distance of the test point B from the center of mass

O and OW is the width of the ellipse in the direction of the test point B. If the
Mahalanobis distance of a test point is large, the test point must be a outlier which
will be abandoned from the sample set. In our problem, the attackers will give an
abnormal location report which is far away from the normal location reports. By
applying the Mahalanobis distance, we can filter out these malicious reports from
the sample set. For example, OB has a larger value and is larger than 1. Therefore,
B must be an outlier. In three dimensional space, the Mahalanobis distance has a
similar definition. For example, test points A and B have the Mahalanobis distance
value

OA
OW

and

OB
OW

respectively, shown in Figure 35.
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FIG. 34: Two-dimensional space.

Page 83 of 169

B
A

W

O

FIG. 35: Three-dimensional space.

The Problem
Based on the data source introduced earlier, the location information collected by an
observer includes two types of data: good reports and malicious reports. The good
reports are from honest vehicles, and the malicious reports are from malicious attackers. Based on our assumption, we assume that the malicious reports are locations
with abnormal values, i.e. outliers. For each of the n observations in a p-dimensional
data set, a Mahalanobis distance value M Di is calculated. Let x be the sample mean
vector and let V be the sample covariance matrix,
n

V

1 X
=
(xi − x)(xi − x)T .
n − 1 i=1

(54)

Then
M Di =

p
{(xi − x)V −1 (xi − x)T }

(55)

for i = 1, · · · , n. Observations with large Di -values may be considered to be outlying.
Di is composed by the mean x and the sample covariance V . Traditionally,
the sample mean and the sample covariance matrix give a good estimation of data
location and data shape if it is not contaminated by outliers. When the location
input is contaminated, the mean x and the sample covariance V will deviate and
be significantly affected by the outliers. Therefore the value of the Mahalanobis
distance affected by outliers will deviate from the real value as well and result in a
false location estimation which will harm location integrity.
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A New Mahalanobis Distance
To remove the deviation of outliers, we replace the sample mean x and the sample
covariance V by the sample median x∗ and the robust covariance S, respectively.
The robust covariance S is defined as follows:
Pn
− x∗ k)(xi − x∗ )(xi − x∗ )T
i=1 K(kx
Pi n
S =
,
∗
i=1 K(kxi − x k)

(56)

where kXk = XV −1 X T , and K(u) = exp(−hu). As recommended by Caussinus and
Ruiz [112], h = 0.1. After replacing the sample mean x and the sample covariance
V , the new Mahalanobis distance Dir is calculated as
Dir =

p
{(xi − x∗ )S −1 (xi − x∗ )T }

(57)

Dir excludes the deviation caused by the outliers by the following rules. For each
input location, we calculate the value of Dir . For multivariate normally distributed
data, the values of Dir are approximately chi-square distributed with p degrees of
freedom(χ2p ) where p is the dimension of the ordinal data, i.e. p = 2 [113]. The
observations with large Dir values can be abandoned by using a quantile of the chisquared distribution (e.g., the 97.5% quantile). Once the outliers are expelled, we can
obtain the location estimation by takeing the mean value of the remaining location
reports.
IV.3.3

Improving Location Resolution

In reality, the sample distribution may not be close to the underlying distribution
(normal distribution). To get a more accurate estimate and construct a confidence
interval for the estimate, we use a resampling method called bootstrapping. The
bootstrapping method allows one to gather many alternative versions of the single
statistic that would ordinarily be calculated from one sample with replacement. This
method has the advantage that one can compute the high resolution estimation when
the sample size is small or the population distribution is unknown. By resampling,
the mean is repeatedly updated and refined and the precision can be improved. The
bootstrap estimation procedure consists of the following steps:
1. Use the original data set (x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , · · · , xn ) to calculate the mean. Call this
x∗0 , where 0 represents the initial step.
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2. Take a set of bootstrap samples of size n from the original data set with replacement, which produces a new data set: (x∗1 , x∗2 , x∗3 , x∗4 , · · · , x∗n ). Calculate
the mean of the bootstrap samples. Note: Some of the x’s will be duplicate or
triplicate observations of the same value. Call this x∗1 .
3. Repeat step 2 N times, where N is a large number.

This produces

x∗1 , x∗2 , · · · , x∗N .
4. Finally, the bootstrap estimate of mean can be calculated as
x∗ =

PN

k=1

x∗i

N

(58)

The final estimate of location can be obtained from the remaining reports by
computing the mean value of the locations. The mean value of the remaining report is
acceptable because abnormal values of reports have been filtered by the Mahalanobis
distance. We can compute a parametric bootstrap confidence interval using the x∗i s.
The standard deviation of the x∗i s, i.e. SE is the estimate of the standard error of
x. An approximate confidence interval is x∗ ∓ z α2 SE, where z α2 is the critical value
of the normal distribution.
IV.4

GENERAL LOCATION INFORMATION INTEGRITY

In real environments, some vehicles will have on-board GPS device and a transceiver,
some will have transceiver only, and some older vehicles will not have eithor of these.
In this section, we present a novel solution to obtain the location coordinates among
the collected input from a noisy environment, i.e. from a real environment. The
collected location reports as input samples are filtered by the Mahalanobis distance.
After filtering, the inputs from different resources are weighted and averaged to
obtain the location estimation which is with a certain acceptable precision. The
contributions of this section are the following: 1) filtering out false location reports
from malicious attackers; 2) computing high-resolution location information from
anonymous low-resolution location observations; 3) obtaining an efficient filtering
algorithm.
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IV.4.1

Data Sources

The location samples as statistical input come from three types of resources: the radar
device of the observer vehicle, the oncoming vehicles, and the neighboring vehicles of
the observer vehicles. The location reports from the radar device are assumed to be
a valid location estimation. The neighboring vehicles of the observer vehicles have
the highest risk to be contaminated. The precision of oncoming vehicle reports are
considered to be in between the precision of radar and the precision of neighboring
vehicles. In Figures 36 and 37, squares represent data from neighboring vehicles’
detection. Squares represent location collected from the neighboring vehicles. The
small circles represent data collected from oncoming vehicles, and the small triangles
represent data from radar detections.

Before filtering
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FIG. 36: Collected raw locations including malicious outliers. N is the number of
locations. The outliers (malicious data) are far away from the center.
We can apply the filtering method of Mahalanobis distance to filter out the malicious data in each data source. Therefore, we can obtain a set of reported locations
which only include measurement errors. These location reports are ready to refine
to compute the final estimation of location.
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After filtering
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FIG. 37: Gaussian error location. N is the number of locations. One symbol represents one location. The center point is the actual location of the observed vehicle.

IV.4.2

Filtering Out Malicious Data

There are three sets of location data that can be obtained from three different sources.
Each set of location data can have outliers from malicious attackers and normally
distributed data from measurement errors. The basic idea of filtering the malicious
data from the collected data is by computing the new Mahalanobis distance.
Let X, Y, and Z represent the location detection variables from radar detection,
oncoming detection, and neighbor detection, respectively. Suppose we have L, M, N
samples of radar detection, oncoming detection, and neighbor detection, respectively.
By applying the filtering method discussed in Section IV.3.2, we can obtain the mean
of each data source. The final estimation of the location can be written as
P = w1 ∗ x∗ + w2 ∗ y ∗ + w3 ∗ z ∗

(59)

where w1 , w2 , w3 are the weights of radar detection, oncoming detection, and neighbor
detection, respectively. x∗ , y ∗ , z ∗ are the estimated mean by filter method in Section
IV.4.2.
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IV.5

ISOLATING MALICIOUS VEHICLES

This section presents a scheme that can be used to manage vehicles, for example
isolating a malicious vehicle. Each vehicle is represented by a piece of memory.
The piece of memory has a fixed size. The design of the memory must be efficient
because we will record as many vehicles as possible. A vehicle ID is used to identify
the memory. The content of the memory includes the mobility history and the trust
status. A vehicle in memory is shown in Figure 38. The mobility history records
the mobility information, i.e. location, speed, acceleration and time. The mobility
history or Map History can be used to validate location announcement to improve
location integrity. Each vehicle has a trust status, trusted, questionable, or suspect
which is managed by tables in memory. We can isolate malicious vehicles by putting
the vehicles into the suspect table. All messages related to vehicles in the suspect
table will be directly dropped. Each new vehicle is put in the questionable table.
All messages related to vehicles in the questionable table will be randomly checked.
Good behaving vehicles are put in the trusted table. All the messages to and from
vehicles in the trusted table will be directly propagated.
Mobility History
Vehicle
ID
Trust Status

FIG. 38: A vehicle in memory. The mobility history records the mobility information
of the vehicle. The trust status records the trust information of the vehicle.
Since the cell leaders and the cell routers are special vehicles, we can specially
design a mechanism to secure these special vehicles. The mechanism is on the basis
of an assumption: the majority of vehicles are honest.
IV.5.1

Map History

The mobility history of a vehicle can be stored in memory. The purpose of this
history is to validate “real” data from “fabricated” data. The basic idea is that
any vehicle without historical consistency is highly suspect. All location information
must be consistent with the location history.
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Location History Levels
We are interested to store the mobility history of a vehicle. The information stored
includes location coordinates, time, mobility parameters, identity and time. The
memory of each vehicle is limited and we want to record vehicles in an intelligent
way that can covers longer location history in a limited memory space.
To save memory space, we record location history at a certain rate e.g. 1s, 10s,
30s, 60s, 5min, etc. One second records will form a set of locations whose interval
is one second. Ten second records will form a set of location whose interval is ten
seconds, and so on. We can have N sets of location records with N intervals. We
term each set of location records as a Level as shown in Figure 39. The time interval
that is used to build a level is called Level Interval IN Ti , i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N and
IN T0 < IN T1 < · · · < IN TN . For example, IN T1 = 1s for the Level One. Level
One will have a set of locations whose interval is one second. IN T2 = 10s for the
Level Two. The Level Two will have a set of locations whose interval is ten seconds.

Current Level

Rc

INT0

Level One

R0

R1

R2

Ri

INT1

R0

R1

R2

Rk

INTn

ID
Level N

FIG. 39: A vehicle in memory with levels. Ri is the record of mobility information.
The level with smaller level number has more detailed records and shorter intervals.
A more direct overview of the map history is shown in Figure 40. Level One
represents locations recorded in a rate of one record per second, i.e. IN T1 = 1. In
one second, a vehicle moves at most 33 meters if we assume the maximum speed is
33 m/s (75 mph). Therefore, the interval between ti and ti+1 is at most 33 meters.
Level Two includes records which are collected every 10 seconds, i.e. IN T2 = 10. The
interval between ti and ti+1 is at most 330 meters. Suppose for each level, we have
10 records. If we want to validate a vehicle with a location 110m from its reference
location (i.e. t0 ), we can use Level One because 110m is less than the maximum
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location of Level One 33*10 or 330m. If we want to validate a vehicle with a location
689m from its reference location, we will use Level Two because 689m is larger than
the maximum location of Level One 33*10 or 330m but is less than the maximum
location of Level Two 330*10 or 3300m.

Level One

Level Two
Tk

ti-1

T0

t6

t2
t5

ti

T1

t4

t1

t0

t3

FIG. 40: Map history overview. Level One has one location record per second. Level
Two has a one location record per 10 seconds.

Validating Location by Map History
Once the map history is created, we can distinguish the “real” locations from the
“fabricated” ones. The idea of validation is shown in Figure 41. In level i, a valid
location must be in the area which is bounded by the predicted locations and the
roadways. For example, the locations between time t2 and t3 must fall into the shaded
region, ABCD. All the locations between time t2 and t3 but not in this region are
considered to be fabricated.

Level i
ti-1
ti

A

B

t2

t6
t5

t4

t3
D

t1

t0

C

FIG. 41: Screening vehicles using the map history. A vehicle with location between
time t2 and t3 must fall into the shaded region, ABCD. Otherwise it is a suspected
vehicle.
We use time, mobility information, and location to validate locations. Subsequent
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vehicle locations can be described by the following formula:


(x − xi )2 + (y − yi )2 ≤ γ 2




γ =t∗ν
i







0 ≤ ν ≤ vmax

(60)

{x, y} ∈ Road

For any Level i, we have a predicted record t0 which is given based on the maximum velocity:
(

(x − xi )2 + (y − yi )2 ≤ (t ∗ vmax )2
{x, y} ∈ Road

(61)

In (60) and (61), xi , yi are the coordinates of record i in any Level N , x, y are the
coordinates of new data or record, t is the length of sample interval of Level N , and
vmax is the speed limit on the road. We can consult the digital map with the (x, y)
coordinates to check if (x, y) is on the road. So far, we can screen all the data by
solving (60) and (61). The physical meaning is that if the new data is inside the
shaded region in Figure 41, we can declare the data acceptable. Otherwise it is not
acceptable, and the vehicle will be isolated by the method in Section IV.5.2.
Validating Examples
The map history can be used to validate locations. To illustrate this, we zoom in one
level and show the detail of one level. Locations of the vehicle in history are stored
in the level. Each location is associated with a time tj , j = 0, 1, · · · , i. We give a
detailed level example in Figure 42. A location between t2 and t3 must be in the
region bounded by the roadways and the locations t2 and t3 . If the vehicle announces
that a location between t2 and t3 is at A, we can reject the location because A is
out of the boundary. In another example, if the vehicle announces that a location
between t1 and t2 is at B, we accept this location because the location B is in the
region formed by the roadways and the locations t1 and t2 . If a vehicle has just joined
the traffic, we will give this vehicle a period of time to build a history.
IV.5.2

Trust State of Vehicles

We use the trust states Trusted, Questionable and Suspect to isolate malicious vehicles. All vehicles in a cell maintain the trust status in memory as shown in Figure
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Map History Memory
ti-1

B
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t6
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t5

t4

t3

t1

t0

FIG. 42: Map history example. A is an impossible location because it is outside the
road; B is an incorrect location because it is supposed to be between t0 and t1 , where
t0 is the predicted location and t1 is the last received location.

38. The trust status includes three tables, the trusted table, the questionable table
and the suspect table, as shown in Figure 43. We will address the initial state and
the transition of the trust status of a vehicle.
Initially, a new vehicle enters the road, as an observer. The new vehicle enters
a cell and broadcasts a “HELLO” message with its location information. The cell
leader will place the vehicle into the questionable table. The cell leader then sends
back the cell leader’s ID, the cell routers’ IDs and all the map history of the cell.
When the leader sends information to the observer, members in the cell will hear
it. If there is bogus information in the message, a member may dispute the leader.
The new vehicle places the cell leader and routers into its trusted table and sets up
the initial map history received from the cell leader. From then on, the new vehicle
starts to build its own map history.
The trust status can be changed on the basis of the behavior of the vehicle. Figure
43 shows the tables and state transitions. If an observed vehicle behaves normally
for a certain period of time, the observer will place the vehicle into the trusted table.
If an observed vehicle behaves abnormally, the observer will place the vehicle into
the suspect table. Otherwise the vehicle will stay in the current table. Here normal
behavior means that the reported location has been validated by methods presented
earlier. There is a timeout rule for a vehicle. If not receiving reports from an observed
vehicle or not detecting the observed vehicle for a while, the observer will move the
observed vehicle from the trusted table to the questionable table. The transitions
between states are based on “Credit Score”. A vehicle will obtain one credit score
if the vehicle behaves normally, for example sending 100 correct location messages.
The vehicle will quickly lose one credit score if the vehicle behaves abnormally, for
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example sending one abnormal location message. We give each newcomer an initial
score: 3. The minimal score for being in the trusted state is 5. The score for being
in the suspected state is 0.
Leader, router
1

Other members

3

Trusted

Questionable

2

8

6

4
7
Suspect

5

FIG. 43: State transitions. State transitions 1, 3, 5, 7: if confirmed. State transitions
2, 4, 6, 8: if not confirmed.
The states of vehicles can be synchronized in two ways: proactively and reactively.
The proactive approach is based on the arrival of new vehicles in a cell. When a new
vehicle enters the cell, the cell leader will broadcast the states of vehicles in the cell.
Members in the cell can synchronize their state tables. The reactive way is based
on a timer. A synchronization timer is preset for all the cell members. When the
timer expires, the cell leader will broadcast the current state table to synchronize the
tables.
IV.5.3

Securing Cell Leaders and Cell Routers

Cell leaders and cell routers are special vehicles elected by the cell members. Since
the cell leaders and the cell routers represent all the members of a cell, corrupted cell
leaders and cell routers can cause great harm. The basic idea of securing them is to
monitor them using other cell members. Cell routers are monitored and challenged by
comparing messages. When a cell router is sending or receiving packets, its neighbors
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will monitor the packets. If the cell router modifies, inserts bogus information, or
drops a packet, its neighbors will detect this by comparing the packet received from
the cell router with the original packet since the neighbors receive same packet as the
router does. If the neighbors detect that the router is compromised, they will isolate
the router. The isolation of cell leaders or cell routers is done by listing vehicles into
suspect tables which is discussed in the previous section IV.5.2.
The cell leader is monitored and challenged by other members of a cell as well.
Since all vehicles are homogenous, they can generate the aggregated location packet
and compare it with the one sent by cell leader. This prevents the cell leader from
changing location information. If cell members keep silent, then it is an indication
that they agree with the message. Otherwise, vehicles can challenge the cell leader.
The challenge will finally be resolved by polling in the cell. The polling involves
three rounds of messages. 1) One vehicle arises a challenge. 2) All the members
reply with their own votes. Therefore, each vehicle will receive votes from other
members. Vehicles in a cell can count votes to solve the challenge. 3) If the leader
is honest, vehicles remaining silent agree with the current cell leader. Otherwise,
vehicles will start a new election for the cell leader. The decision will follow the
majority vehicles’ opinion. The challenger will be punished by decreasing its credit
score. Therefore, we have only two rounds of messages if the cell leader is honest and
three rounds of messages if the cell leader is not honest. Since the population in a
cell is normally not large, the time and control message costs of the polling algorithm
are acceptable. Cell routers will propagate the corrected message to next cell. These
steps will repeat until the destination vehicles receive the message.
IV.6

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have proposed solutions for location integrity which ensures that
location information is original (from the generator), correct (not fabricated) and
unmodified (value unchanged). We started from a simple system with a strong
assumption that all vehicles are equipped with radar, GPS receiver and transceiver.
An active location integrity algorithm is proposed. Radar acts as a virtual “eye”
of a vehicle, and the transceiver acts as a virtual “ear” of the vehicle. The idea
of active location integrity follows the adage: seeing is believing. When vehicles
receive the announced location information from the virtual ear, the receiver will
actively detect the announced location by using the virtual eye. We then weaken
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the assumption by removing radar from the device list. Vehicles have only a virtual
ear. We proposed the passive location integrity algorithm. When vehicles receive the
announced location information from the virtual ear, we filter and refine the location
announcement by computing similarity and applying the map history. We finally
came to the real world solution in an environment that some vehicles have some
combination of the devices (radar, GPS receiver and transceiver). In the real world
solution, a statistical method was addressed and the location information can be
filtered and refined. A weighted average of the location estimation can be computed
after filtering by the statistical method.
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CHAPTER V
LOCATION CONFIDENTIALITY
Location information from multiple vehicles is often aggregated to reduce the number
of messages that are sent. In VANET transmission, plaintext location information,
especially aggregated location information, can be used and stored because other
vehicles need access to validate the location and monitor cell leaders and cell routers.
Given the insecure nature of wireless communication, plaintext messages are vulnerable because an attacker can easily modify the location information and harm
the location integrity. Therefore, we propose both encryption/decryption and access
control mechanisms to provide location confidentiality in this chapter. In VANETs,
most applications require protection of location information. In some environments,
for example in the battlefield, the locations of vehicles need to be extremely secure.
Therefore, not only the content is required to be encrypted but also the place where
the encrypted message can be decrypted is required to be specified. Figure 44 shows
that vehicle Alice specifies a decryption region (shaded area) and vehicle Bob must be
physically present in the decryption region to decrypt the message. The decryption
region can move along with Bob as well.

Alice
b

c

Bob(t0)

e

Bob(t1)

FIG. 44: Vehicle Bob must physically present in the shaded region to decrypt message. The shaded region (decryption region) can move along with Bob.
In our approach, a special region (decryption region) is specified for the message
receiver. The receiver must be physically present in the decryption region to decrypt
the received message. To achieve this, the receiver’s location information is converted
into part of a key. The message is encrypted using both the converted key and PKI.
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The idea of using location as part of a key is called GeoEncryption and was first proposed by Denning et al. [79, 2]. But there are shortcomings to using GeoEncryption
in VANETs, which will be discussed in Section V.1. Our main contributions in this
chapter include:
 Designing an algorithm to convert a location into a key,
 Reducing the overhead in terms of control messages which update the decryp-

tion region,
 Improving location error tolerance.

V.1

DENNING’S GEOENCYPTION

To implement the idea shown in Figure 44, location information will be converted to
a secret key. The idea of using location as part of key is first proposed by Denning
et al. in GeoEncryption [79, 2]. Denning’s GeoEncyption applies a table (GeoLock)
to convert the location into a key. The GeoLock table is shown in Figure 45. All
vehicles need to pre-install this table to convert the location into a key. Like updating
passwords, we need to periodically update the GeoLock table to protect the secret
keys. One issue is that the GeoLock table must be consistent on all vehicles. If the
table on some vehicles is not up-to-date, it is impossible to decrypt the message.
Given the large scale of vehicle population, it is very challenging to keep tables upto-date. We propose a new algorithm to convert the location into the secret key by
dynamically computing the key instead of using a table lookup.
Denning’s GeoEncryption also requires that both sender and receiver are preinstalled with PKI. The message from a sender to a receiver needs PKI. The algorithm
of GeoEncryption is shown in Figure 46. The sender obtains a random number
Key S. Key S is used to encrypt a plaintext message. The ciphertext is propagated
to the receiver. The sender generates a secret key (GeoLock) from the GeoLock
table. The GeoLock is XOR-ed with Key S and then encrypted using the receiver’s
public key Key E to produce the ciphertext E{Key}. The ciphertext E{Key}
is propagated to the receiver. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext E{Key} by
using private key Key D to produce an outcome. The outcome is XOR-ed with
the GeoLock obtained from the GeoLock table, to uncover Key S. Once Key S is
uncovered, Key S can be used to decrypt the ciphertext and uncover the plaintext.
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FIG. 45: Denning’s GeoLock table [2] (Used with permission.)
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Key S can serve as session key for the communication of the sender and receiver.
If attackers can record the initial handshaking message and location information of
the receiver, the attacker can crack the Denning’s GeoEncryption and obtain Key S
by using some hacking methods, such as dictionary lookup, hash-collision, social
engineering, etc. Once Key S is obtained, the information is at risk to be decrypted
because a single and unique session key Key S is used. Therefore, we propose a new
algorithm that can update the session key and avoid the use of a single session key.
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FIG. 46: Denning’s GeoEncryption [2] (Used with permission.)

V.2

DYNAMIC GEOENCRYPTION

We extend Denning’s GeoEncryption by proposing a new GeoLock that can dynamically convert the location into a secret key. Our dynamic GeoEncryption algorithm,
called D-GeoEncryption, can dynamically encrypt and decrypt messages without
checking tables. The new GeoLock, called D-GeoLock, is treated as a black box.
The details of the black box will be covered in Section V.2.2. Figure 47 shows the
device as a black box.
To avoid using a single session key, we propose a new GeoEncryption algorithm
(i.e. D-GeoEncryption) that can dynamically change the session key. Our algorithm
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(04200, 91500)
GPS Coordinates
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d97e0e02efdb13de05d90abf1a99e8feac134f63

FIG. 47: An example of D-GeoLock. The input of region size is 100m. The GPS
coordinates are (04200, 91500). The black box produces the D-GeoLock output.

involves a security key handshake stage and a message exchange stage, as shown in
Figure 48.a. In the key handshake stage, the sender and the receiver negotiate a
shared symmetric key. The sender will send a message which includes the sender’s
location information and mobility information. The sender generates two random
numbers as keys, Key S and Key C. Key C is appended to the original plaintext to
generate a new message. The new message is encrypted by Key S using a symmetric
algorithm, e.g. Triple DES Encryption. This outcome of the encrypted message
is E{Req}. The sender generates a D-GeoLock key based on the location of the
receiver using the D-GeoLock algorithm which will be discussed later. Key S is
XOR-ed with the D-GeoLock key. The outcome of XOR is then encrypted using the
receiver’s public key Key E to produce the ciphertext E{Key}. Both E{Req} and
E{Key} are transmitted to the receiver through the wireless channel. When the
receiver receives E{Key}, the receiver will decrypt E{Key} to obtain the outcome
of XOR using the receiver’s private key Key D. The D-GeoLock key is generated
from the GPS location of the receiver is XOR-ed with the outcome from decryption
and use to uncover the secret key Key S. Once the Key S is obtained, E{Req} can
be decrypted by using Key S. Both the secret key Key C and the original plaintext
can now be obtained. Now Key C is known by both the sender and the receiver.
In the message exchange stage, the receiver and the sender use the shared Key C
to communicate, as shown in Figure 48.b. When the receiver wants to reply to the
sender, the receiver generates a random number Key S 0 . The reply message is directly encrypted using Key S 0 to generate a ciphertext E{Rep}. With the sender’s
location and mobility information, the receiver can predict the decryption region of
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sender and generate the D-GeoLock key of the sender using D-GeoLock algorithm.
The D-GeoLock key is XOR-ed with Key S 0 and then encrypted by Key C to generate a ciphertext E{Key 0 }. Both E{Rep} and E{Key 0 } are transmitted to the
sender through the wireless channel. E{Key 0 } is then decrypted using Key C to
recover the XOR outcome of the D-GeoLock key and Key S 0 . The sender generates
its own D-GeoLock key based on its current location. The D-GeoLock key is XOR-ed
with the outcome to uncover the secret key Key S 0 . E{Rep} can be decrypted using
Key S 0 , and the reply message is recovered as well. Now Key S 0 is known by both
sides. The sender can use Key S 0 as a new secret key and repeats the algorithm to
communicate with the receiver.
Handshake

Message Exahcnage

Random Numbers
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GeoLock
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FIG. 48: Illustrating the proposed encryption and decryption scheme.

V.2.1

Decryption Region Prediction and Updating

The decryption region is a special area where messages can be decrypted. If the
decryption region is larger, it will be more likely to cover some attackers. If the
decryption region is small, the vehicles which will decrypt the messages will be more
likely placed out of the region because of a location error. Therefore, the decryption
region is specially specified to fit the targeted decryption vehicles.
Since vehicles can dynamically move, the decryption region needs to move along
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with the vehicles who will decrypt messages. For example, vehicles in the battlefield
will move. The decryption region of the vehicles is expected to move with these vehicles. Since vehicles have high mobility, we propose two improvements to determine
the decryption region: predicting the decryption region and updating the decryption
region. The movement of vehicles is constrained by roads, and the map of the roads
can be accessed by all vehicles. Therefore, we can predict a vehicle’s location based
on the map and the vehicle’s mobility. Based on the prediction of the decryption region, the messages are checked by geographic location. Because of the high mobility
of vehicles, there will be a certain prediction error. Therefore the predicted decryption region will be corrected by updating the real location of the decryption vehicles.
The real locations of the decryption vehicles are piggy-backed on other messages.
Prediction of the Decryption Region
For location coordinates we use Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) [114]. GPS
coordinates computed by the GPS receiver will be converted into UTM coordinates.
One feature of UTM coordinates is the ability to provide a more precise location by
simply adding a pair of digits to abbreviated coordinates. For example, an 8-digit
UTM location is accurate to 10 meters, approximately the size of a house, and a
10-digit UTM location is accurate to 1 meter.
Suppose the target decryption region starts from location P0 (x0 , y0 ). The decryption region is assumed to be a square region. A square region must have two
components: a starting point and length (length equals to width). The location of
the decryption vehicle is known. Since the decryption vehicle will be placed in the
center of the decryption region (to tolerate location errors), the starting location of
the decryption region can be computed if we know the decryption region size. Therefore, only the length of the square needs to be determined. Based on UTM location
accuracy, the length of the square L is listed as follows 10, 100, and 1000 meters. For
10-digit UTM locations, 1 < L < 104 because the accuracy is about 1 meter. For
8-digit UTM locations, 10 < L < 107 because the location is accurate to 10 meters.
For 6-digit UTM locations, L < 104 because 6 digits UTM locations are accurate to
100 meters. No UTM location smaller than 6 digits can be used in our algorithm.
Therefore, the length of the square is selected from one of the three possible lengths:
10, 100, and 1000 meters.
The decryption region can be computed on the basis of the map of roads and the
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mobility of vehicles. The methods that we address are the following:
1. The location of communication peers can be calculated on the basis of the mobility parameters including current speed, location, acceleration, etc. This is a
dynamic computation method. A new location after a certain time interval can
be computed. Suppose at time t0 , the target vehicle is at location (x0 , y0 ) with
speed vx0 , vy0 and acceleration ax0 , ay0 , where x0 , vx0 , ax0 are the x-axis value
of initial location, relative speed on x-axis direction, and relative acceleration
on x-axis direction; y0 , vy0 , ay0 are the y-axis value of initial location, relative
speed on y-axis direction, and relative acceleration on y-axis direction. After
time interval t, we can roughly predict that the vehicle will be at a place near
location region x1 , or
1
x1 ∈ [x0 + v0 t + a0 t2 − α ∗ XDeviation,
2
1
x0 + v0 t + a0 t2 + α ∗ XDeviation]
2

(62)

and y1 , or
1
y1 ∈ [y0 + v0 t + a0 t2 − α ∗ Y Deviation,
2
1
x0 + v0 t + a0 t2 + α ∗ Y Deviation]
2

(63)

where x1 and XDeviation are the x-axis location prediction and the x-axis
location deviation values, y1 and Y Deviation are the y-axis location prediction
and the y-axis location deviation values, and α is the coefficient which implies
the effect of the deviation, 0 ≥ α ≥ 1.
2. If the decryption region is a fixed area, we can directly check the map of roads
and calculate the GPS coordinates. This is the simplest scenario.
3. If the decryption region is dynamically moving, we can calculate the location
of the decryption region by querying the target receiver.
Updating the Decryption Region
Although the decryption region can be predicted, there may be prediction errors
because of the high mobility of vehicles. Therefore, the decryption region needs to
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be corrected to improve prediction accuracy for future communication. The predicted location will be updated by the real location which is piggybacked on other
communication messages. The speed, acceleration and direction of movement will be
piggybacked as well. Therefore, the updating step includes the following assignments:
x1 = xreal

(64)

y1 = yreal

(65)

XDeviation = (1 − β) ∗ XDeviation + β ∗ |xreal − x0 |

(66)

Y Deviation = (1 − β) ∗ Y Deviation + β ∗ |yreal − y0 |

(67)

where (xreal , yreal ) is the real location piggybacked, and β is the coefficient value
which implies the effect of the prediction error |xreal − x0 |.
The updating frequency depends on the mobility of receiving vehicles, the accuracy requirement of the decryption region and the bandwidth of the control channel.
For example, the frequency of updating on highways should be much higher than
the frequency of updating in urban areas because the velocities on the highway are
much higher than the ones in urban areas. Similarly, the accuracy of the decryption
region and the bandwidth of the control channel impact the updating frequency as
well. The more frequently the updating occurs, the more accurate is the location
that can be obtained. On the other hand, the more frequently the updating occurs,
the higher the overhead of control messages and the more bandwidth will be wasted.
There is an optimal value of the frequency of updating message. We can obtain this
value by simulating and engineering methods which we discuss in Chapter VI.3.
V.2.2

D-GeoLock Mapping Function

The main function of GeoLock is to convert a location into a secret key which will
be used in encryption and decryption. The GeoLock mapping function in Denning’s
GeoEncryption algorithm is a lookup table which has been shown in Figure 45.
The major drawbacks include 1) expensive deployment to all vehicles, 2) difficult to
update on all vehicles, and 3) low location error tolerance. Therefore, we propose
D-GeoLock algorithm which can overcome these drawbacks. Our contribution of
the mapping function is to convert a secret key value on the fly. There are no
preinstalled mapping tables in our algorithm. Our D-GeoLock mapping algorithm
converts VANET parameters into a unique value as a secret key. There are several
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parameters: location coordinates (x0 , y0 ), time interval T , and speed interval V .
From the Sender’s Perspective
The process of generating a lock value/key is shown in Figure 49. The input parameters are speed V , location coordinates (x0 , y0 ), and time T for the comprehensive D-GeoLock shown in 49(a). The input parameters are location coordinates
(x0 , y0 ) for the location D-GeoLock shown in 49(b). The output result is a unique
string/number. There are three steps. Step one will process the input parameters.
The location (x0 , y0 ) will be divided by the length of decryption region (square) L.
For example, if the length of target decryption region is 100 meters or L = 100, then
each of coordinate numbers of P0 (x0 , y0 ) will be divided by 100. Only the integral
part after division will be obtained. Therefore, larger values of L will result in fewer
digital numbers of the output from step one. Fewer digital numbers will result in a
weaker lock key. If the value of L is small, there is a risk that a lock key may be
computed by a brute force attack. Step two will multiplex the outcome of previous
processing step and form a unique string, i.e. the output of the first step is multiplexed or reshuffled. Step three will compute the hash value of the outcome from
step two. The reason for step three is to equalize the size of the keys. The hash
function in practice can be designed as mod operation or as standard hash function,
such as Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).

V

X0

Y0

T

X0

Y0

P

P

P

P

P

P

(a)

Mux

Mux

Hash

Hash

Key

Key

Comprehensive D-GeoLock.

(b)

Location D-GeoLock.

FIG. 49: D-GeoLock mapping function.
An example of D-GeoLock is shown in Figure 50. We show only location DGeoLock as a simplification for the example. The comprehensive D-GeoLock is the
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future work. In the first step, two numbers are divided by the length of the region
100, i.e. (042.00, 915.00). The integer part after division, i.e. (042, 915) is kept.
In the second step, the two numbers: (042,915) are multiplexed or concatenated as
042915. In the third step, the multiplexed number is hashed by SHA to generate the
lock value.

GPS Coordinates
in
Coordinates

E
E
E

04200 N 91500
042.00 N 915.00
N
042
915
Mux
042915
Hash

in Region
Size

SHA(042915)
output
GeoLock

d97e0e02efdb13de05d90abf1a99e8feac134f63

FIG. 50: An example of D-GeoLock.

V.2.3

From the Recipient’s Perspective

The receiver needs to convert its own location into the secret key using the D-GeoLock
algorithm. Figure 51 shows how the receiver can convert its location into the secret
key. The receiver can obtain V, X0 , Y0 and T from the enlisted GPS receiver. The
same D-GeoLock mapping function discussed in Section V.2.2 is used to compute a
lock key. If vehicle b is restricted by the decryption region in terms of location, the
exact same lock value will be generated. Otherwise, the lock key will be different.
Thus, the secret key Key S will not be recovered and the ciphertext E{Req} will
not be decrypted.
An example of the mapping function on the receiver’s view is shown as Figures
51.a and 51.b. The receiver vehicle b is located at location (04250, 91520) (UTM 10
digital coordinates) shown in Figure 51.a and the decryption region L is 100 meters.
Figure 51.b shows the D-GeoLock process on the recipient. Although the receiver’s
location coordinates are (04250, 91520), the new D-GeoLock algorithm generates exactly same key as the sender generates. It is obvious that the vehicles will pass the
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geographic validation.
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(a) A decryption region specified by a location and
a length.

Mux
(b) Computing decryption key.

FIG. 51: An example of secret key recovery.

V.3

SUMMARY

In this chapter, we have addressed a geographic location based encryption, DGeoEncryption. D-GeoEncryption will specify a decryption region where vehicles
must be physically present to decrypt the message. This requirement can enhance
confidentiality.
The GeoEncryption algorithm started from the introduction of the original algorithm proposed by Denning [79]. Denning’s GeoEncryption algorithm uses preinstalled tables to convert location into a secret key. Given the large scale of vehicle
population, it is very hard or expensive to install and update the preinstalled tables
on all vehicles. Denning’s GeoEncryption algorithm also uses a single session key. We
improve upon this by dynamically changing multiple session keys. To improve GeoLock, we specially design a new GeoLock which can dynamically compute the secret
keys from location inputs. In our new GeoLock algorithm, there are no preinstalled
tables.
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CHAPTER VI
EVALUATION
In this chapter we evaluate our three proposed location security mechanisms, location
availability, location integrity and location confidentiality. For location availability,
we first evaluate the link duration model and link duration probability expressions.
We validate the relationship between the link duration and the mobility parameters
(speed and acceleration) in several cases. The pdf of the link duration is also checked.
Routing paths on the basis of link duration model are also simulated. We are interested in the duration of routing paths, the overhead of the control packets, and the
throughput of the routing path. For location integrity, we validate location information and identify the malicious attackers who send out fabricated location claims.
We are interested in detection time, detection ratio, and abnormal location identification. For location confidentiality, we compare our D-GeoEncryption algorithm
with another extension of the original GeoEncryption algorithm. We are interested
in the decryption ratio and the cost of updating the decryption region.
VI.1

AVAILABILITY SIMULATION

Vehicle mobility, including speed, acceleration and direction, dynamically changes
the topology of vehicles. The communication links between vehicles, therefore, are
unstable, and location availability is inherently affected. In our solution, we improved
location availability by proposing a reliable routing scheme based on our link duration
model and on probability of link duration. The purpose of the simulations in this
section is to validate our link duration model and the probability expressions of link
duration. We also evaluate the performance of our location availability technique in
terms of the duration of the routing path, the overhead of control messages and the
throughput of the routing path.
Based on IEEE 802.11p and Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC),
vehicles with wireless devices can communicate with other vehicles and with roadside infrastructure, if any exists. Since the FCC has restricted DSRC communication
to around 300m, multiple hops are needed to send messages to their destinations.
Besides, the topology of the network changes frequently due to rapid vehicular mobility. The mobility model adopted in this work is the Intelligent Intelligent Driver
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Model (IDM) [98, 115]. Here, vehicles can accelerate/decelerate, change lanes and
stop when blocked.
The nodes in VANETs have high mobility. Therefore, simulations of VANETs
typically require a networking simulator and a mobility simulator. In our simulations, the mobility simulator simulates the traffic dynamics and produces a trace file
of vehicle movements. The trace file records the movement of vehicles. The general
format of the movement is: <ID>
coordinate>

<time>

<speed>

<x-coordinate>

<y-

<z-coordinate>. The network simulator imports the trace file and

moves nodes based on the movement track provided. The network simulator simulates network performance in the presence of the mobility of nodes. Our mobility
simulations were performed under the mobility simulation platform of Treiber [98].
We recorded the trace files of vehicle mobility and then imported them into NS-2
(2.30). In NS-2, each node represents one vehicle in the mobility simulations, moving
based on the represented vehicle movement history. Nodes in NS-2 are also entities
of wireless communication nodes integrating network protocol stacks.
VI.1.1

Probability Model Simulation

The general parameters we used in simulations are detailed in Table 2. The total
number of vehicles n is varying because in our mobility simulation, vehicles may
enter and exit. The number of vehicles on the road at any time depends on the
headway distance. We use the Constant Bit Rate (CBR) application in NS-2 to
generate network traffic. The network protocol is 802.11. The total number of
network connections is one third of the total number of vehicles n. Some connections
break after a certain time. At that point, we create new connections to replace the
broken connections. We use a straight highway to simulate the road. The road
length is 10 miles, and the traffic density is 1500 vehicles per hour. The general link
duration model parameters are shown in Table 3.

There are three cases in the simulations. Specifically,
Case I Both vehicle i and j have positive speeds and accelerations. They are in the
same direction as well. Case I covers the scenarios originally shown in Figure
20.e-f and shown here in Figure 52.
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TABLE 2: Availability Simulation: Environment Configure
Name
Value
Total number of vehicles (n)
1000-2000
Application
CBR (128Kbps)
Network protocol
IEEE 802.11
Network connections
bn/3c
Simulation map
Highway
Road length
10 miles
Total number of lanes
2
Traffic density
1500 vehicles/hour

TABLE 3: Availability Simulation: General Parameters
µ
σ
f
γ
σg
C1
X
vm
n

The log-normal distribution parameter
The log-normal distribution parameter
The frequency of wireless channel
The power fall-off coefficient in (5)
The power coefficient for Rg in (5)
The coefficient in (11)
The initial link distance
The velocity
The number of vehicles

2.95
0.55
5.9 GHz
4
7.0
0.5
100m
33m/s
1500

Case II Both vehicle i and j have positive speeds and the same moving direction
but they have opposite accelerations (for example, i has a positive acceleration
and j has a negative acceleration). Case II covers the scenarios originally shown
in Figure 20.a-d and shown here in Figure 53.
Case III Both vehicle i and j have opposite speeds, opposite accelerations and
opposite directions. Case III covers the scenarios originally shown in Figure
21.e-f and shown here in Figure 54.
Case I and II are in the co-directional, as shown in Figure 55. Case III is in the
opposite direction, as shown in Figure 56. The rest of scenarios, e.g. Figure 21.a-d
and Figure 22, are not covered because they are not frequently occurring scenarios.
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FIG. 52: Simulation scenario Case I. Co-directional vehicles with positive speed and
positive acceleration.
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FIG. 53: Simulation scenario Case II. Co-directional vehicles with positive speed and
oppositive acceleration.
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FIG. 54: Simulation scenario Case III. Opposite-directional vehicles with opposite
speeds and opposite accelerations.
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FIG. 55: Simulation Cases I and II. Both vehicles are in the same direction.
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FIG. 56: Simulation Case III. The two vehicles travel in the opposite direction.
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Velocity Simulation
To begin, we were interested in the relationship between the speed and link duration in the three simulation cases. The purpose of this simulation is to verify our
theoretical expression of link duration, given speed and acceleration of both i and j.
The parameters we used are shown in Table 4. The parameters µ and σ are from the
log-normal distribution of headway distance. Given σ = 0.55, we assume that the
mean value of headway distance is 30 meters, i.e. eµ+σ

2 /2

= 30 from which µ can be

determined. f is the frequency of wireless channel. In USA, f is 5.9 GHz for DSRC.
The values of γ and σg are for the log-distance path loss model [116] and [117]. C1
and C2 are the normalizing coefficients in (11), i.e.



C1 a
z − µ1
√
F (z) =
.
1 + erf
2
σ1 2
The simulation settings of Cases I, II and III, in this section, are to validate the
relationship between the speed and the link duration.
TABLE 4: Velocity Simulation: Mobility Parameters
ai (The acceleration of i) (m/s2 )
aj (The acceleration of j) (m/s2 )
vi0 (The initial velocity of i) (m/s)
vj0 (The initial velocity of j) (m/s)

Case I
0.1
1
15
15

Case II
-1
1
20
10

Case III
-1
1
-31
30

We varied the speed (both vi and vj ) from 0.5m/s to 33m/s in Cases I, II, and III
and recorded the link duration. The link duration of 100 seconds represents infinite
link duration. The initial speed and acceleration values are shown in Table 4. When
we changed the initial speed of i (vi0 ), we kept vj0 unchanged. If we changed the
initial speed of j (vj0 ), we kept vi0 unchanged. Each step of speed change is 0.1m/s.
Figure 57 shows the impact of speed on link duration for Case I. A higher speed
for vehicle i will cause a longer link duration, and a higher speed for vehicle j will
cause a shorter link duration, because both i and j are accelerating in the same
direction as shown in Figure 55. When the initial speed vi0 increases, it increases
the likelihood of reaching vm . Therefore both i and i reach vm and they are moving
parallelly. The link tends to be stable and can last forever (i.e. more than 100s).
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FIG. 57: Speed impact in Case I.

The results of Case II are shown in Figure 58. As we expected, the simulation
results match with the theoretical values. The higher speed of vehicle j will cause
the shorter link duration, and the higher speed of vehicle i will cause a longer link
duration. We can explain the result by recalling the link duration model. If vehicle
j has faster speed, the relative speed between j and i, i.e. vj − vi will be higher.
Therefore, the link duration will be shorter. We know the distance covered by i at
time t is

Z

t

vi (x)dx.

Si (t) =
0

This is the area covered by function vi (t) in Figure 59. The distance covered by i at
time t is

Z
Sj (t) =

t

vj (x)dx.
0

This is the area covered by function vj (t) in Figure 59. Therefore, the distance
between the sender and the receiver is
Sj (t) − Si (t).
As shown in Figure 59, the shaded areas represent the distance between the two
vehicles. In the simulation, we obtained one set of link duration values by changing
the value of vi (0) and keeping the value of vj (0) unchanged. Since the link break
distance is 300m, the link will break if the two cars move apart by 200m because the
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FIG. 58: Speed impact in Case II.

initial link distance was 100m. If vi (0) is larger, the line of vi will parallelly move
up and the shaded area with 200 will move right. Therefore, the link duration will
be longer. We obtained another set of link duration values by changing the value of
vj (0) and keeping the value of vi (0) unchanged. If vj (0) is higher, the line of vj will
parallelly move up and the shaded area with 200 will move left. Therefore, the link
duration will be smaller.
The simulation setting for Case III is included to validate the relationship between
the speed and the link duration in formula A.2.1.b (in the Appendix). The results of
Case III are shown in Figure 60. As we expected, the simulation results match the
theoretical values. The higher speed of vehicle i will cause a longer link duration,
and the higher speed of vehicle j will cause a shorter link duration. In Case III, both
i and j are accelerating in opposite direction. We can explain the result using the
Case III scenario shown in Figure 61. When vj (0) increases, the line of vj moves
up, and the area of 200m will move left. Therefore, the link duration will decrease.
When vi (0) increases, the line of vi moves up because vi is negative, and the area of
200m will move right. Therefore, the link duration will increase.
Acceleration Simulation
The previous simulation showed how varying speed affects link duration. Since acceleration affects link duration as well, we simulated relationship between the link
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FIG. 59: An example scenario for simulation Case II. When vi (0) = 20m/s, vj (0) =
10m/s, ai = −1m/s2 and aj = 1m/s2 , the link duration is 19.3s. The numbers in
the shaded areas are the distance values between the sender and the receiver.
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FIG. 61: The scenario for the results of Case III.

duration and acceleration in Case I, II, and III. We only modified the mobility parameters compared with the previous simulations. The initial speed and acceleration
values are changed because we want to simulate longer link durations. We increased
the relative speed in Case I and decreased the relative speed in Case III. The change
of the mobility parameters is shown in Table 5. Simulation results are generated by
varying acceleration and recording the link duration.
TABLE 5: Acceleration Simulation: Mobility Parameters
2

ai (The acceleration of i) (m/s )
aj (The acceleration of j) (m/s2 )
vi0 (The initial velocity of i) (m/s)
vj0 (The initial velocity of j) (m/s)

Case I
0.2
1
30
1

Case II
-1
1
20
10

Case IIII
-1
1
-5
3

The results of Case I are shown in Figure 62. As we expected, the simulation results match with the theoretical values. The increment of aj will cause the decrement
of link duration, and the increment of ai will cause the increment of link duration.
The increment of ai will cause the speed vi to quickly reach the speed limit. Therefor,
both vehicles are moving at the same speed and the link duration tends to be forever
(more than 100s). On the other hand, if the acceleration aj increases, the speed vj
will quickly reach a high speed and the relative speed will increase. The link is more
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likely broken. The acceleration ai is more sensitive than aj because it is more likely
that i and j will be in a state where both vehicles are traveling at the limit speed
vm .
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FIG. 62: Acceleration impact in Case I.
The results of Case II are shown in Figure 63. As we expected, the simulation results match with the theoretical values. The increment of ai will cause the increment
of link duration, and the increment of aj will cause the decrement of link duration.
The smaller acceleration of i means that i stops quickly because the acceleration of
i (i.e. ai ) is negative. The relative speed between i and j will increase, and the link
duration will decrease. On the other hand, the faster acceleration of j means quicker
speed increment of vj . The relative speed will be larger, and the link duration will
be smaller.
The results of Case III are shown in Figure 64. As we expected, the simulation results match with the theoretical values. The increment of ai will cause the
decrement of link duration, and the increment of aj will cause the increment of link
duration. In Case III, the acceleration of i is negative. The smaller ai will cause
the faster increment of i in the opposite direction of j. Therefore, the relative speed
between i and j will be larger and the link duration will be smaller. On the other
hand, the larger aj will result in the faster increment of j. Therefore, the relative
speed between i and j will be larger and the link duration will be smaller.
We were also interested in the pdf of link duration. Since our theory shows
that the link duration is a form of the log-normal distribution, the purpose of this
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simulation is to validate the pdf of link duration which is covered in Chapter III.1.3.
For each case of Case I, II, and III, we created 2000 links among vehicles and recorded
the link durations of each. As we expected, the pdf of link duration for each case is
a form of log-normal distribution, shown in Figure 65. Case I has a flat curve, but
Case II and III have relatively sharp curves. This is because Case II and III tend to
form a centralized relative speed and acceleration. Therefore the link duration values
are crowded around a certain range.
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FIG. 65: The pdf of link duration.

VI.1.2

Routing Protocol Simulation

In this section, we used the same simulation environment as the one used in Section
VI.1.1. The simulation map is a straight highway which is 5 Km long. The initial
speed is 25 m/s and the average speed is 28 m/s. The acceleration is in the range
from 0 to 2m/s2 . The detailed parameters used in this section are shown in Table 6.
We simulated our routing protocol and compared it with DSR (Dynamic Source
Routing) [33] and ROMSGP (Receive On Most Stable Group-Path) [118]. DSR is
a well-known on-demand routing protocol. DSR records the source-destination path
information during route discovery. The learned source-destination path information
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TABLE 6: Routing Protocol Simulation: Environment Configure
Name
Value
The number of vehicles (n)
1000-2000
Application
CBR
Network protocol
IEEE 802.11
Transmission range
300m
Network connections
n/3
Simulation map
Highway
Road length
5 Km
Traffic density
1500 vehicles/hour
Average speed
28 m/s
Acceleration range
[0,2] m/s2
Initial acceleration
0 m/s2
Initial speed
25 m/s
Mobility model
IDM

is used to route packets. DSR was originally proposed for MANETs, but DSR has
been refined and applied in VANETs [52]. ROMSGP is a mobility-based routing
protocol for VANETs. ROMSGP computes the link duration time of a group of
vehicles. By selecting the most stable routing link, ROMSGP can route packets
for a group using a stable routing path. The difference between ROMSGP and our
proposed routing scheme is that our scheme computes not only link duration but also
the probability of the link duration. In addition, our computation is based on the
mobility parameters speed and acceleration, but ROMSGP’s computation is based
only on speed.
First, we investigated the average duration of the routing path. The source and
destination nodes are randomly selected among the vehicles on the highway. For
each routing path, we computed and recorded the average path duration and the
average speed of the vehicles involved in the routing path. As expected, our protocol
provides more stable paths than the other two protocols. This is because we select
the most durable routing links, as shown in Figure 66. Our protocol is designed on
the basis of link duration and the probability of the link duration. For each link,
we selected the optimal one, and thus the optimal routing path can be obtained.
We also dynamically maintain the routing path by locally replacing and globally
reconstructing the routing path.
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FIG. 66: Duration of links.

We were also interested in the control packet overhead. Vehicles in VANETs will
periodically change mobility status to maintain an optimal routing path and to keep
the routing path alive as long as possible. Therefore, there will be some control
packets exchanged among vehicles. The control packets consume network resources
and are treated as overhead. In this simulation, we counted the number of control
packets among vehicles involved in the routing path and the average speed of the
involved vehicles. We plotted the number of control packets and the average speed
in Figure 67. As expected, our proposal is more efficient than DSR and ROMSGP.
This is because our maintenance of the routing path is lightweight. If the expected
duration of the routing path is t, we maintain the routing path at time t/3 and
2t/3. Therefore, we only send out a few packets. DSR and ROMSGP are constantly
sending control packets to maintain the routing path.
For many applications, throughput is one of the key factors. We compared our
protocol with the other two protocols in terms of throughput. In this simulation,
we computed the average throughput of the routing path and the average speed of
the involved vehicles. We plotted the average throughput and the average speed
in Figure 68. As expected, our proposed protocol still outperforms both DSR and
ROMSGP since fewer routing links will break under our protocol. This is because

Control overhead (# of control packets) [10^6]
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FIG. 67: Control message overhead.

our protocol is more reliable and stable. There are fewer breaks of the routing path,
therefore, vehicles in the routing path can continually exchange packets. We also
noticed that the throughput decreases when the speed of vehicles increases. This is
because more links will break when the speed is high.
VI.2

INTEGRITY SIMULATION

The purpose of location integrity is to validate location information. We proposed
three solutions: active location integrity, passive location integrity, and general location integrity. The active location integrity solution validates the received location
by using installed radar. The passive location integrity solution filters and refines
the location information about an observed vehicle. The general location integrity
combines the active and passive location integrity solutions. Therefore, to evaluate
integrity, we introduce some malicious vehicles that send fabricated packets in the
simulation. We use a self-developed Java simulator to identify the malicious vehicles. We are interested in the detection time, the detection ratio, and the abnormal
location identification.
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VI.2.1

Validating Locations

In our experiments, we simulated a bidirectional 3 km highway with two lanes in each
direction. The cell radius was 100 meters, traffic arrival rate was 1600 vehicles/hour,
mean velocity was 33.3 m/s, and transmission radius initially was 100 meters. Each
simulation has some number of compromised, or malicious, vehicles and a single
observer vehicle. When the observer enters the simulated highway, it initiates a
request to find all of the compromised vehicles. The simulation terminates when the
observer reaches the end of the 3 km highway.
We wanted to investigate the amount of time required to detect a certain number
of compromised vehicles. In our first set of experiments, we inserted 16 compromised
vehicles and varied the total number of vehicles on the highway. Each experiment
was run 10 times, and we measured the average amount of time needed to detect
the 16 compromised vehicles. As a comparison, we show in Figure 69 the average
amount of time to detect the compromised vehicles using our cell-based routing as
opposed to message flooding, where each node re-broadcasts the received message.
As expected, cell-based routing is more efficient than flooding. The time needed to
detect the compromised vehicles increases when the number of vehicles decreases.

Page 125 of 169

The reason is that in low density traffic vehicles must physically drive the packet to
the next cell if there are no middle nodes available as routing nodes.
14
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FIG. 69: Time needed to detect the 16 malicious vehicles as the total number of
vehicles varies.
To determine how transmission range affects the time needed to detect malicious
vehicles, we ran a set of experiments with a 100 m transmission range and a set
with a 500 m transmission range. The vehicle density was about 30 vehicles per
kilometer per lane on the highway. The compromised vehicles were 5% of the total
vehicles and were randomly deployed along the highway. In each set of simulations,
we varied the length of the highway to investigate the effect of transmission range.
Since the time depends on the number of intermediate hops, the increased range of
transmission would certainly decrease the time. However, the increased transmission
range increases the probability of packet collisions. Figure 70 shows the time taken to
detect the malicious vehicles with respect to their distance from the vehicle generating
the verification request. As expected, with a 500 m range, the time is much lower,
but the re-broadcasting of packets needs to be handled carefully to avoid an increase
in collisions.
Finally, we wanted to investigate how many compromised vehicles could remain
undetected in our system. We randomly distributed compromised vehicles along the
highway. The vehicle density was about 30 vehicles per km on the highway. The
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FIG. 70: Average detection time.

transmission radius was 100 meters. We varied the percentage of all vehicles that
were compromised from 0% to 30% because our assumption is that the majority
of vehicles are honest. Compared with previous compromised vehicle percentage
(5%), we increased this number to 30% to investigate a larger scope. We measured
the number of compromised vehicles detected in 30 seconds and show the results in
Figure 71. As expected, the percentage undetected compromised vehicles decreases
when the percentage of compromised vehicles decreases.
VI.2.2

Filtering and Refining Location

In the simulation of filtering and refining location solutions, we assumed 1% of vehicles will send out compromised locations. They are malicious attackers who can
create a random bogus location. In our simulations, the malicious vehicles always
send false locations. The remaining 99% vehicles are honest regarding the location
information. All vehicles report what they detect or forward what they receive. The
observed locations have measurement errors which are normally distributed with
mean µ and deviation σ. Two vehicles are monitored. One is the target vehicle X
which is observed by its neighboring vehicles. Another is the observer vehicle which

The Percentage of undetected malicious vehicles
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FIG. 71: The number of undetected compromised vehicles as the percentage of compromised vehicles increases.

collects the location of X. The vehicle X announces its location and sends it to
the observer vehicle. X’s neighboring vehicles, receiving this announcement in 300
meters, will figure out the location of X using the received signal strength indicator
[119, 120]. The neighboring vehicles will send their measurements. The malicious
attackers will send their bogus location as well. The observer vehicle collects all
of these reports and treats them as input. The input was processed by MATLAB
R2009A where our algorithms were implemented. The initial simulation parameters
and values are listed in Table 7. The initial traffic density is 35 vehicles per Km
per lane. The road is a straight highway which is 3Km long. The average speed
of vehicles is 60 Km/h. The number of lanes is 4 per direction. The mean error
and the deviation of the reported locations are both 1m. The acceptable location
estimation error is 3m. The number of outliers is 4 for the neighboring vehicles and
1 for opposite vehicles. The weights of final location estimation in (59) are 0.5 for
w1 , 0.3 for w2 and 0.2 for w3 .
In our simulation results, a Q-Q plot (Quantile-Quantile Plot) [121] is applied to
show the Mahalanobis distance vs. the normal quantile. The Q-Q plot is a graphical
method for comparing two probability distributions. It is a commonly used tool in
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TABLE 7: General Integrity Case: Parameters and Values
Parameters
Values
Initial traffic density
30 vehicles/Km/lane
The length of the road L
3 Km
Average speed
60 km/h
The number of lanes
4/direction
The mean error µ
1m
The deviation of error σ
1m
Error 
3m
# of neighbor outliers mn
4
# of opposite outliers mo
1
The weight for radar w1
0.5
The weight for opposite w2
0.3
The weight for neighbors w3
0.2

statistics to show outliers. Quantiles are points taken at regular intervals from the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a random variable.
We were interested to show the Mahalanobis distance of reported locations from
neighboring vehicles and opposite vehicles. The samples from radar are not included
because samples from radar are detected by the vehicle itself which will not contaminate the location detection. In the simulation, each vehicle will report one location
of the observed vehicle to the observer vehicle. The observer vehicle will collect 990
location reports from normal vehicles and 10 location malicious reports (outliers)
from attackers. Figure 72 shows the Mahalanobis distance for neighboring samples.
The Mahalanobis distance computed from outliers are far away from the normal
samples. As expected, the Mahalanobis distance computed from malicious reports
can be identified and expelled from the normal data.
We were also interested in the final location estimation to validate the proposed method in this work.

On the basis of the previous simulation, we can

obtain the filtered location observations. These observations are resampled and
manipulated to obtain the location estimation by using bootstraping method discussed in Section IV.3.3. Figure 73 shows the plot of the location observations
and the location estimation.

We obtained the location estimation coordinates:

(−0.0041642037, −0.002087865). Compared to the real location (0, 0), the precisions
of x-y axis are about (0.416%, 0.2%).
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FIG. 72: Q-Q plot of the Mahalanobis distance for neighboring samples. Each point
represents one Mahalanobis distance computed from one sample. The rectangle
indicates all the outliers which are away from the other samples. The normal samples
are aligned to the straight line.
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VI.3

CONFIDENTIALITY SIMULATION

In this simulation, we simulated our D-GeoEncryption algorithm to enhance the
location confidentiality. Instead of using a straight highway, we simulated an urban
scenario which is generated by the SUMO simulator [122]. SUMO is an open source
and microscopic road traffic simulation package which is often used by transportation
researchers. The network simulator we used is ns-2 [123]. SUMO creates a trace file
which records the mobility of vehicles. We loaded the trace file into ns-2 to evaluate
the security techniques. The application used is Constant Bit Rate (CBR) with
128Kbps. The total number of vehicles is 320. The map is 3.2km x 3.2km. The
number of encryption-decryption peers is 20. The decryption region of vehicles is a
square of 100m x 100m. The simulation settings are shown in Table 8.
TABLE 8: The selected environment configuration
Name
Transmission range
Simulation map
Map area
Decryption area
Traffic density
Average speed
Acceleration range
Initial acceleration
Initial speed
Mobility model

Value
300m
Urban
3.2 × 3.2 Km2
100 × 100 m2
1500 vehicles/hour
28 m/s
[0,2] m/s2
0 m/s2
25 m/s
IDM [Treiber et al. (2000)]

Since our interest is in location-based security, we predicted a decryption region
based on the updated vehicle’s location. The vehicle’s decryption region is dynamically updated on the basis of the vehicle’s mobility. We recorded two events:
 Decryption failure, a message is not able to be decrypted.
 Decryption success, a message is successfully decrypted.

We compared our algorithm with Al-Fuqaha’s algorithm. Al-Fuqaha et al. [80]
extended the Denning’s GeoEncyption by predicting and updating the decryption
region along with mobile nodes. Al-Fuqaha’s algorithm still uses the table-based
GeoLock to convert a location to a secret key.
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In the GeoEncryption algorithm, a location is converted to a secret key for encryption and decryption. We are interested in the decryption ratio which is defined
as the number of successfully decrypted messages over the number of the received
messages. We varied the location error from 0 to 10%. We compared two sets of
results with a speed 24 m/s. The result of the comparison is shown in Figure 74.
As we expected, our proposed algorithm has a much higher decryption ratio than
Al-Fuqaha’s algorithm. This is because of the design of the D-GeoLock. In our al-

1
Yan
Al-Fuqaha

Decryption ratio

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0

2

4

6

8

10

Location error (%)

FIG. 74: Decryption ratio.
gorithm, the location is divided by the size of the decryption square and the integer
part is collected. Our algorithm can tolerate location errors. For example, a location
(04200, 91500) can produce a multiplexed outcome of 042915. The location with
measurement error (04299, 91599) can produce the same multiplexed outcome, as
shown in Figure 75. Even if two locations can end up with the same keys, the private
key of the receiver is needed to decrypt a message.
Relative mobility is one of the major challenges in the D-GeoEncryption algorithm. We wanted to know how much relative speed can affect the decryption ratio.
We recorded the communication of encryption-decryption peers and the speed of
each peer. We computed the relative speed by using the average speed of each peer.
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FIG. 75: Our GeoLock can tolerate location errors. Both cases with different locations obtain the same multiplexed outcome.

As expected, the decryption ratio of our algorithm is less affected by the relative
speed, as shown in Figure 76. We also noticed that the decryption ratio decreases
when the relative speed increases. This is because the interval of updating location
information between the encryption-decryption peers is 4t which is a fixed value.
The location change in the interval L = 4t ∗ vr where vr is the relative speed. Larger
relative speeds will cause larger location changes, which will cause smaller decryption
ratios.
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FIG. 76: Relative speed can affect the decryption ratio
Security is not free but has a cost. In the GeoEncyption algorithm, the decryption
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region will be predicted and updated. Vehicles have to exchange locations by sending
control messages. We investigated the number of control messages as overhead. The
control messages can be sent with a certain frequency. We varied the updating
intervals which are the inverse of the updating frequencies. The control message
ratio and the decryption error ratio are counted and computed for each interval. The
control message ratio is defined as the number of the control messages divided by
the total messages. The decryption error ratio is defined as the number of failed
decryptions divided by the number of received messages. As expected and as shown
in Figure 77, our algorithm outperformed Al-Fuqaha’s algorithm. The increment of
the updating intervals results in a lower updating frequency. The lower updating
frequencies will cause larger location errors which will result in larger decryption
errors. On the other hand, the lower updating frequencies can lead to a smaller
number of control messages. Interestingly, we can find a joint point between the
curve of the overhead results and the curve of the decryption error results, as shown
in Figure 77. The joint point shows the optimal updating interval which can lead to
a compromise for both the overhead and the decryption errors. Our algorithm has
an optimal updating interval of 1.6s while Al-Fuqaha’s algorithm has the value of
3.6s. Therefore, our algorithm can send fewer control message to achieve the same
decryption ratio as Al-Fuqaha’s algorithm.
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FIG. 77: Overhead of D-GeoEncryption.
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VI.4

SUMMARY

In this section, we explained in detail our simulation results. Our simulations include
location availability, location integrity and location confidentiality simulations. For
location availability, we were interested in the pdf of link duration, the duration of
links, and the impact of speed and acceleration to the link duration. We also examined the throughput and control overhead. Simulations showed that our location
availability is not only effective but also efficient. For location integrity, we were
interested in the detection time of attackers and the filtering of attackers. Simulations showed the location integrity mechanism can effectively validate the location
modification and detect attackers. In location confidentiality, we were interested in
the decryption ratio and the overhead of our algorithm. Simulations showed that our
D-GeoEncryption has high decryption ratio, high location error tolerance, and low
overhead.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter we summarize the motivation for this dissertation, the problems we
have addressed, and the solutions we have proposed. The work in this dissertation
also projects future research. We also list some future developments and extensions
to our work. The chapter is organized as follows: Section VII.1 addresses the summary and main conclusions of this dissertation. Section VII.2 analyzes the proposed
security techniques that can prevent most location attacks. The simulation results
are listed in Section VII.3. The contributions of this dissertation are listed in Section
VII.4. Future extensions and developments of this work are shown in Section VII.5.
VII.1

SUMMARY

Vehicles installed with advanced devices can communicate with each other and create wireless networks, called VANETs. The applications developed for this network
will bring a revolution to our driving experience. The applications of VANET include safety and entertainment applications. Most, if not all, of these applications
are location-aware and strongly depend on location information. Compared with
other networks, such as MANETs, the Internet, and cellular networks, VANETs
have unique and distinctive features:
 large scale of node mobility,
 large scale of node population,
 physical limitation of node mobility by roadways,
 short wireless communication range.

In this dissertation, we are protecting a tuple, correct time, correct identity, correct location, although we simply call it location information. We initially show that
location security is of fundamental importance to VANET applications. Based on
information security requirements, we have to ensure location information confidentiality, integrity and availability. The following attacks can harm location security:
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 Dropping messages will break the routing path. This kind of attack will block

location availability. Without location availability, you cannot get location
information when you need it most.
 Modifying the content of location information. This damages location integrity.
 Replaying information. This is an attack that sends outdated messages to

pretend that the previously past vehicles still exist. This attack violates location
integrity.
 Injecting location messages with fabricated locations and IDs. A Sybil attack

is an attack that send bogus identities with location information to create an
illusion that traffic is jammed. This attack damages location integrity.
 Eavesdropping on messages and then decrypting it to access location informa-

tion. This kind of attack will expose location information to people who have
not been authorized. This breaks location confidentiality.
Previous research can only protect part of the three requirements. For example,
PKI is used to encrypt VANET information such as locations to protect location confidentiality. The digital signatures of messages are used to protect location integrity.
But both PKI-based and digital-signature-based methods cannot improve location
availability which is the fundamental requirement of location security. In addition,
PKI encryption and digital signature processing usually come with expensive processing time, for example PKI encryption time is three times more computationally
expensive than symmetric encryption e.g. DES3. Other security methods such as
signal-based methods [71, 72] and resource-based methods [73, 20] can only validate
location integrity without providing location confidentiality and availability. The
methods in the literature have a common drawback in that none of them can provide
an ultimate and comprehensive location security solution.
Therefore, the research in this dissertation addresses location information security
by providing location information confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The presentation of the research is organized into location confidentiality, location integrity,
and location availability on the basis of the information security CIA model.
Location information needs to be propagated to other vehicles for both safety and
comfort applications. Due to the high mobility of vehicles, the wireless connections
among vehicles are not stable. Location information routing is inherently unreliable.
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Therefore location availability will be harmed. We improve location availability by
proposing a reliable routing scheme which is on the basis of the link duration model.
In the link duration model, we assume that the inter-car headway distance (i.e., the
instantaneous gap between consecutive vehicles) obeys a log-normal distribution. Using this assumption and a classic radio propagation model, we derive the probability
and the mean duration of a link.
A reliable routing path is selected on the basis of the link duration model. The
source vehicle broadcasts a probing request Prb on the wireless channel. All vehicles in the transmission range receive the request and compute the distance from
the sender, the duration of the link, and the probability of the existence of the link.
An acknowledgment packet AckP will be constructed that contains the computed
distance, duration, and probability of the link. The AckP is sent back to the sender
who will collect multiple AckP s and select the best link i.e., the one with the highest
probability and whose expected duration matches the routing path duration requirement EDur. The sender then sends a confirmation packet CfmP to the next hop
on the best link. This node will further explore the routing path by broadcasting
the Prb. When the destination node receives the Prb, it will terminate the probing
process and will send an AckP back to the source vehicle along the newly formed
routing path. This completes the routing path exploration stage.
The basic idea of maintaining a routing path is to repair those links that are
expected to break soon. The expiring links can be predicted using the link duration
estimation. These links can be locally repaired by replacing them with new links
formed by neighboring vehicles or globally reconstructed using the path discovery
protocol discussed above. For a local repair, the destination vehicle initiates the
process by sending a routing break packet RBRK at the expected expiration time of
the routing path (i.e., the minimum duration of the links). Vehicles which comprise
the weakest link replace it with more reliable links. A global repair is similar to
finding an entirely new routing path.
In our location integrity model, we began by presenting our first contribution, an
active location integrity mechanism. This is motivated by the need to provide secure
topology information in VANET and to build a secure network for applications.
Underlying our solution is the well-known adage: “Seeing is believing”. We assume
vehicles are equipped with GPS, an on-board radar device, a computer and a wireless
transceiver. In our scheme, the on-board radar acts as a virtual eye of the vehicle,
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while the wireless transceiver acts as a virtual ear of the vehicle. Although the
eyesight is rather limited due to the modest radar transmission range, a vehicle can
see the surrounding vehicles and hear reports of their GPS coordinates. We expect the
on-board radar device to provide useful corroboration of alleged location information,
except for during short transient periods. For example, the line-of-sight that radar
needs may be temporarily obstructed by a large truck. Due to the dynamic nature
of traffic, even if there are transient obstructions, the line of sight will eventually be
restored.
To overcome the inherent range limitations of radar and the wireless transceiver,
we build network cells as basic security and communication units. The cells are sized
such that each vehicle can directly communicate with all other vehicles in its own
cell. To achieve intra-cell security, a vehicle may use its radar to verify the alleged
position of neighboring vehicles in its own cell. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
each vehicle knows, with high certainty, the position of the other vehicles in its own
cell. At the same time, since many applications require position information beyond
the current cell boundary, we propose a method for inter-cell position information
integrity. In our scheme, when a vehicle receives an aggregated message which alleges
the position of a remote vehicle, it can randomly challenge the position of a vehicle
in a remote cell. The challenging vehicle uses the on-board radar of remote vehicles
or enlists the help of vehicles in the oncoming traffic. When radar is not available,
vehicles can rely on reports from oncoming traffic or trusted neighbors.
We propose a method to validate position information in scenarios where an onboard radar device is not available or its use is hampered by various traffic/weather
conditions. Specifically, we propose a passive location integrity solution. We forgo the
requirement of an on-board radar device but assume the presence of on-board GPS
and transceiver. Vehicles collect location information from neighbors and oncoming
vehicles. After validating and filtering out false or inaccurate locations using a data
fusion algorithm, vehicles store the validated locations into memory to create a trackrecord (called a Map History) of the mobility of other vehicles. Based on the Map
History, position prediction can be used to validate the announced positions. The
data fusion algorithm achieves intra-cell location integrity by counting the number
of location reports and abandoning reports that highly deviate from the majority of
reports. For inter-cell location integrity, we apply the intra-cell position validation
method in the cell that includes the announced position.
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As VANET technology will be deployed incrementally, not all vehicles will have
on-board radar, GPS, and a transceiver. Some vehicles will have all three, some
will have only GPS and a transceiver, while others will have none of the devices.
Mindful of this, we propose a validation system that works in this scenario. Vehicles
will create a Map History table using radar-validated locations, oncoming traffic
detected positions, and neighbor location information to achieve location integrity.
Each type of data is given a weight, and we apply data fusion algorithms to filter
out spurious location information.
To ensure inter-cell location integrity, the aggregated position information of several vehicles is transmitted over the wireless medium which is open to the public. If
the aggregated message is in plaintext, it is vulnerable to an assortment of attacks.
One simple solution is to encrypt the plaintext message by using conventional cryptography (e.g., using symmetric or asymmetric keys). However, key management is
a very challenging task given the huge number of participating vehicles. In addition,
attackers can crack conventional cryptography by employing several well-known techniques. To provide location confidentiality, we propose a geographic location-based
security mechanism to provide physical security on top of conventional methods.
Messages are encrypted with a geographic location key that specifies a decryption
region. This provides physical security because a vehicle has to be physically present
in the decryption region in order to decrypt ciphertext encrypted with this geographic
location key. This physical security needs to encrypt messages with a secret key which
is converted from geographic location information. We design a new conversion algorithm that can compute the secret key from the geographic location information.
VII.2

SECURITY ANALYSIS

The methods proposed in this dissertation can prevent most position attacks in
VANETs. We now show how each type of attack is addressed by our scheme:
 Fabrication attacks: the location integrity module has three schemes to fil-

ter out fabricated location information (active, passive and general location
integrity).
 Alteration attacks: the location confidentiality module can prevent location

information from being modified by unauthorized vehicles.
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 Packet dropping: the location availability module can overcome malicious

packet dropping and establish a reliable routing path that avoids intentional
packet dropping.
 Replaying: the location integrity module can validate the correctness of location

information at the specified time and vehicle ID.
VII.3

SIMULATION RESULTS

There are two mobility simulators that we used in our simulations, SUMO [122]
for urban scenarios and a tailored Java simulation engine [98] for highways. Our
network simulator is NS-2.30 [123]. The mobility simulators generate a trace file
which records the mobility of each vehicle. This trace file is imported into NS-2 to
control the movement of each vehicle. We summarize our findings in the following
points:
1. Relative velocity plays a vital role in link duration. Positive relative velocity
will dramatically decrease the link duration. It is possible to reach infinite link
duration if two vehicles are traveling in the same direction and with a consistent
zero relative speed.
2. Relative acceleration also plays an important role in link duration. Positive
relative acceleration will dramatically decrease the link duration.
3. Our link duration model and link probability model are verified by simulation.
The formula of link duration is based on the mobility of two vehicles. The
relationship of the mobility parameters has been examined and verified. The
pdf of link duration is proven to be a log-normal distribution.
4. Our location availability routing protocol, developed on the basis of our link
duration model, has more than 80% longer path durations than DSR and more
than 40% long path durations than ROMSGP. The overhead of our method
is only 1/3 of ROMSGP and 1/50 of DSR. The throughput of our method is
more than 25% higher than ROMSGP and about 50% higher than DSR.
5. For location integrity, the cell-based network is more efficient than the flooding
network. The cell-based network needs about 50% less time to detect attacks.
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6. The data fusion mechanism proposed in this dissertation performed correctly
and filtered 100% of wrong location information.
7. Our D-GeoLock algorithm can tolerate larger location errors than the original
GeoLock algorithm. The geographic location-based encryption stated in our
dissertation has about 70% higher decryption ratio than AlFuqaha’s method.
8. Our D-Geoencryption algorithm has lower control overhead than the original
Geoencryption algorithm.
VII.4

CONTRIBUTIONS

Our motivation in this dissertation was to provide location security in terms of location confidentiality, integrity and availability. The main contribution is the first
comprehensive solution to enhance location security. We provide location confidentiality, integrity and availability. Specifically, in location availability, we discover that
the link duration distribution of VANETs has a log-normal distribution which was
often assumed in MANETs to be exponential. On the basis of this discovery, we
proposed a reliable routing protocol to improve location availability. Our protocol
can reduce control overhead and reduce response time. In location confidentiality, a
dynamic GeoLock (D-GeoLock) algorithm is proposed. D-GeoLock can dynamically
convert a geographic location into a secret key without checking location mapping
tables. Compared to the original GeoLock, D-GeoLock can tolerate larger location
errors. On the basis of D-GeoLock, D-GeoEncryption algorithm is addressed, which
can specify a decryption region where messages can be decrypted. In location integrity, we are the first to propose active location integrity using on-board radar, and
we address a real world location integrity solution.
VII.5

FUTURE WORK

Preliminary work on the location information security was completed as part of this
research. The need for efficient implementation has never been greater than now. As
part of our future work, we plan to continue to improve the current implementation,
develop new methods and conduct scalability studies under different traffic situations.
We present possible future work in this section.
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VII.5.1

Location Availability

In our current work, we analyzed vehicular mobility to obtain a link duration model
and a link probability model. This model works on a highway scenario because most
of the vehicles are traveling in the same direction and are constrained by the roadway.
Although our proposed link duration model and link probability model can work in
an urban/city scenario, we would have to frequently update the mobility information
of vehicles so that they could be aware of the status of neighbors. This will cause
certain overhead of control messages. In the future work of location availability, we
can include digital maps to know the road type such as “T” type of intersections,
“Y” type of intersections, “+” type of intersections, etc. Once we know the road
type, we can know when we need to collect the status of neighboring vehicles.
VII.5.2

Location Integrity

We introduced radar as the “virtual eye” of vehicles because some new models of
vehicles have radar installed for cruise control. Actually, there are some other devices
that have been installed in cars, such as camera, infrared detector, etc. These devices
can serve as eye devices of cars as well. Local location integrity can be achieved using
these devices. For example, a car-mounted camera can be used to detect and predict
vehicle accidents. The algorithm for predicting accidents includes location prediction
as well. We can incorporate the location prediction algorithm for cameras into our
location integrity in future work.
For passive location integrity, we can use different statistical methods to filter the
incorrect location information and refine low-resolution location information to highresolution location information. For example, we can apply Bayesian Probability to
compute the confidence probability of location information on the basis of certain
events such as changing lanes. With the probability of location information, we can
fine-tune location detection.
The scenarios of sparse traffic can change the communication of VANETs. Figure
78 shows gaps between clusters of vehicles when the traffic is sparse. The election
of the cell routers and leaders will take a long time. In this type of scenario, the
cell routers and the cell leaders are not applicable for VANETs. Cells discussed in
IV are not applicable any more as well. The different communication styles require
different location integrity solutions. New solutions that can work in sparse traffic
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are the future focus work to improve location integrity.

FIG. 78: Gaps created when the traffic is sparse.

VII.5.3

Location Confidentiality

As future work, we can integrate the D-GeoEncryption method into existing security
methods. Different applications will need different levels of security. For example, an
expensive-cargo-tracking application may need high security of location. A medical
assistant application may need high security as well. PKI-based location confidentiality can be applied. Many roadside location eavesdropping attacks may be defeated
by a simple XOR encryption. Safety-related applications, such as traffic condition
alert, forward/rear collision warning, and pedestrian crossing alert, do not need any
encryption. Therefore, we can implement different levels of location confidentiality
for different applications.
In our current design of location confidentiality, the decryption region is squareshaped. As future work, the shape of the decryption region can be generalized to
any shape. One idea to do this is to partition an irregular shape into a set of
regular shapes. For each obtained regular shape, we can apply the GeoEncryption
algorithm. Then we can merge the subtasks of location confidentiality to obtain the
whole location confidentiality.
Vehicles in traffic often form clusters or groups as illustrated in Figure 78. The
D-GeoEncryption algorithm can be extended in this scenario. A group of vehicles
can share a secret key to encrypt and decrypt messages. The advantage of this idea
includes:
 providing efficient key management. One group key can serve all the members

in a group.
 reducing control message overhead. The groups will be the communication

unit. The number of players is reduced and fewer control messages are sent.
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Another future work topic is the new algorithm of GeoLock. For example, time
and velocity can be included in the new GeoLock algorithm. In the battle field
application, we can provide more strict location security. If vehicles are moving at
or above a certain speed and before a certain time, they are allowed to decrypt the
received messages. Otherwise, they are not allowed to decrypt the messages.
VII.5.4

Miscellaneous Issues

We now briefly list other possible future work:
 Cross-layer research on location information security. For example, we can

detect the location of vehicles by computing the wireless signal strength at the
physical layer, conduct location data fusion at the network layer, and we can
encrypt location messages based on geo-encryption algorithm at the application
layer.
 Infrastructure-based location security. By using infrastructure, we can obtain

accurate and reliable location information about the whole topology of network.
 Extensively simulate the proposed methods to evaluate the performance. For

example, we can collect real traffic data using cameras and retrieve location
information to obtain location information. The obtained location information
can serve as our input of mobility of vehicles. We can simulate our ideas on
the basis of real traffic.
 Conduct scalability research in different traffic situations by real or close-to-real

traffic data to study the impact on performance from different schemes.
 Integrate with other research such as privacy protection. In this dissertation, we

only discuss location security without touching privacy protection. But privacy
protection is as important as location security because location is one piece of
the privacy information of passengers. The basic idea of privacy protection
is pseudonymization which will give vehicles a temporary pseudonym with a
certain expiration time.
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APPENDIX A
PROBABILITY MODEL APPENDIX
A.1

FITTING THE PDF OF HEADWAY

To fit the simulation result and pdf curve by lognormal distribution, we define a
general form of the lognormal distribution.
f (x, µ, σ, a, b, c) =

(ln(cx−a)−µ)2
b
2σ 2
√ e−
(cx − a)σ 2π

(68)

where x > 0. Since we have five unknown parameters, we establish five equations to
solve them. Equation one is given by the mean headway. We obtain the mean from
the general form of lognormal distribution.
Z

∞

(ln(cx−a)−µ)2
b
2σ 2
√ e−
dx
(cx − a)σ 2π
0
Z
(ln(cx−a)−µ)2
1 ∞ (cx − a)b
2σ 2
√ e−
=
dx
c 0 (cx − a)σ 2π
Z
(ln(cx−a)−µ)2
1 ∞
ab
2σ 2
√ e−
+
dx
c 0 (cx − a)σ 2π
ab
b
2
= 2 eµ+σ /2 + 2
c
c

E(x, µ, σ, a, b, c) =

x

(69)

The parameters we applied to simulations are the following:
 The traffic density: 2800 vehicle/hour
 Maximum speed: 60 km/h
 Minimum speed: 20 km/h
 Road: highway
 # of lanes: 2

Total 48257 headway readings are collected. Table 9 shows the simulation results:
headway in meters and its frequency. We select four other headways and the probability according to the four points, i.e. (x=8.0, p=0.0100), (x=19.0, p=0.0442),
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(x=33.0, p=0.0241), (x=47.0, p=0.0098). Thereafter, five equations are created.


36.0900 =






0.0100 =



0.0442 =





0.0241 =




 0.0098 =

b µ+σ 2 /2
e
c2

+

ab
c2
(ln(8.0·c−a)−µ)2
−
2

b √
e
(8.0·c−a)σ 2π

2σ

b √
e−
(19.0·c−a)σ 2π

(ln(19.0·c−a)−µ)2
2σ 2

(70)

(ln(33.0·c−a)−µ)2
−
2σ 2

b √
e
(33.0·c−a)σ 2π

b √
e−
(47.0·c−a)σ 2π

(ln(47.0·c−a)−µ)2
2σ 2

The base 10 logarithm is taken for all the five equations for the sake of programming. With the aid of computer, we can numerically solve the solution of
µ = 2.95, σ = 0.55, a = 2.93, b = 1, c = 0.80. Different selections of the headway and
its frequency might reach to different value of these parameters but they are close to
the one we calculated. Therefore, the lognormal form of headway is
f (x) =

(ln(0.80x−2.93)−2.95)2
1
2∗0.552
√ e−
(0.80x − 2.93)0.55 2π

(71)

Similarly, a general form of the normal distribution is defined as
(cx−a−µ)2
b
N (x, µ, σ, a, b, c) = √ e− 2σ2
σ 2π

(72)

We obtained σ = 9.51, µ = 0.085, a = 8.55, b = 1.01, c = 0.53 after selecting five
points and solving five equations.
A general form of the exponential distribution is defined as
Expo(x, λ, a, b, c) = bλe−λ(cx−a) .

(73)

We obtained λ = 2.01, a = 1.05, b = 0.01, c = 0.03 after selecting four points and
solving four equations.
A general form of the gamma distribution is defined as
Γ(x, θ, k, a, b, c) = b(cx − a)k−1

e−(cx−a)/θ
.
θk Γ(k)

(74)

We obtained θ = 4.01, k = 6.085, a = 1.05, b = 1.01, c = 1.03 after selecting five
points and solving five equations.
The comparison of these fitting curves are shown in Figure 13. It is clear that
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the log-normal distribution fits the simulation results better than other distributions. Although the gamma distribution has a similar bell-shape curve, the gamma
distribution does not match the simulation results except at several points.

H
5.0
8.0
11.0
14.0
17.0
20.0
23.0
26.0
29.0
32.0
35.0
38.0
41.0
44.0
47.0
50.0
53.0
56.0
59.0
62.0

TABLE 9: Simulation Headway Values (H) and Frequencies (Pr)
Pr
H
Pr
H
Pr
0.0010 6.0
0.0028 7.0
0.0059
0.0100 9.0
0.0148 10.0 0.0201
0.0253 12.0 0.0296 13.0 0.0340
0.0377 15.0 0.0396 16.0 0.0412
0.0432 18.0 0.0431 19.0 0.0442
0.0441 21.0 0.0426 22.0 0.0414
0.0411 24.0 0.0399 25.0 0.0376
0.0358 27.0 0.0342 28.0 0.0325
0.0312 30.0 0.0297 31.0 0.0275
0.0266 33.0 0.0241 34.0 0.0236
0.0222 36.0 0.0201 37.0 0.0189
0.0179 39.0 0.0167 40.0 0.0156
0.0145 42.0 0.0138 43.0 0.0130
0.0122 45.0 0.0114 46.0 0.0105
0.0098 48.0 0.0091 49.0 0.0085
0.0081 51.0 0.0074 52.0 0.0069
0.0066 54.0 0.0061 55.0 0.0057
0.0053 57.0 0.0050 58.0 0.0046
0.0043 60.0 0.0041 61.0 0.0038
0.0035 63.0 0.0033 64.0 0.0031
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A.2

LINK DURATION CASES

A.2.1

The Same Direction Cases

Case a
In this case, only tβ and tε exist, as shown in Figure 20.a. We can obtain the link
duration time t.
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√ ar


−vr − vr2 −2ar (300+X)



aq

r

v −v


−(v
−v
)−
(vj −vm )2 −2aj (300+X+ m2 i tε )
m
j



aj

vj

vm −vi

300+x+
t
+
t
ε
β

2
2
√ 2vm
t=
−vr − vr −2ar (300+X)




√ ar


−vr + vr2 +2ar (300−X)



aq
r


vm −v


−(v
−v
)−
(vi −vm )2 −2aj (300−X+ 2 j tε )
m
i



ai

vm −v

v

 300−X+ 2 j tε + 2i tβ
vm

, {ai > 0 > aj ; vj > vi > 0; 0 ≤ t ≤ tα }
, {ai > 0 > aj ; vj > vi > 0; tα < t ≤ tε }
, {ai > 0 > aj ; vj > vi > 0; tε < t < tβ }
, {ai > 0 > aj ; vj > vi > 0; tβ < t}
, {aj > 0 > ai ; vi > vj > 0; 0 ≤ t ≤ tα }
, {aj > 0 > ai ; vi > vj > 0; tα < t ≤ tε }
, {aj > 0 > ai ; vi > vj > 0; tε < t ≤ tβ }
, {aj > 0 > ai ; vi > vj > 0; tβ < t}

Case b
In this case, the difference from case a in Figure 20.b is the order of tβ and tε . We
can obtain the link duration time t.
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, {aj > 0 > ai ; vi > vj > 0; tβ < t ≤ tε }
, {aj > 0 > ai ; vi > vj > 0; tε < t}
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Case c
In this case, the difference from case b in Figure 20.c is the intersection of two velocity
curves. We can obtain the link duration time t.
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Case d
In this case, the difference from case c in Figure 20.d is the order of tβ and tε . We
can obtain the link duration time t.
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Case e
In this case, the difference from case b in Figure 20.e is that both acceleration are
positive. We can obtain the link duration time t.

t=
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Case f
In this case, the difference from case e in Figure 20.f is the intersection of two velocity
curves. We can obtain the link duration time t.
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A.2.2

The Oncoming Direction Cases

case a
As shown in Figure 21.a, we can obtain the link duration in this case.
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case b
In this case, the difference from case a in Figure 21.b is the order of tβ and tε . We
can obtain the link duration time t.
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case c
In this case, the difference from case a in Figure 21.c is the directions of two velocity.
We can obtain the link duration time t.
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case d
In this case, the difference from case c in Figure 21.d is the order of tβ and tε . We
can obtain the link duration time t.
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case e
In this case, the difference from case d in Figure 21.e is the accelerations of two
vehicles. We can obtain the link duration time t.
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case f
In this case, the difference from case e in Figure 21.f is on which direction vehicles
reach speed limit first. We can obtain the link duration time t.
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The Decelerating Cases

Case a
As shown in Figure 22.a, both vehicles are decelerating and we can obtain the link
duration time t.
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Case b
In this case, the difference from case a in Figure 22.b is the intersection of the two
velocity curves. We can obtain the link duration time t.
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, {0 ≤ t ≤ tβ ; vi > vj > 0; aj 6= ai < 0}
, {0 ≤ t ≤ tβ ; vi > vj > 0; aj = ai <= 0}
, {tβ < t; vi > vj > 0; aj , ai < 0}
, {tβ < t; vi > vj > 0; aj <= 0; ai = 0}

Case c
In this case, the difference from case a in Figure 22.c is the direction of the two
velocity of the two vehicles. We can obtain the link duration time t.
√

−vr + vr2 +2ar (300−X)



ar




+∞


√


 −vj + vj2 +2aj (300−X+Si (tβ ))
aj
√
t=
−vr − vr2 −2ar (300+X)




√ ar


−vi + vi2 +2ai (300+X+Sj (tβ ))



ai



+∞

, {0 ≤ t ≤ tβ ; vj > 0 > vi ; ai > 0 > aj }
, {tγ < t; }
, {tβ < t ≤ tγ ; vj > 0 > vi ; ai > 0 > aj }
, {0 ≤ t ≤ tβ ; vi > 0 > vj ; aj > 0 > ai }
, {tβ < t ≤ tγ ; vi > 0 > vj ; aj > 0 > ai }
, {tγ < t; }
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Case d
In this case, the difference from case a in Figure 22.d is the direction of the two
velocity of the two vehicles. We can obtain the link duration time t.
√

−vr + vr2 +2ar (300−X)



ar




+∞


√


 −vi − vi2 −2ai (300−X−Sj (tβ ))
ai
√
t=
−vr − vr2 −2ar (300+X)




√ ar


−vj − vj2 −2aj (300+X−Si (tβ ))



aj



+∞

, {0 ≤ t ≤ tβ ; vj > 0 > vi ; ai > 0 > aj }
, {tγ < t; }
, {tβ < t ≤ tγ ; vj > 0 > vi ; ai > 0 > aj }
, {0 ≤ t ≤ tβ ; vi > 0 > vj ; aj > 0 > ai }
, {tβ < t ≤ tγ ; vi > 0 > vj ; aj > 0 > ai }
, {tγ < t; }
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